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Abstract 
This thesis argues that the law of Equity is a means to complete justice for stakeholders 
of capitalism with a desire for and need to believe in the certainty and perfectibility of the 
symbolic of capitalist reason and logic.  By applying a Marxist Freudian reading I claim 
that stakeholder desire for and insistence on certainty and perfectibility within contexts 
of Anglo-American, Western, capitalist civil justice is both characteristic of subjugation to 
the reason and logic of capital, and symptomatic of the power of the unconscious and of 
fantasy on subjectivity within capitalism.  Starting with an account of the Tudor jurist, 
statesman and Lord Chancellor Thomas More in the sixteenth-century, this thesis 
explores the long durée of Equity and civil justice, including analyses of the role a neurotic 
legal community has in defining conscience, discretion and flexibility within the 
principles, substance and procedures of civil justice upon which the stakeholder relies.  
Equity, therefore, provides a means for stakeholder’s to express their desire for what is 
missing, what they lack, in the symbolic, and the response to this desire is, I claim, the 
construction of an elaborate fantasy: Equity fetishism.  As a theory of civil justice 
predicated on a conjunction of law, political economy and psychology, Equity fetishism 
explains Equity, as a body of jurisprudence, form of private law reasoning, and mode of 
adjudication, within domains of capitalist civil justice as being determined by fantasy and 
desire as it is defined by the normative discourses and processes of case-law, legislation 
and civil justice reform.  As a structure in fantasy within civil justice Equity fetishism 
works in and through institutions such as private property and trusts in order to maintain 
stakeholder belief in the limitless possibilities of capital accumulation, which in turn 
maintains stakeholder disavowal of the realities of castration, subjective longing, loss, 
and limitation in the symbolic.   
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Finally, this thesis aims to demonstrate that Equity fetishism is a vital consideration for 
critical and mainstream legal scholarship, as both a complementary and countervailing 
legal theory and discourse that is able to contribute to practical and theoretical legal 
thinking and education.  Specifically, I argue, Equity fetishism accounts for and explains 
the influence of the vagaries of subjective psychic life on the development of institutions, 
concepts and practices in Equity and civil justice and, in particular, how these parallel and 
occur in harmony and agreement with capitalism.   
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Introduction 
1. The Thesis 
This thesis analyses characteristics of the law of Equity (hereafter ‘Equity’) within 
Western (Anglo-American) Common Law, capitalist and neoliberal capitalist civil justice 
systems by means of a Marxist Freudian reading of fetishism.  Equity and civil justice are 
understood here as juridical institutions, concepts, and practices within neoliberal 
capitalism in the contemporary setting, and therefore products of inter alia the fusion of 
law and economics fermented in Western Common Law jurisdictions, as well as subject 
to more generalized notions of competition, free-market efficiency standards, and legal 
utilitarianism that neoliberalism promotes1.  What Man Yip and James Lee refer to as the 
‘commercial pragmatism of simplifying legal standards for commercial actors, as well as 
wider commercial concerns’ underlying contemporary judicial reasoning that places 
equitable principles in ‘jeopardy’, this thesis interprets as symptomatic of the effect on 
law and procedures of civil justice wrought by neoliberal capitalism2.   
                                                        
1 On the characteristics of neoliberal capitalism highlighted here and more generally with regard to its 
impact upon law and legal systems in Western Common Law jurisdictions, see: Jeanne Lorraine 
Schroeder. 2004. The Triumph of Venus: The Erotics of the Market. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
p.14 – ‘the legal utilitarian […] views all human relations in terms of individual self-interest’; David 
Harvey. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.181 – ‘To live under 
neoliberalism also means to accept or submit to that bundle of rights necessary for capital accumulation.  
We live, therefore in a society in which the inalienable rights of individuals to private property, and the 
profit rate trump any other conception of inalienable rights you can think of’;  Jodie Dean. 2009. 
Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics. Durham: Duke 
University Press, p.132 – ‘the emergence of a new legal regime that strengthens the power and reach of 
the state by securing and protecting corporate, financial, and market interests’; Jodie Dean. 2012. The 
Communist Horizon. London: Verso, pp.122-123 – ‘neoliberalism designates a particular strategy of class 
domination that uses the state to promote certain competitive dynamics for the benefit of the very rich.  
[P]ursued through policies of privatization, deregulation, and financialization, and buttressed by an 
ideology of private property, free markets, and free trade’; Wendy Brown. 2015. Undoing the Demos: 
Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. New York: Zone Books, p.151-152 – ‘More than simply securing the 
rights of capital and structuring competition, neoliberal juridical reason recasts political rights, 
citizenship, and the field of democracy itself in an economic register’. William Davies. 2017. The Limits of 
Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of Competition. London: Sage, pp.86-89.    
2 Man Yip and James Lee. 2017. The Commercialisation of Equity. Legal Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4, p.648.   
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As juridical institutions, concepts, and practices within capitalism in its broader historical 
setting, Equity and civil justice and have long helped to define what Max Weber called, 
‘the rational structure of the law’3.  Capitalism and capitalist interests, Weber claims, 
‘undoubtedly smoothed the path for the legal profession [Juristenstandes], with its 
specialist training in rational law, to dominate the administration of justice and other 
forms of administration’4.  Chancery practitioners for instance, have long contributed to 
the capitalist legal system and profession that Weber highlights, I argue, through their 
evolution of a jurisprudence (rules, principles and doctrines) tailored towards 
maintaining exclusive and exclusionary regimes of private property, corporate and 
commercial interests, and institutions such as trusts that are valued as core interventions 
within ‘modern rational’ capitalism for the management of wealth and assets5.   
As pillars of capitalism, private property and the safeguarding of private property rights 
and interests as a means of, among others things, developing financial capital, have 
ultimately benefited and guaranteed the success of a limited number of capitalist 
                                                        
3 Max Weber. 2002. The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism and Other Writings. Edited and 
Translated by Peter Baehr. London: Penguin, p.365 
4 Weber, 2002, p.365 
5 Weber, 2002, p.365; Geoffrey M. Hodgson. 2015. Conceptualizing Capitalism: Institutions, Evolution, 
Future. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p.116 – ‘capitalism is a system with contract at its center’.  
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stakeholders6.  Equally private property has made capitalism the principal mode of 
bourgeois socioeconomic desire, aspiration and organization in Western Common Law 
jurisdictions, not least, as Marx and Engels claim, due to a ‘juridical illusion’ of reducing 
law to the private will that underscores the selfish nature of much civil justice litigation7.  
Within capitalism, argues Nikolas Rose, individuals ‘are forced into a profound 
inwardness, and cling for comfort to a belief in their own uniqueness, in the process 
                                                        
6 Inequality, as a description of capitalism’s limited benefit, is not a theme that will be explicitly or 
specifically discussed during this thesis.  It is nevertheless a powerful undercurrent to the critique as a 
whole, as left-critique, and encompasses a number of the concepts and ideas that are directly relevant to 
the nature of Equity and civil justice under discussion here, including how civil justice reaches and 
enforces determinations of what is just and fair.  Therefore, some indication of how inequality is 
understood here is necessary.  Ardent advocates of capitalism still recognise its ability to produce 
inequality.  In contradistinction to centrist and left socialist and communist critique, however, this right-
wing libertarian view tends to understand and explain inequality as a necessary function of capitalism 
that still leads to a wider and general benefit: Joseph A. Schumpeter. 2010. Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy. London: Routledge, pp.377-379 – ‘no social system can work which is based exclusively upon 
a network of free contracts between (legally) equal contracting parties and in which everyone is 
supposed to be guided by nothing except his own (short-run) utilitarian ends […] Capitalism means a 
scheme of values, an attitude toward life, a civilization – the civilization of inequality’; as a victory for 
bourgeois capitalists over the inequality they suffered at the hands of feudal lords and the aristocracy: 
Ludwig Von Mises. 2009. The Anti-Capitalist Mentality. Mansfield Centre: Martino Publishing, pp.6-7 – ‘the 
preservation of these feudal intuitions was incompatible with the system of capitalism.  Their abolition 
and the establishment of the principle of equality under the law removed the barriers that prevented 
mankind from enjoying all those benefits which the system of private ownership of the means of 
production and private enterprise makes possible’; or a liberal requirement in order to resist the 
incursion of government on private interests: Milton Friedman. 2002. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, p.176 – ‘Much of the actual inequality derives from imperfections of the 
market.  Many of these have themselves been created by government action or could be removed by 
government action.  There is every reason to adjust the rules of the game so as to eliminate these sources 
of inequality’.  More centrist and centre-left responses recognise the failure of capitalism, but not 
irredeemably so: Angus Deaton. 2013. The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.327 – ‘Economic growth is the engine of the escape from poverty 
and material deprivation.  Yet growth is faltering in the rich world.  Growth in each recent decade has 
been lower than in the previous one.  Almost everywhere, the faltering of growth has come with 
expansions of inequality’; Thomas Piketty. 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Translated by Arthur 
Goldhammer. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p.20 – ‘the resurgence of 
inequality after 1980 is due largely to the political shifts of the past several decades, especially in regard 
to taxation and finance.  The history of inequality is shaped by the way economic, social, and political 
actors view what is just and what is not, as well as by the relative power of those actors and the collective 
choices that result; Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2013. The Price of Inequality. London: Penguin, p.4 – ‘Countries 
around the world provide frightening examples of what happens to societies when they reach the level of 
inequality toward which we are moving.  It is not a pretty picture: countries where rich live in gated 
communities, waited upon by hordes of low-income workers; unstable political systems where populists 
promise the masses a better life, only to disappoint.  Perhaps most importantly, there is an absence of 
hope.  In these countries, the poor know that their prospects of emerging from poverty, let alone making 
it to the top, are minuscule.  This is not something we should be striving for’.          
7 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. 1970. The German Ideology. Edited by C.J. Arthur. London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, p.81; J.A. Jolowicz. 1983. General Ideas and the Reform of Civil Procedure. Legal Studies, Vol. 3, 
Issue 3 (November), p.298 
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elaborating a complex inner world of self’8.  As a consequence Rose concludes, ‘the 
fundamental dialectic of modern society – maximum individualization and maximum 
‘freedom’ is developed only at the price of maximum fragmentation, maximum 
uncertainty, maximum estrangement of individual from fellow individual’9.  Certainty and 
coherence in the substance and procedure of civil justice becomes a necessary 
counterweight to the realities of existence within capitalism, therefore, and tempered by 
a flexibility and responsiveness that allows rules to bend to novel social and economic 
demands, this mode of existence is made enjoyable and desirable to stakeholders 
generally, and in their business and commercial activities, and Equity has over time 
within capitalism aimed to provide these things10.    
                                                        
8 Nikolas Rose. 1999. Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p.66 
9 Rose, 1999, p.66 
10 The flexibility that Equity brings to Common Law and civil justice substance and procedure, in 
particular, will be discussed at a number of points throughout this thesis, and is considered especially 
vital to understanding the role of Equity within neoliberal capitalism, which will be discussed in the final 
chapters.  As an expression of the type of flexibility and responsiveness suggested, however, see, for 
example: Lord Cottenham L.C. in Taylor v. Salmon (1838) 4 My. & Cr. 134 at 14 – ‘I have before taken 
occasion to observe that I thought it the duty of this court to adapt its practice and course of proceeding 
as far as possible to the existing state of society, and to apply its jurisdiction to all those new cases which, 
from the progress daily making in the affairs of men, must continually arise, and not, from too strict an 
adherence to forms and rules established under very different circumstances, decline to administer 
justice, and to enforce rights for which there is no other remedy’; Devlin LJJ in Ingram v Little [1961] 1 QB 
31 at 73 – ‘The true spirit of the common law is to override theoretical distinctions when they stand in the 
way of doing practical justice’; Millett J in Lonrho plc. v Fayed and Others (No. 2) [1992] 1 WLR 1 at 9 – 
‘Equity must retain what has been called its “inherent flexibility” and capacity to adjust to new situations 
by reference to mainsprings of the equitable jurisdiction’; Lord Hoffmann in Co-Operative Insurance 
Society Ltd. Respondents and Argyll Stores Ltd. Appellants [1997] 2 WLR 898 at 901 - ‘A decree of specific 
performance is, of course, a discretionary remedy and the question for your Lordships is whether the 
Court of Appeal was entitled to set aside the exercise of the judge's discretion. There are well-established 
principles which govern the exercise of the discretion but these, like all equitable principles, are flexible and 
adaptable to achieve the ends of equity, which is, as Lord Selborne L.C. once remarked, to “do more perfect 
and complete justice” than would be the result of leaving the parties to their remedies at common 
law: Wilson v. Northampton and Banbury Junction Railway Co. (1874) L.R. 9 Ch App 279, 284’ [my 
emphasis]; P.J. Millett. 1998. Equity’s place in the law of commerce. Law Quarterly Review, Vol.114 (April), 
p.214 – ‘Equity’s place in the law of commerce, long resisted by commercial lawyers, can no longer be 
denied’;  Lord Reed and Lord Neuberger in Zurich Insurance plc UK v International Energy Group Ltd 
[2015] UKSC 33 at 209 - ‘There is often much to be said for the courts developing the common law to 
achieve what appears to be a just result in a particular type of case, even though it involves departing 
from established common law principles. Indeed, it can be said with force that that precisely reflects the 
genius of the common law, namely its ability to develop and adapt with the benefit of experience’.  
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Chapter 4 will discuss the concept of private property in depth, for now, however, it can 
be summarily defined as contingent on notions of resource scarcity that give form to 
social relations (and market relations in a neoliberal capitalist schema) through bundles 
of legal, moral and customary rights, concepts and practices including inter alia those of 
use, possession, ownership, enjoyment and exclusion11.  In the private property context 
these mechanisms can assume a particular quality as safeguarding functions that 
guarantee assignment of separate objects (things) to individuals, with libertarian and 
utilitarian approaches to private property foregrounding liberal policy and forging a 
morality based on private property and ownership, including through the greater 
contractual determination of property rights (a contractarian perspective)12.  In contrast 
to what Suman Gupta calls Hayek’s and Nozick’s ‘anti-political’ conceptualization of 
private property within the libertarian tradition, here I argue that social and power 
relations constitute private property and property rights and that they are therefore 
political concepts and not, as Graham Virgo suggests, ‘neutral’13.  Contract meanwhile 
maintains a close association with private property and indeed ‘presupposes the 
institution of property', and is of special concern within capitalism for enabling the 
                                                        
11 See for example: Marx and Engels, 1970, pp.79-81; J.W. Harris. 1996. Property & Justice. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p.1 – ‘Property is a legal and social institution governing the use of most things and the 
allocation of some items of social wealth.  ‘Social wealth’ comprises all those things and services for which 
there is a greater potential total demand than there is supply’; J.E. Penner. 1997. The Idea of Property in 
Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press; A.M. Honoré. 2013. Ownership. Readings in the Philosophy of Law. 
Edited by Jules L. Coleman. New York: Routledge, pp.563-574; Schroeder, 2004, pp.179-182; Gregory S. 
Alexander and Eduardo M. Peñalver. 2012. An Introduction to Property Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; Christopher Pierson. 2016. Just Property, Volume Two: Enlightenment, Revolution, and 
History. Oxford: Oxford University Press  
12 Obvious examples, some of which will be revisited at different points throughout this thesis, include: 
Robert Nozick. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books; Ludwig Von Mises. 2005. 
Liberalism: The Classical Tradition. Edited by Bettina Bien Greaves. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund; F.A. Hayek. 
2013. Law, Legislation and Liberty. London: Routledge Classics;   
13 Suman Gupta. 2001. Corporate Capitalism and Political Philosophy: Corporate Capitalism and Political 
Philosophy. London: Pluto Press; Graham Virgo. 2015. The Principles of the Law of Restitution. 3rd Edition. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.15 
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‘wealth-allocating function' of property by inter alia dissociating it from property’s use-
control function14.   
For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to note that no specific or definitive dates 
can be put on the origin of capitalism, which remains a complex question much debated 
by economic historians15.  The emergence of capitalism is however understood here to 
involve a series of sociocultural, legal (including determinations of an evolution in the 
jurisprudence of property and contract), and political shifts in Britain, France and other 
European nations that started in the fifteenth century, gathered pace during the sixteenth 
century, and matured during the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment with the onset 
of Revolution in England, America, and France and the rise of industrialization and 
urbanization16.  The evolution, systemisation and ultimate calibration of Equity and civil 
justice to capitalism and forms of commercialism symptomatic of capitalist reason and 
logic will be explored at key stages in history including the nineteenth-century and late 
twentieth-century, notably the same periods that Thomas Piketty identifies with the 
‘prodigiously inegalitarian’ ‘“first globalization” of finance and trade (1870-1914)’, and 
‘the “second globalization”, which has been under way since the 1970s’17.  As well as via 
figures of note who have been influential in shaping legal thinking, reform, and the 
relationship and tensions between law and economics, including Jeremey Bentham, 
Frederick Hayek and Richard Posner. 
                                                        
14 Harris, 1996, p.50 
15 Robert Heilbroner. 2000. The Worldly Philosophers. London: Penguin; Weber, 2002; Hodgson; 2015; 
Ellen Meiksins Wood. 2017. The Origins of Capitalism: A Longer View. London: Verso  
16 Eric Hobsbawm. 1992. The Age of Revolution 1789-1848. London: Abacus, pp.13-16; Victor D. Lippit. 
2005. Capitalism. London: Routledge, p.1; Bruce R. Scott. 2011. Capitalism: Its Origins and Evolution as a 
System of Governance. Berlin: Springer; Hodgson. 2015, p.17; Pierson, 2016 
17 Piketty, 2014, p.28 
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Equity fetishism is symptomatic of the influence on the subject, as well as on the systems 
and institutions that organize the society in which the subject exists, of ideology, fantasy 
and desire constituted around the logic and economic reason of the type of neoliberal 
capitalism described above.  The overlap between theories of ideology and fetishism are 
viewed here as productive of critical insight into the truth of the stakeholder, who, it may 
be said, exists within what Lorenzo Chiesa and Alberto Toscano have called the 
‘ideological force-field of contemporary capitalism’18.  But who also, through that same 
combination of ideology and fetishism, enjoy and find pleasure in their existence by virtue 
of the fantasies that ideology and fetishism together construct and promulgate on their 
behalf.  ‘Fantasies can make life bearable, though they can also lead us to error’, argues 
Bernard Harcourt, but they are sometimes ‘so extravagant or unrestrained that the 
person fantasizing should know, herself, that they are unreal.  In that sense, the person 
may be complicit in the act of fantasizing’19.  What Karl Polanyi called ‘atomistic and 
individualistic’ organic forms and Louis Althusser referred to as ‘interpellated subjects’, 
I interpret here as stakeholders20.  Stakeholders are economic subjects complicit in the 
fantasy Harcourt describes; who willingly answer the call of capitalism to engage in, 
amongst other things, free-market logics of competition and efficiency, whilst all the time 
seeking to accumulate, exploit and seize opportunities to exercise their self-interest, 
economic advantage and gain, even where that might or does involve calling foul, unfair 
or unequal the bargaining and conduct of other stakeholders.    
                                                        
18 Lorenzo Chiesa and Alberto Toscano. 2007. Agape and the Anonymous Religion of Atheism. Angelaki 
Journal of Theoretical Humanities, Vol. 12, No.1 (April), p.118  
19 Bernard E. Harcourt. 2012. Fantasies and Illusions: On Liberty, Order, and Free Markets. Cardoza Law 
Review, Vol. 33, Issue 6 (August), p.2418 
20 Karl Polanyi. 2001. Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: 
Beacon Press, p.171; Louis Althusser. 2008. On Ideology. London: Verso 
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As a theory of civil justice Equity fetishism first highlights the encounter of economic 
subjects within neoliberal capitalism with the ‘fact of castration as the requirement for 
entrance into society’, and then the nature of the stakeholder construction in fantasy of a 
fetish to conceal the threat of castration, which takes the form of demands, needs and 
desires directed at the institutions, concepts, and practices of Equity and civil justice21.  
Equity fetishism points to the fact of the unconscious as a vitiating factor within Equity 
jurisprudence and its place in civil justice procedure predicated on the stakeholder’s 
encounter with the trauma of castration, the paradigm negativity endured by all subjects 
that Maria Aristodemou calls the ‘trope of insufficiency, of loss, of absence […] ‘lack’’, 
which ‘instigates and permeates not only our cultural products, but our social, legal, and 
political practices’22.  Further, Jeanne Schroeder, in her thesis on the erotics of markets, 
discusses the gendered aspects of castration that resonate with the present thesis, 
although gender is not a theme that will be explicitly covered here.  ‘The two sexes are 
two positions one can take with respect to castration’, claims Schroeder, ‘denial and 
acceptance.  The masculine, which feels that he has lost a precious part of himself, falsely 
claims to possess and exchange the object of desire.  The feminine, which feels that she 
has lost her selfhood, accepts the role of identification with the enjoyment of the object 
of desire’23.  Although, as stated a moment ago, gender is not an explicit theme in this 
thesis, on Schroeder’s account it is clear that the masculine form of castration is of 
primary concern here.  Not because it necessarily tells us anything about capitalism than 
the account of feminine castration cannot, but because the masculine is reflective of the 
                                                        
21 Todd McGowan. 2013. Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis. Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, p.4 
22 Maria Aristodemou. 2014. Law, Psychoanalysis, Society: Taking the unconscious seriously. Abingdon: 
Routledge, p.7 
23 Schroeder, 2004, p.241.  Following Jacques Lacan, Schroeder further develops her analysis by exploring 
the ways in which the feminine does not so much reside as a separate form of castration from the 
masculine, as one that the masculine represses and thus ultimately denies. 
14 
 
privileging of wealth maximisation within capitalism, as well as the  dominance of 
patriarchy in shaping the conjunction between law and economics, including the civil 
justice system that the stakeholder utilizes to maintain their self-interest24.   
Following Schroeder’s account of masculine castration as the dominant mode in societies 
underscored by wealth maximisation, namely those within capitalism, she describes how 
the ‘masculine must lie to himself and pretend nothing has been lost.  He must deny the 
existence of the real and act as though the symbolic were complete’ [emphasis added]25.  
This last statement is crucial to understanding the nature of the encounter that the 
stakeholder within capitalism has with castration, as a central theme of this thesis.  An 
encounter that signals an insufficiency, loss or absence that the fetishistic stakeholder, 
importantly, refuses to acknowledge, and thus one they disavow and conceal via 
substitutes in fantasy, in this instance, Equity as a means to complete justice (hereafter 
‘ECJ’).   
2. Thesis Structure & Why Equity? 
The following thesis is a product of the academic imaginary within legal education.  The 
format and structure of the thesis mirrors, in many respects, the format of mass market 
legal education textbooks and the Equity and Trusts courses in which they are used, 
insofar as it treats Equity as historically significant to the broader function of Common 
Law jurisdictions, and thus traces the idea of Equity from various points of historical 
meaning.  As a critical account of Equity and the legal system more generally, however, 
this thesis does not reproduce legal histories and epistemologies without accounting for 
                                                        
24 Schroeder, 2004, p.243.  The significance of Schroder’s account is even greater here because she applies 
in the form of a critique of Richard Posner’s theory of law and economics, something this thesis will 
explore in more depth in Chapter 3. 
25 Schroeder, 2004, p.241 
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the social, political and economic contexts in which they are situated.  A vast number of 
textbooks begin with the idea of Equity in Ancient Greece and with Aristotle26.  For many, 
and for this thesis, Equity is traced to the present day from the medieval law, as a 
residuum of the conjunction of sacred injunctions of Canon and Ecclesiastical Law and 
the profane rules and doctrines of Common Law.  A site summed up in the notion of Equity 
as a ‘court of conscience', which has long since been supplanted or ‘repressed', as Peter 
Goodrich argues, by the systematization of the Common Law jurisdiction27.  In that sense, 
Equity fetishism as a relatively contemporary phenomenon (this thesis considers it as 
emerging from the socioeconomic and political shifts that occurred during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries within capitalism) is symptomatic of and defence to, at least in 
part, what Freud referred to as the return of the repressed: ‘The emotion that had 
disappeared re-emerges, transformed into social anxiety, tormented conscience, and 
unrelenting self-reproach, while the rejected idea undergoes a substitution by 
displacement, often on to something trivial or indifferent’28.  As a bulwark of private 
property interests in Western capitalist societies, the suggestion here is not that Equity 
is trivial.  As to its indifference, however, the following pages will aim to discover.    
Following a chronological framework, the thesis begins by reviewing Equity during two 
notable periods in its development as a central pillar of civil justice in England.  Firstly, 
during the early modern pre-capitalist Tudor period in which Equity, and in particular 
                                                        
26 See for example: E.H. Burn and G.J. Virgo. 2008. Maudsley & Burn’s Trusts & Trustees, Cases & Materials. 
7th Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Michael Haley and Lara McMurty. 2011. Equity & Trusts. 3rd 
Edition. London: Sweet & Maxwell; Graham Virgo. 2012. The Principles of Equity & Trusts. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; Jill E. Martin. 2012. Modern Equity. 19th Edition. London: Sweet & Maxwell; Scott Atkins. 
2013. Equity and Trusts. London: Routledge; Gary Watt. 2014. Trusts & Equity. 6th Edition. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; Alastair Hudson. 2017. Equity and Trusts. 9th Edition. London: Routledge  
27 Peter Goodrich. 1996. Law in the Courts of Love: Literature and Other Minor Jurisprudences. London: 
Routledge, pp.10-11; see also: Mark Fortier. 2005. The Culture of Equity in Early Modern England. 
Farnham: Ashgate; Dennis R. Klinck. 2010. Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern 
England. Farnham: Ashgate 
28 Sigmund Freud. 2005. The Unconscious. Translated by Graham Frankland. London: Penguin Modern 
Classics, p.44 
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the notion of conscience as the sine qua non of the Equity jurisdiction, began to shift from 
the ecclesiastical to civil domain under the tutelage of jurists including Christopher St. 
German, John Rastell and Edmund Plowden29.  And perhaps most importantly, as Chapter 
1 will discuss, under the influence of the Chancellorship of Thomas More and his 
particular conceptualization of conscience and divine moral authority that stands in stark 
contrast to the sort of Nietzschean theological return, if not a Freudian return, of the 
repressed that Equity fetishism within capitalism describes.  Secondly, the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, which saw wholesale reforms across law, politics, economics and 
social life in England and Wales, but equally in the younger settlor nations of America, 
Australia and Canada.   
With regards to Equity the reform agenda came to a head with the enactment of the 
Judicature Acts 1873-75, which fused Equity and Common Law procedure in a new High 
Court system of civil justice with the notion of complete justice at its heart30.  The notion 
of complete justice during this period will be explored beginning with the influence of 
Jeremy Bentham both on law reform generally, and on the complexion of civil justice both 
during the drafting of and after the Judicature Acts more specifically.  The conjunction of 
Common Law and Equity is, I argue, a product of beliefs and desires, specifically 
displacement in the form of fantastical belief that ECJ offers capitalism as an answer to a 
lack that, for the stakeholder, always already resides elsewhere in the field of their 
                                                        
29 For a useful discussion on the development of Equity during the Tudor period, see: Fortier, 2005, 
pp.59-86 
30 The Judicature process did not cease with these Acts but continued to be (re)substantiated through 
various pieces of legislation (1975, 1925 and 1981), as well as the Rules of the Supreme Court (‘RSC’) 
(1883 and 1965) and Civil Procedure Rules (‘CPR’) in 1999.  Other than the state of New South Wales, 
Australia followed the same course in the nineteenth-century, and as Chapter 3 will show, American civil 
justice across various states not only reimagined and reconfigured the roles of Common Law and Equity 
courts and procedures, but in the case of New York State actually influenced the English reform process. 
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existence31.  The concept of Equity fetishism is symptomatic of the effects of the 
unconscious in the (re)production and mobilization of Equity’s principles, rules and 
doctrines, and, perhaps more importantly, in the development of complete justice as a 
phenomenon of political economy since the rise of industrial and commercial capitalism.   
The consequence of these reforms, as Chapter 2 will show, was to, in part, establish a new 
form of stakeholder belief in civil justice adjudication, particularly with regard to the 
nature of justice and the efficiency of its administration.  As D.M. Kerly remarked shortly 
after Judicature, the reunion of the jurisdictions of Equity and Common Law was, so it 
was believed, going to make the administration of civil justice both ‘cheaper and more 
certain’32.  Belief, in other words, is as the theory of the fetish discussed later will show, 
and in particular the role of the fetish in concealing a lack of perfectibility or certainty in 
the subject as well as the institutions, systems and so on that subject relies upon, key to 
understanding the nature of the contemporary civil justice system.  Amongst other things, 
this includes the ultimate belief in what John Sorabji calls the ‘triumph of equity over the 
common law’ following the Judicature reforms and the subsequent implementation of ECJ 
by the justice system as a whole33.  And thus also the (re)emergence, the return, of Equity 
as a ‘radically new commitment’ to justice rooted in discretion and merit rather than via 
                                                        
31 It is important to note at this point that capitalism is not viewed here as static.  Indeed, Equity fetishism 
can be mapped across at least four stages of capitalist evolution of the course of the last two hundred 
years: the classical economics of, for example, Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Marx during the first half of 
the nineteenth century; the neo-classical economics of, for example, Alfred Marshall, William Stanley 
Jevons, and Leon Walras in the latter half of the nineteenth century (arguably the direct ancestor of 
neoliberalism), which encompassed the Judicature age; the centre-left welfarism during the middle part 
of the twentieth century under the direction of John Maynard Keynes; and finally the neoliberal upsurge 
of the latter part of the twentieth century under the aegis of Frederick Hayek, Ludwig Von Mises and 
Milton Friedman.  Capitalism is not static, and yet it would be wrong to say, even if somewhat 
reductionist, that these different manifestations of capitalism over the course of two hundred years do 
not engender the same fundamental ideological principles, not least the necessary predominance to all 
social life of economic reason.    
32 D.M. Kerly. 1889. An Historical Sketch of the Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery: Being the 
Yorke Prize Essay of the University of Cambridge for 1889. Leopold Classic Library, p.294 
33 John Sorabji. 2014. English Civil Justice after the Woolf and Jackson Reforms: A Critical Analysis. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.56 
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stringent formalism34.  And what Raymond Evershed called ‘the necessary elasticity’ of 
Equity that would ‘add by way of complement or appendix to the enacted law what may 
be required to perfect the system as a whole’ [emphasis added]35.   
Following an historical review of Equity, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 will consider Equity within 
the field of political economy, and in particular, the relationship between Equity, private 
property and stakeholder’s of capitalism that will pave the way for the analysis of the 
theory of Equity fetishism.  Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will substantiate the theory of Equity 
fetishism, most notably with regards to the work of both Marx and Freud.  Finally, 
Chapters 8 and 9 will apply the theory of Equity fetishism to examples of post-Judicature 
and contemporary civil justice, with a particular focus on the impact of neoliberalism on 
long-standing juridical institutions and practices.  
So, why Equity?  Equity is, I suggest, generally under-utilised and perhaps under-valued, 
certainly in contemporary critical legal scholarship, as a site in which to interrogate the 
intersectionality of law, economics and the political36.  Part of the aim of this thesis is to 
demonstrate the significance of Equity within critical scholarship.  This involves placing 
Equity at the centre of debates concerning the ideological influence of capital on the 
private property order and scrutinizing Equity’s relationship to that ideology based on 
the place and role its jurisprudence has in maintaining a regime of private property rights 
and commercialism, as well as institutions and methods for growing financial capital and 
preserving personal and corporate wealth, notably through tax avoidance schemes 
underpinned by trusts law.  By highlighting and bringing into question the relationship 
                                                        
34 Sorabji, 2014, p.47 
35 Raymond Evershed. 1954. Reflections on the Fusion of Law and Equity after 75 Years. The Law 
Quarterly Review, Vol. 70 (July), p. 341 
36 There is no precise measure for this claim and in that sense it is somewhat anecdotal.  Yet research 
within the field of critical legal scholarship reveals, in my experience, a notable lack of work on Equity. 
See for example: http://criticallegalthinking.com/ (accessed 26 June 2017)   
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between Equity, stakeholders and capitalism this thesis asks what is at stake politically 
from the operation of civil justice to meet these various ends, and thus contributes 
modestly to critical evaluations of law within capitalism.   
The nature of Equity in capitalist modernity is considered here to be contingent upon a 
combination of materially historical, socioeconomic, political and psychological factors37.    
This makes the nexus between Equity jurisprudence, notions of complete civil justice and 
the private property order a site par excellence for analysing complex factors relating to 
capitalist and neoliberal capitalist subjectivities.  Key overlaps between the work of both 
Marx and Freud on fetishism is instructive in this regard.  For example, this thesis does 
not fully accept Marx’s claim that, ‘it is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
existence, but on the contrary, it is their social existence which determines their 
consciousness’38.  Rather, as Freud’s insistence on castration as a requirement for 
entrance into society attests, there is a claim to be made for certain psychic conditions in 
the production of the subject that necessarily prefigure the existence of the very ‘men’ 
that Marx refers to39.  The conjunction of these two theories provide, I argue, a more 
thorough analysis of the subjects in question, and help bring into focus the role played by 
law and, in particular, Equity in relationship to them.                     
The discussion during this thesis will follow a path worn thin in places by discussants, 
enthusiasts and critics of the relationship between law and capitalism.  Whether in light 
                                                        
37 The expression of modernity that can be traced throughout this thesis is indelibly marked by capitalism 
as form of ‘systematic production' broadly defined, although capitalism itself will be examined in depth 
here.  Modernity is construed, moreover, as a ‘Western' phenomenon, insofar as, to echo Anthony 
Giddens, references to the development or evolution of civil justice is a reference ‘to institutional 
transformations that have their origins in the West' (Anthony Giddens. 1991. The Consequences of 
Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press, p.174)   
38 Karl Marx. 1859. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. [Online] Available at: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm (accessed 26 
June 2017) 
39 McGowan, 2013, p.4 
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of the classic liberal capitalist fervour for individualism, entrepreneurialism and free 
trade in Victorian Britain, something that has re-emerged under contemporary forms of 
neoliberalism in the late twentieth century, or imperialist capitalism and heavy industry 
predicated on cartels, trusts and monopolies that have sought to conquer the world and 
often achieved this aim, Equity has been part of the ‘rational’ legal apparatus of civil 
justice that maintains the social order in light of economic reason.  Underscoring the main 
ideas presented by this thesis is a critique of the influence of capitalist economic reason 
on the management and organization of public (State) institutions such as civil justice.  
This influence continually manifests itself through, for example, legitimation of reforms 
of civil justice that are justified predominately in terms of cost and efficiency.  In recent 
decades this has led to questions relating to access to justice, legal aid, and the everyday 
ability of the courts to handle workloads, to name but three40.  Yet issues such as these, 
and many others, remain unresolved and this thesis does not claim to have solutions or 
answers to them.  What this thesis does maintain, however, is that capitalism is a root 
cause, and, therefore, the role of capitalism must be called into question and where 
necessary challenged.    
Finally, it is important to describe some of the key elements of this thesis from the point 
of view of it being an academic and educational enterprise.  As a theory of civil justice 
Equity fetishism contrasts with conventional analyses and wisdom of Equity, but 
necessarily so if a critical vocabulary of ECJ is to emerge.  Conventional wisdom is, I claim, 
found in an array of discourse that include legal narratives, speeches, lectures, academic 
articles, case reports, commentary, and even to some extent work that self-identifies as 
                                                        
40 See, for example: Lord Woolf. 1996. Overview. Access to Justice: Final Report. [Online] Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060213223540/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/conte
nts.htm (accessed 21 June 2018) 
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criticism of positive law and the status quo.  To be clear, the status quo within which I 
argue the theory of Equity fetishism emerged and exists is not fixed throughout the period 
of time covered by the thesis.  For the most part, it is defined here, as already claimed, by 
the pervasive influence of economic ideas, rituals and practices that constitute capitalist 
subjectivity, and its recent ‘mutant' neoliberal form41.  Whilst the conventional wisdom is 
in some circumstances useful as ‘objective' insight into particular events or states of affair 
that constitute the status quo – the Hansard Parliamentary reports referred to in later 
chapters is an example.  More importantly it reflects and reproduces privilege and 
command of a particular class over the sorts of discourse highlighted above, and that is 
why it is important for critique and analysis such as the one conducted here.  
‘Conventional’ is a normative qualification, therefore, and it stems from the status of legal 
wisdom and conduct being in large part self-referential, self-perpetuating and resolvable 
on its own internal logic42.   
Further, in their contrasting definitions of general and restrictive jurisprudence, where the 
latter resonates with the notion of conventional wisdom as it is applied here, Costas 
Douzinas and Adam Gearey define restrictive as an ‘endless interrogation of the essence 
or substance of law’ resulting in ‘a limited number of institutions, practices and actors’ 
being included and ‘considered relevant to jurisprudential inquiry’ and therefore a ‘large 
number of questions’ going unanswered43.  Similarly, Wendy Brown and Janet Halley 
establish their critique of law and legal institutions and systems as stemming from the 
                                                        
41 Byung-Chul Han. 2017. Psycho-Politics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power. Translated by 
Erik Butler. London: Verso, p.5 
42 Roger Cotterrell points to the role of legal critique to deal quite precisely with claims that law is a ‘self-
justifying edifice’ rather than a ‘social construct’, which, among other things, also denies and seeks to 
denude the political status of law in contemporary capitalism (Roger Cotterrell. 1987. Power, Property 
and the Law of Trusts: A Partial Agenda for Critical Legal Scholarship. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 
14. No. 1 (spring), p.79).  
43 Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey. 2005. Critical Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Justice. 
Oxford: Hart, p.10 
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problematic of law figuring as ‘technically neutral within liberalism’44.  This requires a 
‘left critique’ of the conventional wisdom of liberal and conservative jurisprudence and 
legal institutions that begins ‘with a critique of liberalism itself as well as an explicit focus 
on the social powers producing and stratifying subjects that liberalism largely ignores’, 
including, most notably, capital’s domination of the social and political45.   
Discussion in later chapters examines inter alia conventional wisdom from the 
nineteenth-century and more recently in order to ascertain what is both said and left 
unsaid in that discourse about the socioeconomic and political landscape in which 
Judicature reform was fermented and from which, I argue, Equity fetishism emerged.  
Equity fetishism speaks to the notion of a distinct jurisdiction of conscience that has been 
both absorbed into the Common Law and therefore repressed and lost to some degree, 
but also preserved and valorised, not least, Peter Goodrich argues, by contemporary 
critical legal studies when it invokes ‘the ethical dimensions of judgment and justice’46.  
This point is important for two main reasons.  Firstly, because of what it says about the 
nature of my own fetishism of Equity, a matter that will be covered in more detail shortly.  
Secondly, naming Equity fetishism makes possible the more precise orientation of 
general legal critique of the type described by the likes of Douzinas, Gearey, Brown and 
Halley, to Equity.  It exposes Equity not only to students within law schools qua schools 
of divinity ‘devoted to the preservations of the faith', but to a critical legal education that 
journeys ‘beyond the university walls into society at large’47.  Naming Equity fetishism 
treats Equity as a major jurisprudence within the Common Law tradition.  The 
                                                        
44 Wendy Brown and Janet Halley, 2002, Introduction. Left Legalism/Left Critique. Durham: Duke 
University Press, p.6 
45 Brown and Halley, 2002, p.6 
46 Goodrich, 1996, p.4 
47 Gary Watt. 2012. Equity Stirring: The Story of Justice Beyond Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing, p.42 
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heterogeneity of Equity anticipates and is thus primed for inter– and trans-disciplinary 
analysis.  Equity invites consideration of where the social, legal, economic, psychological 
and political intermingle.  It is because critical legal scholarship posits a ‘great paradox of 
justice […] clouded in controversy, uncertainty and disputation’ that I argue Equity or 
more particularly the notion of ECJ demands interrogation48.  
Equity fetishism is indicative of a particular form of collusion between civil justice and 
capitalism.  Equity is not exclusive either in its dominion over private property, contract, 
nor in affording stakeholder's restitution or remedies if and when the social relations 
both property and contract involve fail to function as they ought to within the boundaries 
of the law and the expectations wrought by capitalist reason and logic. Common Law 
shares responsibility in supporting capitalism in its full array of practices.  But through 
the theory of Equity fetishism, this thesis demonstrates the peculiarities of Equity's 
contribution, the specific fantasies to which Equity gives structure.  Further, civil justice 
is not just a site for settling stakeholder property disputes, for calls to financial 
accountability, or paths to remedy and restitution within the logic of neoliberal 
capitalism.  It is a way to (re)produce capitalist class power and ideology in order to 
guarantee neoliberal capitalism as a primary, prevailing social aim and standard for 
contemporary societies.   
By structuring society this way capitalism both relies upon and generates psychological 
effects displaced onto the institutions, systems, networks, and so on that constitute and 
maintain the structure.  ‘[L]aw and legal reasoning not only give form to the economic, 
but economize new spheres and practices’, argues Wendy Brown, and in this way ‘law 
becomes a medium for disseminating neoliberal rationality beyond the economy, 
                                                        
48 Douzinas and Gearey, 2005, p.28 
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including to constitutive elements of democratic life’49.  What Brown is highlighting here, 
I claims, is the complexity of the conjunction between neoliberal capitalism and law (and 
Equity), the political, the economic, and psychological; a vast reality of fictions, illusions, 
fantasies, rituals and symbolism of which Equity is a small part and influence, but one, I 
argue, which demands greater critical attention.    
3. Am I an Equity fetishist? 
Fetishism is central to this thesis because of what it reveals about Equity and ECJ as 
socioeconomic, institutional, systemic and encoded symbolic forms.  I agree with Lord 
Denning and Gary Watt insofar as both claim the ‘essential educational nature of 
Equity’50.  As a body of jurisprudence in the practice of the Chancery barrister and 
throughout civil justice, Equity holds a notable place and application in law.  The primary 
concern for this thesis is to analyse and interrogate Equity as a text, to explore the 
language used to describe and apply it, to examine how it is spoken about, narrated, 
reported, valorised, and criticized.  The aim is, in other words, to treat Equity as an object 
of educational intrigue and academic curiosity.  This does, however, raise a potential 
problem that needs to be addressed before moving on: what is the extent to which this 
thesis can be accused of its own fetishism of Equity?   
To talk of Equity or ECJ rather than simply law or civil justice problematizes Althusser’s 
claim that such a distinction is merely ‘internal to bourgeois law, and valid in the 
(subordinate) domains in which bourgeois law exercises its ‘authority’’51.  This thesis 
                                                        
49 Brown, 2015, p.151 
50 Watt, 2012, p.42.  Watt is himself referencing Lord Denning’s claim that the new spirit of Equity is to be 
found in universities, by which one can assume is meant law schools.  Although as this thesis argues there 
is a plurality to Equity that makes it multidisciplinary and thus does not confine it, necessarily or entirely 
to the law school.  See: Alfred Denning. 1952. The Need for a New Equity. Current Legal Problems, Vol. 5, 
Issue. 1 (January), pp.1-10 
51 Althusser, 2008, p.18 
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agrees with Althusser's observations as to the fundamental nature of the distinction in 
terms of political economy but does not view it as credible from the point of view of 
critical method.  This is because to overlook Equity or dissolve it into any one of the levels 
to which it is ultimately subservient (Common Law, civil justice or even the broader 
superstructure of capitalism) risks overgeneralization.  To particularize in that sense is 
not to accept the authority of bourgeois law but to aim for a more precise criticism of it.  
By virtue of the fact that the emphasis here is on Equity’s jurisprudential and procedural 
peculiarities and distinctiveness from the general or Common Law, and argues that it is 
necessary to do so in order to facilitate a more precise analysis of the law, suggests an 
innate fetishism.  Is this a problem?   
Baudrillard noted that the ‘term "fetishism" almost has a life of its own.  Instead of 
functioning as a metalanguage for the magical thinking of others, it turns against those 
who use it and surreptitiously exposes their own magical thinking'52.  Based on 
Baudrillard's account a degree of fetishism here is not denied but anticipated.  On the one 
hand, this can be read in light of a general problem for modern theory to escape self-
contradiction and constantly problematize itself53.  On the other hand, for Baudrillard 
psychoanalysis is the only mode of critique able to escape the ‘vicious circle’ inaugurated 
by a surreptitious exposure to one’s own magical thinking54.  ‘[P]sychoanalysis has 
escaped this vicious circle’, says Baudrillard, ‘by returning fetishism to its context within 
a perverse structure that perhaps underlies all desire’, hence it ‘avoids any projection of 
                                                        
52 Jean Baudrillard. 1981. For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign. Translated by Charles Levin. 
St. Louis: Telos Press Ltd., p.90 
53 Douzinas and Gearey, 2005, p.305 
54 Baudrillard, 1981, p.90 
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magical or transcendental animism, and thus the rationalist position of positing a false 
consciousness and a transcendental subject’55.     
The very fact that this thesis focuses on Equity amid a far broader field of law is 
undoubtedly a fetishism of sorts.  This is because Equity is afforded a degree of objective 
devotion (a key indicator of fetishism) that is not extended, for example, to other areas of 
civil justice.  Treating Equity as such is, to echo some conventional accounts, to consider 
it discrete, a gloss on the law and thus to elevate it to a fetishistic prerequisite.  In order 
to (re)claim Equity as a subject of criticism and inquiry, it is nevertheless necessary to 
stray into levels of objectification and to concede to some degree that Equity is an object 
worthy of special devotion within the broader spectrum of law and civil justice.  Finally, 
as later chapters will discuss, there is also case to be made that the following thesis 
engenderers a degree of neuroticism insofar as it is a legal academic project.  Neuroticism 
within the legal community means directing expertise, knowledge and meaning to placing 
limits and constraints, seen as necessary, on economic existence, by defining laws that 
counterbalance and give particular form to economic existence within capitalism56.  The 
neuroticism of the legal community is, therefore, an important complement to the 
perverse enjoyment sought by stakeholders, and, I argue, the two conjoin in structuring 
Equity fetishism as a fantasy of civil justice within the capitalist juridical-economic 
imagination.       
                                                        
55 Baudrillard, 1981, p.90 
56 Freud defines neurosis as key to notions of civilization and the creation of a degree of social utility that 
resonates, in some respects, with the ideas of Jeremy Bentham that will be discussed in Chapter 2.  ‘It was 
discovered that a person becomes neurotic’, claims Freud, ‘because he cannot tolerate the amount of 
frustration which society imposes on him in the service of it cultural ideals, and it was inferred from this 
that the abolition or reduction of those demands would result in a return to possibilities of happiness’ 
(Sigmund Freud. 2001e. The Future of an Illusion, Civilization and its Discontents and Other Works: The 
Standard Edition Volume XXI (1927-1931). Translated and Edited by James Strachey. London: Vintage, 
p.87)   
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Chapter 1 
The Conscience of Thomas More: 
An Introduction to Equity in 
Modernity 
1. Introduction 
In 1999, the same year that new Civil Procedure Rules impacting the prevailing notion of 
complete justice in the civil justice system were introduced, the Law Society Gazette 
polled members of the legal profession in the United Kingdom asking for nominations for 
the most influential and significant legal figure of the preceding millennium57. The poll 
sought an individual who crystallized greatness and embodied virtues in law, one who 
spoke equally to the closure of a millennium, to an age of transition occupied with root 
and branch changes in law, politics and the power brokerage of the social indicative of 
politico-legal reforms such as the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Access to Justice Act 
1999.  It is perhaps no surprise that the individual who emerged foremost in the Gazette’s 
poll was one who represented a significant and formative tradition in British law, but also 
its human, conscientious and equitable side combined with a staunch and unwavering 
belief in authority.  That individual was Sir Thomas More58.   
A significant amount of ink has been spilt defending and attacking Thomas More since his 
death in 1535.  Stories of More's achievements as to borrow Robert Bolt’s infamous label, 
‘a man for all seasons’, have created a powerful and deep-rooted mythology around the 
                                                        
57 Evlynne Gilvarry. 1999. Lawyer of the Millennium: Gazette Survey The Law Society Gazette, 24th 
November; see also: Lawyer of the Millennium [Online] Available at: 
http://www.thomasmorestudies.org/rep_lawyer.html (accessed 20 Oct 2017) 
58 Rebecca Towers. 1999. Man for the Millennium, The Law Society Gazette, 17th December; see also: 
Lawyer of the Millennium [Online] Available at: http://www.thomasmorestudies.org/rep_lawyer.html 
(accessed 20 Oct 2017) 
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man59.  And like Roland Barthes’ discussion of the eminent twentieth-century physicist 
Albert Einstein, has reified him for the benefit of future generations60.  In the case of 
Einstein Barthes considered his brain as that ‘object for anthologies, a true museum 
exhibit’61.  In the case of Thomas More a candidate for exhibition in this mythological 
museum of super-human artefacts would undoubtedly be his conscience, to which, as 
Dennis Klinck remarks, More was ‘notoriously devoted’62.  It was this internalized faculty 
More used to significant public and private effect in his administrative and procedural 
activities as a statesman, lawyer and, crucially, Lord Chancellor of the Equity 
jurisdiction63.  An analysis of Equity in modernity reasonably begins therefore not just 
with Thomas More, who remains in conjunction with notions of conscience a highly 
valued symbol of English law, but with the idea and implementation of conscience 
through Chancery as indicative of Equity’s value to English law and valorisation by legal 
communities around the world.  As the Gazette poll implied, it was the high moral 
integrity and authority of More’s conscience that has represented an enduring pillar 
within the nation’s legal tradition.  This led The Times newspaper to further conclude that 
the former Lord Chancellor was the most likely representation the English people would 
give of a man who embodied all that was best in English civilization and history64.  
Further, that at his death, as John Guy claims, More had ‘earned his place among the very 
few who have enlarged the horizon of the human spirit’65.   
                                                        
59 For example: Robert Bolt. 1996. A Man for all Seasons. Harlow: Heinemann   
60 Roland Barthes. 2000. Mythologies. London: Vintage 
61 Barthes, 2000, p.68  
62 Klinck, 2010, p.42 
63 J.A. Guy. 2000. Thomas More. London: Arnold, pp.1-18; Russell K. Osgood. 2006. Law in Sir Thomas 
More’s Utopia as Compared to His Lord Chancellorship. Thomas More Studies 1: Utopia, pp.177-187; 
Travis Curtright. 2009. Humanist Lawyer, Public Career: Thomas More and Conscience. Moreana, Vol.46, 
No. 176  
64 The Times, 7th February 1978, quoted in Guy, 2000, p.17. 
65 J.A. Guy. 1980. The Public Career of Sir Thomas More. Brighton: The Harvester Press, p.203 
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The authority that More’s conscience appeared to derive from a divine faith was aptly 
demonstrated through his legal practice.  As Klinck maintains, for both More’s successor 
Cardinal Wolsey and More himself ‘conscience remained front-and-centre as far as 
Chancery was concerned’66.  More was not simply an advocate for conscience in and 
through the practice of Chancery Equity during his time, however, but, I argue, a key to 
its introduction into an early modern social ecosystem in which the legal, political and, 
increasingly, the economic intermingled.  More's time, on the cusp of the Reformation, 
saw the medieval order ‘yielding to an intellectual and economic revolution’, and 
Christendom ‘rent by the divisions between Protestant and Catholic'67.   Thomas More's 
conscience smashed with devastating effect against these first brutal vestiges of 
modernity and it cost him his life.  By the same token, however, More introduced Equity 
into modernity by, for example, insisting on the use of injunctions ‘to prevent 
unconscientious use of legal rights', a form of proto unconscionability that, as we will see 
throughout this thesis, remains central to, and for some a particular feature of, the 
problem of Equity's perceived flexibility and discretion68. 
                                                        
66 Klinck, 2010, p.43 
67 John Cardinal Wright. 1976. Saint Thomas More, patron of Lawyers and Model for Our Changing Times. 
Moreana, No. 51 (September), p.98 
68 Harold Potter. 1931. An Introduction to the History of Equity and its Courts. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
p.45.  The extent of the flexibility and discretion of Equity is widely debated and often discussed in terms 
of the level of containment of flexibility within the rules-based framework and by the points at which 
rights arise.  As Alison Dunn maintains in her discussion of National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth 
[1965] 2 All ER 472, despite the view of ‘Equity as one in which good morals, ethical justice, duties and 
reason hold sway, the location of its operation is often within tightly construed property principles’ 
(Alison Dunn. 2012. National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth (1965). Landmark Cases in Equity. Edited 
by Charles Mitchell and Paul Mitchell. London: Bloomsbury,p.580); see also: Lord Eldon LC in Sheddon v 
Goodrich (1803) 8 Ves 481 at 497; Langton J in Greenwood v Greenwood [1937] P 157 at 164; Lord 
Neuberger in Chukorova Finance International Ltd v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd [2013] UKPC 20, at 97 and 
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2. Conscience and Moral Authority     
Examining More’s conscience as both mythical and historical provides a conceptual 
bridge between early modern Equity and its present form in the twenty-first century.  
This is not to suggest that More was or is solely responsible for Equity’s character 
throughout modernity.  Metaphysical conceptions of Equity that define it as an ideal or 
principle and which find early formulation, primarily, in Aristotle, were filtered through 
Christian doctrine and attached resolutely to the type of conscience understood by 
More69.  But based on his strong adherence to the power of conscience in public life, and 
notably as Chancellor, More’s impact on the history of Equity lies in his contribution to a 
form of civil justice adjudication directed by conscience and permeated by a significant 
moral ethos.  What Ralph A. Newman has defined with regard to contemporary Equity as, 
‘the expression of standards of decent and honourable conduct which are the mark of a 
morally mature society’70.   
More’s conscience engendered a particular form of authority that he sought to impart in 
the world, one informed greatly by faith and Catholic doctrine.  More’s conscience was 
directed towards enforcing the will of God and the Church, and led him, for example, to 
expend a great deal of energy rooting out, convicting and executing heretics in the years 
                                                        
69 Following Aristotle’s conception of Equity (see for example: Aristotle. 2009. Nicomachean Ethics. 
Translated by David Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.99), it was Christian authors including 
Thomas Aquinas and Jean Gerson that would provide the substantive arguments for its authority that 
underpinned More’s thinking.  See: Timothy O. Endicott. 1989. The Conscience of the King: Christopher St. 
German and Thomas More and the Development of English Equity. Toronto, Faculty of Law Review, Vol. 
47, No. 2, pp.549-570  
70 Ralph A. Newman. 1973. The General Principles of Equity, in Equity in the World’s Legal Systems: a 
Comparative Study (dedicated to Rene Cassin). Edited by Ralph Newman. Brussels: Établissements Émile 
Bruylant, p.599 
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prior to his Chancellorship71.  Later, conscience was the moral principle which gave 
Chancellor More ‘the cognitive and coercive authority to pronounce decisions in his 
courts and bind litigants to observe them’, and was defined by More as a form of authority 
and power able to elicit consensus among individuals72.  W.S. Holdsworth describes this 
period as one in which ‘the common law became more rigid, and less closely connected 
with the person of the king, the stream of equity ceased to flow through the channel of 
the common law courts, and began to flow through the channel of the Council and the 
Chancery’73.   
Based on the confession of Sir George Throckmorton to Henry VIII in October 1537, Guy 
describes how ‘More wanted to be remembered not for Utopia or his achievements as 
Lord Chancellor, but for his stand against Henry VIII’74.  A stand that More principally 
orientated around his silence in the face of the King’s desire – a desire to divorce his first 
wife, Catherine of Aragon, and a desire to remarry against the will of the Pope and the 
Catholic Church, to whom More was a resolute devotee.  Yet, that same conscience in the 
hands of the inquisitor-More, a side of his character some commentators have suggested 
he might have shared with Nazis, made it a tool of discretion and arbitrariness which he 
used to define and fanatically hunt his own pre-conceived notions of evil75.  This was 
More’s conscience-in-action which, cast in both positive and negative lights, although 
admittedly by contemporary standards, revealed a degree of duality and stark paradox.  
                                                        
71 More’s role as inquisitor and persecutor of what the Catholic Church perceived to be heretics 
(Lutherans in the main) has played a significant role in many of the revisionist histories of recent years.  
Whilst these histories serve to reformulate the ways in which More’s conscience is perceived and alters 
the complexion of his Chancellorship, his role as a heretic-hunter, a mission he conducted via the Star 
Chamber rather than Chancery, can be viewed for present purposes as something separate from his role 
vis-à-vis Equity. 
72 Guy, 1980, p.43 
73 W.S. Holdsworth. 1925. Sources and Literature of English Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.178 
74 Guy, 2000, p.21 
75 See for example: Jasper Ridley. 1982. Statesman and Fanatic: Thomas Wolsey and Thomas More. London: 
Constable  
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On the one hand, there was his stand against the King whose actions and fevered desire 
threatened the socio-political basis of the nation; and on the other a spurious rationale 
supporting the torture and murder of so-called ‘heretics'.  More, like the dualities of 
Equity, was both authority and an ‘anti-legal element', a kernel of discretion at the heart 
of a system of law and governance in which forms of incremental formalism and rule-
compliance underpinned by precedent were becoming the norm76.   
As a divine moral authority More’s conscience had long taken aim at forms of 
authoritarianism, including by enabling ‘abstract justice to be done in individual cases, at 
the cost of dispensing (if necessary) with the law of the state’77.  Thus it appeared to 
transcend the boundaries of the various offices of law and state that he held during his 
life.  Further, More did not claim conscience as a personal standard ‘but an objective one', 
hence its independence from ‘the king's prerogative or the individual magistrate'78.  
Harold Potter maintains that the ecclesiastical Chancellors, of which More was arguably 
the last in vocation and spirit if not exactly in training, ‘tended naturally to derive their 
ideas from the conceptions of the canonists.  These conceptions depended upon the 
theory that the law of God governed the universe, and hence His law and the law of nature 
and reason, which were nearly synonymous, predominated the rules of any State’79.  
When applied to the theory of transcendentalism that accounts for More’s application of 
conscience as a devout Catholic, statesman and lawyer, therefore, it is clear from Potter’s 
claim that what anchored More was situating, indeed deeply rooting, conscience in faith.  
                                                        
76 ‘Anti-legal’ was a definition of the nature of Equity made by the twentieth century jurist Roscoe Pound.  
See: Roscoe Pound. 1905. The Decadence of Equity. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Jan), pp. 20-21 
77 Guy 2000, pp.186-208; Holdsworth, 1925, p.179 
78 Fortier, 2005, p.102 
79 Potter, 1931, p.37 
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Shaped by the teachings of the Catholic Church, More’s conscience provided him with a 
single point of reference for his actions.    
A backdrop to the shifts in the socioeconomic and political landscape of Tudor England 
remained, for More, faith and the laws of God.  And the ways in which faith manifested in 
More’s Equity brings to mind two determinations that are of particular relevance to the 
discussion that will be conducted later in the thesis, but that warrant a brief introduction 
here.  Firstly, and following Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, faith in its theological sense has 
an operative power, by which is meant an efficacy to prayer that is both tangible and 
certain in the world.  As de Chardin suggests, in a manner that resonates with descriptions 
of the moral authority of More’s conscience discussed here, ‘[a]ll the natural links of the 
world remain intact under the transforming action of ‘operative faith’; but a principle, an 
inward finality, one might almost say an additional soul, is superimposed upon them’80.  
The second takes a more secular account of faith symptomatic of that element which 
modern idiomatic parlance conveys upon the efficacy of the bureaucrat when it is said 
that they go ‘the extra mile’, or, ‘above and beyond the call of duty’.  In this sense 
bureaucracy is able to transform the prosaic and every day into the extraordinary, 
enjoyable and desirable.    
The influence of Catholicism contributed to More's promulgation of the intellectual 
tradition of Equity as a paternal order.  Pierre Legendre maintains a continuing 
significance of this principle of paternity to the procedural juridical structure in a manner 
that would not have been unrecognisable to More, dominated as it was, and to large 
                                                        
80 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. 1964. Le Milieu Divin: An Essay on the Interior Life, London: Fontana, 
pp.135-136  
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extent still is, by the centrality of a judge-cum-father-(confessor)81.  Despite Legendre’s 
focus on Roman Law, a civil law system that Guy maintains presented little danger of 
supplanting or countermanding the Common Law system during the Tudor period, the 
position of the paternal figure operating as both external, public judge and internal, 
private father-confessor is closely allied with the image of More as Chancellor82.  More 
undertook both formal, morning sittings as a judge in Chancery and Star Chamber, as well 
as an open hall confessional at his home in Chelsea in the afternoon so he might allow 
litigants to, ‘more boldly come to his presence’83.  More was viewed (and viewed himself) 
in this sense as a ‘family man’ who garnered respect not only from his wife and children, 
but the extended family of litigants who sought his counsel, wisdom and discretion, but 
perhaps above all, the divine moral authority his conscience might impart.  William 
Roper, More’s son-in-law, highlights this view of More in his book, Life of Sir Thomas 
More84.  And More himself acknowledges this paternal role and duty in an illustration of 
domesticity that implies a belief in principles that extend far beyond his home life:  
You see, when I come home, I’ve got to talk to my wife, have a chat with my 
children, and discuss things with my servants.  I count this as one of my 
commitments, because it’s absolutely necessary, if I’m not to be stranger in 
my own home.  Besides, one should always try to be nice to the people one 
lives with, whether one has chosen their company deliberately, or merely 
                                                        
81 Pierre Legendre. 1997. Law and the Unconscious: A Legendre Reader. Edited by Peter Goodrich. 
Translated by Peter Goodrich with Alain Pottage and Anton Schütz. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; 
Guy, 2000, p.171 
82 J.A. Guy. 1977. The Cardinal’s Court. Hassocks: The Harvester Press, p.131 
83 William Roper. 1626. Life of Sir Thomas More. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/16Croper-more.asp (accessed 31 Oct 2013) 
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been thrown into it by chance or family-relationship – that is, as nice as one 
can without spoiling them, or turning servants into masters85.   
The extent to which More’s legacy of conscience – his legacy of a moral ethos 
underpinning general equitable principles and doctrines of inter alia honourable conduct 
– functions within contemporary capitalist civil justice in ways that reflect More’s 
intellectual tradition is highly questionable.  His mythology offers a conceptual bridge 
between Equity then and now, but the socioeconomic and political contexts in which 
Equity exists alters and this is the key, if not exclusive variable, that is able to account for 
the nature of Equity.  Yet, Equity fetishism demonstrates, as later chapters will show, that, 
whilst the language of conscience remains extant in contemporary civil justice, as a basis 
for Equity’s reasoning and adjudication the idea and meaning of conscience has been 
transformed by the demands of economic reason.  In place of conscience as a rich form of 
human moral reasoning that More understood it as, there is a hollow moral authority 
rooted, for instance, in the materiality of the property concept and the abstract provision 
for wealth creation that concept engenders.  
It is important at this point to recognise that the dialogue between socioeconomic and 
political factors and the themes of conscience, Equity and civil justice are key, but that 
that dialogue is not only contemporary.  John Guy, F.W. Maitland and others posit More 
as a key figure during a crucial and transitional phase in Equity’s history, a “sea-change” 
as Dennis R. Klinck suggests86.  In order to understand Equity fetishism, therefore, More 
is of crucial importance.  Equity in modernity exists on the cusp of two worlds.  The first 
remains an ideal and intellectual project, a utopian Equity balancing out the need for 
                                                        
85 More’s letter to Peter Gilles in the preface to: Thomas More. 1965. Utopia. Translated by Paul Turner. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.30 
86 Klinck, 2010, p.44  
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certainty in rule-making with the need to achieve fair results in individual circumstances 
through measures of discretion, agility, adaptability and flexibility.  The second is a world 
in which Equity is a systemic and systematic machine of codification, precedent and rule, 
in which institutionalised moral capacities are those of brute economic and commercial 
efficiencies and cost-effectiveness.  The disjuncture between these two worlds is 
something that will become more apparent in later chapters.  More's conscience, 
however, is a window through which can be viewed the emergent internal divisions 
within civil justice and elasticities within Equity in particular that have been so effectively 
exploited under capitalism for the benefit of stakeholders. 
3. More’s Sacred Adjudication of Profane Equity 
Nicholas Phillip’s bill complained that although four out of five feoffees to his use were 
willing to execute their estate to him, one John Lilley had refused against ‘all right and 
conscience’.  Having neither ‘ability nor power’ to enter, and having no remedy at common 
law, the plaintiff begged More to compel Lilly to agree with his co-feoffees.  No degree is 
extant in the case, but a writ of subpoena was issued, ordering the defendant’s immediate 
appearance in Chancery to explain his alleged breach of trust87.   
More’s ascendency to the high office of Lord Chancellor and the subsequent impact this 
office had upon Equity and civil justice is marked by two major factors.  Firstly, More was 
born into a family with traditions firmly rooted in the law88.  Informed by this genealogy 
his becoming a lawyer was all but determined at birth and by late youth he was on track 
for a powerful legal career.  Secondly, the indelible mark left on More and the wider legal 
landscape from the Tudor period onwards by his predecessor as Lord Chancellor, the 
                                                        
87 Case report quoted in Guy, 1980, p.55 
88 More trained as a young lawyer in much the same way as his contemporaries at Lincoln's Inn and had 
followed his well-respected father, the Chief Justice, John More, into the profession.  As David Lloyd 
proclaims at the opening of his account of More: ‘Thomas More was half way Chancellor, when born to Sir 
John More [...] The father’s prudence, wit, and nobleness flowed with his blood to the son’s veins’, (David 
Lloyd. 1766. State-worthies, or, the Statesmen and Favourites of England from the Reformation to the 
Revolution, Vol. 1. London: J. Robinson [Online] Available at: https://books.google.co.uk/books (accessed 
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formidable, ambitious, and in the end despised, Cardinal Wolsey89.  Guy has suggested 
that the policies and procedures developed by Wolsey during his fourteen years as Lord 
Chancellor - many of which echo Legendre’s principle of paternity discussed above – were 
highly influential and, crucially, continued by More following the Cardinal’s disgrace in 
1529.  On Wolsey, Guy maintains that:  
As Lord Chancellor, he insisted that litigants should be allowed to present 
their complaints, if necessary, to him personally.  His system was largely of 
his own creation.  He expected suitors to follow the procedures he laid 
down, to submit to independent arbitration wherever possible, and to be 
governed by the golden rule of equity: ‘Do as you would be done by’ – as 
Christ himself commanded in the Sermon on the Mount90.   
Wolsey has a large part in the story of More's Equity, in this, there is no doubt.  Potter 
describes Wolsey as the ‘last of the succession of great ecclesiastical Chancellors who had 
built up a jurisdiction capable of great elasticity, and founded upon peculiar principles, 
dependent as they were primarily upon conscience rather than external acts’91.  It is 
nevertheless important that More trained and practised as a lawyer for a number of years 
prior to his Chancellorship because this means he differed from the prelate Wolsey by 
virtue of his investment in law as a profession. 
More’s devotion to the Catholic Church provided a constant backdrop to his every word 
and deed as a lawyer, so even though he may have loved the King and the law, he 
                                                        
89 As David Lloyd outlines in his State-worthies: ‘[Wolsey] died unpitied, because he had lived feared; 
being the great bias of the Christian world. (Lloyd, 1766, p.31) 
90 Guy, 1980, p.131 
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ultimately had only one master, God92.  Indeed, so strong was his devotion to God and the 
Catholic Church that many, including his father, an eminent Common Law judge, believed 
it would draw him away from practising law and into the priesthood93.  Whilst still a 
young lawyer, following his day-time observance at the courts of Westminster Hall and 
the necessary socialising in the collegiate atmosphere of Lincoln’s Inn, More would 
regularly decamp to the contemplative surrounds of Charterhouse.  Then on the very 
fringes of the City of London Charterhouse was a place ‘for men who sought asceticism, 
poverty, solitude and lifelong chastity [...] a place for men who were willing to detach 
themselves from the pursuit of pleasure, estates, riches and titles’94.  This was a practice 
that More continued as an elder statesman and Chancellor, although eventually only in a 
private chapel called the New Building in close proximity to his house in Chelsea.   
Charterhouse was the very antithesis in temperament and tempo to Westminster Hall, as 
well as to the proprietary and material assertions and aspirations of the types of litigant 
More encountered during his legal career and especially as Lord Chancellor.  Religion 
remained a powerful and influential guiding hand in society at this time.  But the first 
vestiges of a wider public interest in property was clearly beginning to show, and in a 
telling parallel with the nineteenth century (the focus of the next chapter of this thesis) 
this made the sixteenth century, what R.H Tawney has called, both an age of social 
speculation and social dislocation95.  Capitalism as a dominant social and political idea 
and force was yet to be realised and certainly nothing resembling the latter commercial 
                                                        
92 Steven D. Smith. 2003. Interrogating Thomas More: The Conundrums of Conscience. University of St 
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form capitalism would assume in conjunction with Enlightenment thinking96.  Yet the 
seeds of both great theories of modernity were expanding their roots in More's world, 
and during the period of More's Chancellorship, the ground was prepared for the arrival 
of capitalism.  During his relatively short time as Chancellor, for example, More oversaw 
a sharp increase in the business of Chancery, albeit an increase that began under Wolsey, 
the majority of which involved disputes over real property and chattels real97.     
As the first lawyer in one hundred and fifty years to become Chancellor, More inherited 
Wolsey’s robust ecclesiastical traditions which coloured the office as one of mediation 
between the sacred institutions of the church and the profane institutions of the law.  But 
as a lawyer, More's view of Equity was equally subject to an intellectual legal tradition 
not shared by Wolsey.  Indeed, what distinguished More’s Chancellorship from Wolsey’s 
might be argued to be More’s emphasis upon tighter and more efficient forms of 
bureaucracy.  ‘Whereas Wolsey had been hubristic and relaxed about justice’ Guy claims, 
‘More tightened up the practical procedures’98.  More highlighted this distinction, as a 
lawyer rather than prelate, in the speech he gave at his trial for treason for failing to 
support Henry VIII’s move away from the papal authority of Rome, when he thanked his 
King for placing him in so high an office as that of Chancellor, ‘that he never did to 
temporal man before’99.  As both a young lawyer and senior servant of the King, More’s 
temporal and spiritual life coalesced in his professional guise, as a human corpus aequitas 
that was, for a time, mirrored in and exercised through his command of Chancery Equity.  
This characterization of More is perhaps most recognizable in the ambivalence of his 
                                                        
96 Ellen Meiksins Wood argues that: ‘The Enlightenment is typically conceived of as a, if not the, major 
turning point in the advance of modernity, and the conflation of modernity with capitalism is most readily 
visible in the way theories of modernity connect the Enlightenment with capitalism' (2017, p.183) 
97 Guy, 1980, p.50 
98 Guy, 2000, p.218 
99 Sir Thomas More’s Speech at his Trial. 1535. [Online] Available at: 
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features, at once unyielding and compassionate, in the famous portrait by Hans Holbein 
the Younger in 1527 - painted, it is also worth noting, shortly before More became 
Chancellor.   
The role of the Catholic Church (as well as the beginnings of Protestantism100) in the day-
to-day life of civil justice under More’s Chancellorship was significant.  As was the 
influence of Canon Law, which proved a major battleground between More and another 
key figure in the development of Equity during this period, Christopher St. German101.  ‘St. 
Germain’s [sic] studies in the canon law, and his knowledge of English law, naturally led 
him to interest himself in the development of equity’, maintains Holdsworth, ‘which, up 
to this time, had been closely connected with the canon law, because it had been mainly 
developed by the ecclesiastical Chancellors’, notably Wolsey and to a lesser extent 
More102.   The divide between a spiritual and temporal law that each man represented in 
the field of Equity is encapsulated by the very words and language that Equity was seen 
and expected to communicate103.    ‘More would have transformed the common law’, 
argues Timothy Endicott, ‘where St German would transform the chancellor’s equity’104.  
More’s famed oppositional dialogue with Christopher St. German centred on the latter’s 
book, Doctor and Student, a text that framed secular conceptions of Equity for generations 
                                                        
100 Even as More accepted the Great Seal and the office of Chancellor, the Reformation Parliament of 1529 
was taking its seat and the inseparability of legal, political and religious interests of rival hues bound up in 
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and bring More’s brand of conscience and sacred adjudication into question105.  ‘On one 
side of the transition from spiritual to temporal supremacy lay the shattered and 
increasingly subordinate jurisdiction of spiritual law’, argues Peter Goodrich, and the 
‘distinction is signalled most powerfully in the debate between Sir Thomas More and 
Christopher St German’106.     
The importance of Doctor and Student is well noted in historical discussions of the 
formation of modern Equity, and its endurance as one of the first legal textbooks is 
evidence of this.  As Franklin Le Van Baumer states, Doctor and Student functioned as ‘the 
basic handbook for law students up to the time of Blackstone’, by which time the 
systemization of Equity, not least due to the increasing influence and authority of a 
nascent capitalism, was achieved and the type of Equity More had fostered and celebrated 
greatly denuded107.  Contrary to More, St German stipulated a role for conscience in 
Equity as one that did not rely on the Catholic imagination, but was ‘consistent with the 
ordinary law’ and grounded in the ‘law of reason, the law of God, and – particularly 
significant for his project – the law of man’108.  By the eighteenth century, William 
Blackstone had laid down directions and guidance as to the proper function of the 
Common Law courts in his Commentaries in a clear rebuke to the role of conscience in 
adjudication that may not precisely echo St German's work but is certainly built on its 
foundation as a rejection of More’s reasoning.  Thus while Blackstone seized upon 
systemization of the law as the aim in his time, it was arguably a continuation of the 
project of reconciling Christendom with the modern law that St German turned his 
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energies to by removing conscience ‘as the motive force in equity' and thus provoking a 
new level of secularization109.  The foundations St German laid are thus in evidence in the 
following passage from Blackstone: 
For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same 
points come again in litigation; as well to keep the scale of justice even and 
steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion; as also 
because the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined, what 
before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent 
rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary 
from, according to his private sentiments: he being sworn to determine, not 
according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws 
and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to 
maintain and expound the old one. Yet this rule admits of exception, where 
the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason; much more 
if it be contrary to the divine law. But even in such cases the subsequent 
judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from 
misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly 
absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but 
that it was not law; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, 
as has been erroneously determined. And hence it is that our lawyers are 
with justice so copious in their encomiums on the reason of the common 
law; that they tell us, that the law is the perfection of reason, that it always 
                                                        
109 Endicott, 1989, p549; Goodrich, 1996, p.17 – ‘the principle effect of his [St. German's] arguments was 
to insist upon the right of the common law to incorporate or to subsume the spirituality.  It is not that the 
spiritual jurisdiction should be removed or abandoned but rather that it be transferred so as better to 
reflect the ‘true state of English law'.  
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intends to conform thereto, and that what is not reason is not law. Not that 
the particular reason of every rule in the law can at this distance of time be 
always precisely assigned; but it is sufficient that there be nothing in the 
rule flatly contradictory to reason, and then the law will presume it to be 
well founded - Non omnium, quae a majoribus nostris constituta sunt, ratio 
reddi potest. Et ideo rationes eorum quae constituuntur, inquiri non oportet: 
alioquin multa ex his, quae certa sunt, subvertuntur110. 
As Holdsworth points out, for St. German in the sixteenth century ‘when the rules of the 
common law were still fluid, and the rules of equity were still more so, it was possible 
that changes in common law rules, which made recourse to equity no longer necessary, 
would enlarge the jurisdiction of the common law courts and curtail the jurisdiction of 
the court of Chancery.  This was not possible’, concludes Holdsworth, ‘in the middle of the 
eighteenth century’111.   
Dennis Klinck cautions against viewing St German as the ‘harbinger of a new age of equity’ 
however, as his position was ‘hardly an abrupt departure from medieval concepts’ and 
he was as much ‘the inheritor and perpetuator of an old tradition as he was the progenitor 
of a new one’112.  In spite of their differences, therefore, More and St. German both 
contemplated Equity and Common Law as much through the stained glass of the nave 
window, as from the ‘crib’ in Westminster Hall from where law students and young 
lawyers watched proceedings in all three of the main courts: Common Pleas, King’s 
Bench, and Chancery113.  Lawyers like More and St German were men ‘who were by no 
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means barren of piety and religion’, and the figure of More as a lawyer is especially 
difficult to separate from the figure of More as a deeply pious man114.  During his 
declaration upon being made Lord Chancellor More claimed he would, ‘serve his majesty, 
but he must obey his God: he would keep the king’s conscience and his own’115.  And in 
Roper’s Life there is expressed the notion that the Court of Chancery was the place that 
More’s private and public virtues converged; a public theatre for the expression of More’s 
proto-saintliness that allowed it to achieve a firm grip on the popular imagination of the 
time116.    
More was a dedicated and effective Chancellor, and evidence for both of these things 
exists in the records of the suits that came before him.  A dedication that was much 
needed if the records are to be believed.  As Guy suggests More was presented with 2,356 
suits in the thirty-one months of his office, an average of 912 per annum 117.  ‘More’s 
suitability for the lord chancellor’s judicial work had been an important consideration at 
the time of his elevation to office’, Guys continues, ‘and the official expectation that he 
would become energetically involved in the management of Chancery and Star Chamber 
was soon fulfilled’118.  More was certainly a dedicated and perhaps somewhat fastidious 
bureaucrat, concerned with each and every detail of the causes that came before him and 
the accuracy and efficiency of their disposal119.  More was, as a servant of the court, both 
willing and capable of confronting the rapidly increasing business of Chancery.  A 
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jurisdiction, moreover, that was by his hand becoming increasingly distinct from the 
Common Law and forging its own peculiar forms of adjudication.   
More inherited from Wolsey and continued to grow a very popular and sought-after 
institution in Chancery.  ‘There has always been some sort of an effort to bring private 
law into line with what the public interest is currently thought to require’, argues Steve 
Hedley, in ‘medieval and early modern times, legislation was a poor tool for this, and 
common law autonomy from the rest of government was accordingly quite strong – the 
occasional legislative inroad into the common law could be dismissed as just an 
unimportant refinement of the common law system’120.   An increasingly litigious fervour 
concerning property and land disputes that arguably anticipated civil justice adjudication 
under capitalism swept into More’s Chancery, but also stretched across the private (civil) 
and criminal law spectrum, from commercial disputes to false imprisonment121.  This 
fervour needed an outlet that was more effective than the equivalent at Common Law, 
and to all intents and purposes, Chancery Equity was able to answer those needs.  ‘The 
court of conscience would archetypically proceed according to rules of conscience and 
would apply the norms of a justice that transcended the temporal law and its positive 
procedures’, claims Goodrich, but more than that ‘the courts of spiritual justice existed 
alongside the community and process of common law, not simply to apply a separate law 
to the community of the ecclesiastical estate in its institutional sense, the clerics and all 
who could plead the privileged of the clergy, but also to provide a parallel set of rules for 
those who would seek some other justice than that available at common law’122.  Equity 
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did not achieve this feat by directly contradicting the Common Law (the Courts of King’s 
Bench and Common Pleas).  Indeed, the practices of many lawyers at this time straddled 
both jurisdictions and it was not in their interests to undermine the other jurisdiction as 
such without inflicting damage upon themselves.  As Guy explains, ‘Wolsey’s emphasis on 
Chancery and Star Chamber was only possible in the first place because he had secured 
the co-operation of many top common lawyers’, and More continued to maintain this 
crucial, if somewhat paradoxical, relationship between the two jurisdictions123.   
Equity’s popularity, and the litigant’s increasing desire for it, appeared to emerge from a 
simple fact of bureaucratic efficiency on the one hand, based on ‘an independent body of 
rules regulating, among other things, the transfer and enjoyment of real property’, where 
‘the Chancellor had taken on the mantle of an appellate court, meddling with the 
proceedings and reviewing the decisions of the common law courts according to 
principles of equity or conscience’124.  But on the other hand from a pervasive and popular 
appreciation of Equity as an idea.  There was, in other words, a sixteenth-century culture 
saturated in Equity as a ‘powerful concept' that More would undoubtedly have 
appreciated and understood125.  ‘[N]otions of equity play a prominent part in discourses 
that have or seek to have influence on major social conflicts and issues’, Mark Fortier 
explains, continuing: 
Equity appears in conjunction with other powerful notions, supporting 
them or simply accompanying them.  Some of these notions – god, king, 
conscience, the people – may be more ubiquitous than notions of equity, 
but equity is their companion and is often deeply connected with the ideas 
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that matter most.  At times equity takes on a relation of identity with such 
ideas: god’s law is equity, as is the king’s law; the Christian conscience is 
guided by equity; the welfare of people is equity.  In the realm of early 
modern ideas, equity moves in the highest company126.        
As a popular institution, the Tudor Chancery, as we have seen, offered an alternative 
forum for adjudication and remedy otherwise unavailable at Common Law.  This can also 
be interpreted, and importantly from the point of view of later discussions on fetishism, 
as a socio-legal response to a lack in the Common Law system that led to the ‘mass 
defection’ of litigants from the common law court to Chancery’, which Georg Behrens 
argues, did not abate under More’s Chancellorship but accelerated127.  By exposing 
inadequacies in the Common Law and speaking its lack, More and the Equity of the Tudor 
Chancery ignited jurisdictional tensions that echoed throughout the evolving system of 
modern civil justice adjudication in England and Wales.  Further, Equity’s undermining 
of the Common Law in matters of civil justice, both procedural and doctrinal, created a 
basis from which Common Law was driven to counteract Equity’s principles, thus 
systemically embedding tensions between the two jurisdictions in the centuries to 
come128.  Sir Henry Maine points to Equity’s claim to override the Common Law ‘by 
supposing a general right to superintend the administration of justice’ based on the 
paternal authority of the King as untenable129.  ‘The growth of the English constitution 
rendered such a theory unpalatable after a time’, argues Maine, ‘but, as the Jurisdiction of 
the Chancery was then firmly established, it was not worth while [sic] to devise any 
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formal substitute for it’130.  And the reason that Chancery was so established in 
modernity, following More’s Chancellorship, was in many respects, as this chapter has 
argued, due to More.      
4. Conclusion 
Under More’s Chancellorship Equity functioned in harmony with the demands of its 
public, and the growing case-load of Chancery revealed a general and popular enthusiasm 
for its forms of civil justice over those of the Common Law courts.  It is perhaps a 
testament to the bureaucratic skills and knowledge, but also the deeply-held faith of More 
that it appeared and functioned as such.  The intellectual battle with St German paints a 
picture of More and his instance on the authority of conscience as antediluvian, making 
him a relic rather than a reformer, and thus difficult to reconcile with contemporary 
Equity and civil justice.  Yet this is to underestimate the transformative effect More has 
had on the socio-legal imagination by virtue of a broader intellectual project, or perhaps 
mission, which encapsulated divine as well as humanist ideas.   
More is, I argue, an important bridge between the sorts of inner life redolent of the 
practices of pre-capitalist divine ontologies and those of contemporary self-regarding 
ethics of humanist ontologies that anticipated both the Enlightenment and, more 
importantly, the rise of capitalism.  More’s time was, as R.H. Tawney maintains, a period 
‘seething with economic unrest and social passions’131.  And even though he effectively 
lost his life to the passions that underpinned the Reformation and Henry VIII’s schism 
with the Pope and Rome, More played a significant and central role, whether directly or 
in terms of the repudiation by others of his ideas and practices, in property’s elevation to 
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an unconditional right and the development of a creed of the individual as ‘absolute 
master of his own, and, within the limits set by positive law, may exploit [property] with 
a single eye to his pecuniary advantage, unrestrained by any obligation to postpone his 
own profit to the well-being of his neighbours, or to give account of his actions to a higher 
authority’132.  It was, in short, as Tawney maintains, ‘the theory of property which was 
later to be accepted by all civilized communities’133.     
The intellectual underpinnings of More’s formulation of Chancery Equity were not limited 
to the divine, therefore, but included humanist ideas, and later invited humanist 
interpretations, which could be traced to the influence of mercantilism and philosophies 
in continental Europe134.  More’s friend Erasmus, his counterpart in the Roman law 
system of France and a publisher of Utopia, Guillaume Bude, as well as via another notable 
European humanist scholar Juan Luis Vives, who was both a visiting lecturer at Oxford 
and sometime house-guest of More’s were all influential in his life and thinking.  As Travis 
Curtright maintains, it seems certain that More was acquainted with humanist 
jurisprudence and that the centrality of Equity to humanist doctrines was important in 
More’s reasoning135.   
In Rhetoric Aristotle says of Equity that, ‘people regard it as just; it is, in fact, the sort of 
justice which goes beyond the written law’136.  More would almost certainly have been 
exposed to these Aristotelian ideas during his time as a student at Oxford in the early 
1500s when waves of humanism were also washing ashore in England from the 
continent137.  Indeed, More’s reflections on humanism and humanist ideas are peppered 
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throughout his Utopia, and especially during his fictitious discussions with Raphael in 
Book I, where they exchange views on the quality and value of ancient Greek and Roman 
notions of justice138.  It is in that sense, I argue, More’s adjudication of Chancery Equity 
applied the sacred to the profane, a key duality in the history of Equity that has marked 
and shaped both it and civil justice since. 
Under More's tutelage, Chancery Equity emerged as a juridical form desired rather than 
loathed or feared by those who sought its civil justice.  More was a deeply spiritual lawyer 
and gatekeeper to the bounty of Equity in the sixteenth-century Chancery.  But More’s 
Equity and his moral authority was also objective, not least because his conscience told 
him so, which has made Equity a moral project with centuries of ‘worrying at its core'139.  
Equity is said in contemporary legislation to prevail, but does so under a new God, a 
different master to the one More served: capitalism.  And yet capitalism continues to 
carve out Equity as an object of devotion within the field of civil law, a fetish for those 
who seek it.  For better or worse, More is part of this legacy and key to understanding 
Equity fetishism. 
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Chapter 2 
Economics of Reform or the ‘Plucked 
Rib’ of Equity 
1. Introduction 
‘If chancellors were Cardinals and Archbishops before the Reformation, and common 
lawyers afterward, it is easy to see that the theory and practice of equity had to change’, 
argues Timothy Endicott140.  And whilst nineteenth-century chancery judgements ‘bear 
no reference to the safety of the plaintiff's soul' Endicott concludes, ‘the change demands 
closer examination, and particularly an answer to the question of how equity survived at 
all as a system outside the common law.  Why was the institutional reconciliation delayed 
until 1873?'141  The following chapter develops the theory of Equity fetishism by 
examining it as a phenomenon within the framework of broader philosophical, 
sociocultural, economic and political changes that occurred during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.   
This chapter will assess Judicature and Chancery reform as it was ultimately made-out in 
the Parliamentary reports and records from the time, in order to further develop the 
argument that the reforms signalled a closer alignment between civil justice and the 
needs, desires and fantasies provoked by capitalism142.  The examination of the 
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Judicature period is undertaken here less for the purposes of explaining the tension 
between the stringent rule-compliance and formalism of Common Law and the liberal 
approach of Equity as the basis of complete justice, than to explain what made unification, 
perfectibility and thus complete justice such powerful and necessary ideals and concepts 
in the minds of civil justice reformers during the nineteenth century and in the decades 
thereafter.  If, as William Davies following Karl Polanyi states, the ‘achievement of 
nineteenth-century liberalism was to produce a sense of economic activity as separate 
from and external to social and political activity’, a point on which this thesis largely 
agrees, then the issue for this chapter, in highlighting the resurgence of capital as grounds 
for Equity fetishism, is to show how the civil justice reforms and ultimately ECJ fitted into 
this ‘achievement’143.       
2. The pleasure, pain and pannomion of Jeremy Bentham 
It is important to account for the influence of Jeremy Bentham on the subject of this thesis, 
which is based here on two factors.  Firstly, Bentham’s influence over law reform 
generally and thus Chancery reform as a species of it - ‘the founder of all legal reform’ as 
Bentham was enthusiastically referred to during the Parliamentary law reform debates 
in the 1830s144.  Secondly, and specific to Equity and thus Equity fetishism, the influence 
of Bentham’s idea of ‘complete law’ or pannomion on the excretion of uncertainties (if 
not always a corresponding guarantee of certainties) from the substance and processes 
of the law, which has led commentators to speculate on whether he was the progenitor 
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of Judicature reform and the fusion of Common Law and Equity145.  ‘The standard account 
of Chancery', argues Mark Fortier in his assessment of Equity and the law in Restoration 
and eighteenth-century England, ‘is one of a Restoration regularization of principles and 
procedures after the wild and woolly early modern period before the inefficiency, 
stultification, and stagnation decried by Jeremy Bentham […] became endemic'146.  
Further, Bentham’s influence is important here because of what it tells us about the 
tensions produced by principles and ideology from without the law imposed upon the 
fundamental institutions and procedures of law.  Specifically the exposure of civil justice 
(at this point in time still the bifurcated system of Common Law and Equity courts) to 
Bentham’s ideas of utilitarianism and political economy more generally, and the tensions 
this created between conservative protectionism of law’s institutions and a shifting 
liberal political class intoxicated by the promises of capitalism and increasingly 
subservient to the influence and the will of business and commerce147.   
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of fantasy and fetishism.    
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Certainty and perfection were themes Bentham explored rigorously throughout his work, 
in part as a rebuttal to Blackstone’s vision and ‘mapping’ of a system of laws in the 
Commentaries of the Common Law and English Constitution, which Bentham saw as 
expansive, flexible, yet elitist and overly focused on the demands of the King and of the 
aristocracy148.  But also due to the growing perception of Chancery as dysfunctional.  Thus 
the tendency outside of Chancery towards generalizing and universalising ‘common 
equity was helping further political and social causes with which any progressive-minded 
person might sympathize’, argues Fortier, ‘within Chancery the movement was to delimit 
and order general equity for the sake of enclosing it within precedent and rule-based 
jurisprudence'149.  Gerald Postema maintains that in contrast to critics like Bentham, 
others followed Blackstone too closely even as systemic issues with the Common Law 
troubled them.  ‘Unlike Bentham, these critics treat this bred-in-the-bone resistance to 
theory and system not as sufficient cause to raze the obsolete structure and replace it 
with a fully modern, rational, built-from-scratch code’, states Postema, ‘but rather, like 
Blackstone, to festoon its ancient, ramshackle ramparts with celebratory banners’150.  For 
his part, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Blackstone followed Grotius in his interpretation of 
Equity in light of Aristotelian flexibility and adaptability based on that idea that, ‘since in 
laws all cases cannot be foreseen or expressed, it is necessary, that when the general 
decrees of the law come to be applied to particular cases, there should be somewhere a 
power vested of excepting those circumstances, which (had they been foreseen) the 
legislator himself would have excepted’151.   
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As the following passage shows, Bentham reserved a special level of vitriol for 
Blackstone’s ideas, as well as for Equity: 
In regard to the Law of England in particular, it is here that he gives an 
account of the division of it into its two branches (branches, however, that 
are no ways distinct in the purport of them, when once established, but 
only in respect of the source from whence their establishment took its rise) 
the Statute or Written law, as it is called, and the Common or Unwritten: an 
account of what are called General Customs or institutions in force 
throughout the whole empire, or at least the whole nation; of what are 
called Particular Customs, institutions of local extent established in 
particular districts; and of such adopted institutions of a general extent, as 
are parcel of what are called the Civil and the Canon laws; all three in the 
character of so many branches of what is called the Common Law: in fine, a 
general account of Equity, that capricious and incomprehensible mistress 
of our fortunes, whose features neither our Author, nor perhaps any one is 
well able to delineate; of Equity, who having in the beginning been a rib of 
Law, but since in some dark age plucked from her side, when sleeping, by 
the hands not so much of God as of enterprizing Judges, now lords it over 
her parent sister152.   
‘Bentham directed this analysis against a host of ethical propositions he sought to 
eliminate as competing alternatives to the utility principle’, claims James Crimmins, ‘  
such as “moral sense”, “common sense”, “law of reason”, “natural justice”, and “natural 
equity”. All are dismissed on the grounds that they are merely empty phrases that 
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express nothing beyond the sentiment of the person who advocates them’153.  
Bentham's dislike of the uncertainty of language, including the language of Equity, as 
a contributory factor to a lack of coherence in Common law system, was central to his 
motivation for a complete law and complete code.  Moreover, this insistence on 
systemisation, and especially its relationship to the problematic of Equity, in 
particular, remained a strong theme some two hundred years later in the work of 
Peter Birks154.  We will discuss Birks in more detail later with regard to Equity and 
property, but for now it is worth noting the lineage between Bentham and Birks – as 
we did St German to Blackstone in Chapter 1 - as advocates for clarity and order as 
the bulwarks of certainty in law, a position that placed Equity as a jurisprudence of 
discretion and conscience on the wrong side of both men155.  
Certainty and perfection of the law were clearly matters of economic and by extension 
social expediency and improvement for Bentham.  In his introduction to A Fragment on 
Government, F.C Montague states that Bentham’s ideal of codification of the law qua 
complete law was twofold: ‘an advantage in assisting the study of the law and an 
advantage in assisting the administration of the law’156.  He continues:  
First, as regards the study of the law, Bentham believed that law once 
codified would be brought within the grasp of laymen as well as of lawyers; 
that every person of sound mind would be able to understand and to 
remember the provisions of the law. Secondly, as regards the 
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administration of the law, Bentham believed that law once codified could 
be administered with certainty, with speed and with economy, since there 
would be little for judges to do when the application of law had been made 
so simple, and less for lawyers to do when every man would be able to 
conduct his own case. Codification, therefore, would make the knowledge 
of the law attainable by all, and the remedy for wrong endured accessible 
to all, and thus in one word perfect the legal development of society157.  
The preface to A Fragment on Government begins with Bentham’s assessment of the post-
Enlightenment age through which he was living, on the cusp of the meteoric rise of 
industrial capitalism, as ‘a busy age; in which knowledge is rapidly advancing towards 
perfection’158.  And, therefore, Bentham’s idea of complete law matters here because of 
the conjunction of law, property and economics that it represents – a theme that we will 
see developing in-step with the evolution of capitalism throughout the nineteenth, 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries.   
Bentham recognised that power, and political power, in particular, was as much over 
things (property) as it was persons159.  Moreover, that both had profound effects on 
subjective being (psychology), notably portrayed as an insistence on pleasure, happiness, 
as well as a striving for the reduction of pain in Bentham’s utilitarianism and his ultimate 
regard for the purposes of law and the political will160.  The avoidance of pain that 
Bentham is concerned with is notable here because it echoes the role, I claim, in the 
avoidance for the economic subject (stakeholder) of the trauma of castration that occurs 
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within capitalism via Equity fetishism.  This does make Equity fetishism a utilitarian 
theory but does reveal the utility inherent in fetishism and fantasy.  In other words, Equity 
fetishism is symptomatic of the type of pain alleviation Bentham envisaged, as Paul Kelly 
maintains: ‘In terms of his [Bentham’s] psychology, pain and pleasure are intimately 
connected, but in terms of his practical application of this psychology to the science of 
legislation and government, pain is by far the more important consideration.  Whatever 
else it is that people want, they all want to avoid pain’ [emphasis added]161.   
Franceso Ferraro points to the mitigation of pain in Bentham’s theory being directly 
associated to mitigation of disappointment162.  In other words, the legal system, as one 
branch of the utilitarian infrastructure maintaining the happiness of the individual, must 
provide means of overriding the strictness of laws where it is necessary to do so for the 
welfare of the individual.  This notion of welfarism is important to note prior to the later 
discussion relating to the influence of Bentham on the law and economics models of 
neoliberal capitalism, because of its influence on that school of thought and, in particular, 
the work of Ronald Coase and Richard Posner.  ‘It is because Law and Economics 
combines Benthamite empiricism with a particular (Coasian) idea of free competition 
that it preserves a central feature of neoliberalism, and remains hostile to state 
interventions’, argues Davies, ‘it strives to square the circle between liberalism and 
utilitarianism, through an idiosyncratic appeal to the rationality of individual decision 
making’163.  Bentham was, after all, according to Amanda Perreau-Saussine, ‘a legal 
positivist who would count as a paradigm rationalist’164.          
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Bentham’s pannomion is therefore understood here as symptomatic of an alignment of 
legal reason to what Morris R. Cohen calls ‘the Benthamite hedonistic psychology’, a 
‘classical economic optimism that there is a sort of pre-established harmony between the 
good of all and the pursuit by each of his own self economic gain’ in order to forge a 
complete civic juridical ideal165.  Bentham understood law as establishing an ‘expectation’ 
with regards to property and its exploitation that accords fully, I suggest, with Cohen’s 
portrait of ‘economic optimism’ as euphemistic of a resurgent capitalism166 .  ‘Property 
and law are born together, and die together’ states Bentham, and F.C. Montague remarks 
that for Bentham, ‘when the law has once sanctioned expectations it is bound to uphold 
those expectations’167.  Furthermore, in what functions both as a literal interpretation of 
the evolution of capitalism that Bentham would have been witness to in the eighteenth 
century, and a metaphor of the inherent exploitability of property that its privatization 
facilitated, he remarks on the protection the law provides in order for him to ‘inclose [sic] 
a field, and to give myself up to its cultivation with the sure though distant hope of 
harvest’168.  Enclosure, understood as lost access to the commons, was paradigmatic of 
the shifts in law and property ownership that the expansion of capitalism demanded, and 
one, moreover, methods and systems of private civil justice and governance enabled.   
‘Enclosure (when all the sophistications are allowed for) was a plain enough case of class 
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robbery’, argues E. P. Thompson, ‘played according to fair rules of property and law laid 
down by a parliament of property-owners and lawyers’ [emphasis added]169.    
Cohen further attributes the influence of Bentham to shaping a political theory of 
contractualism, ‘that in an ideally desirable system of law all obligation would arise only 
out of the will of the individual contracting freely’, a system supported in part by remedial 
counterpoints such as specific performance that Equity offers to shore-up such 
agreements and arrangements170.  Contract, along with private property, is key to 
Equity's influence within capitalism and will be examined in greater depth in later 
chapters.  But for now we are able, at least, to recognise that in conjunction with his 
enthusiasm for law reform, Equity was necessarily central to Bentham’s broader social 
and philosophical ideas.  And, therefore, as with the work of Peter Birks at the end of the 
twentieth-century, Bentham’s expressions of aversion to Equity were arguably 
overstated and somewhat misguided.  Bentham might have found Equity and 
encumbrance to his pannomion but he equally recognised that Equity was far to 
embedded in the landscape of the Common Law to dislodge, something nineteenth-
century reformers, many of whom celebrated Bentham’s ideas, would also discover.     
3. The age of reform and capital 
Following the erosion of ancient feudal hegemonies and the absolute and divine authority 
of monarchs across Europe, a nascent middle class with increasing authority in 
Parliament on its side saw a retreat in ‘the forces of conservatism, privilege and wealth’, 
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who latterly had to ‘defend themselves in new ways’, and the ‘defenders of the social 
order had to learn the politics of the people’171.  Confronted by members of a new 
liberalising socioeconomic class who refused to submit to the economic limitations of 
conservatism and the last vestiges of feudal traditions, led to uncertainty for the 
establishment forces.  Uncertainty concerning their future dominance of the social order 
and many of its institutions and, equally, a degree of confusion with regard to their socio-
political affiliations and identities172.   
The politics of the people during this time evolved a spectrum of interests unmatched by 
any prior period in British politico-economic history as the restrictive yoke of limited 
suffrage was lifted and old entrenched lines dividing the social classes were rendered 
permeable due to the authority that opportunities for private property ownership 
afforded the liberal middle-classes.  It was not, however, as Frederick Hayek following 
John Locke argues, simply the material aspect of property that was of importance but ‘life, 
liberty and estates' that each individual had the right to pursue173.  Hayek looks to the 
seventeenth century and John Milton for his confirmation of the deep and well-founded 
traditions of liberal property rights and ownership, as well as the rights to exploit that 
ownership for personal advantage, or as Milton puts it: the ‘liberty to dispose and 
economise in the land which God has given them, as masters of family in their own 
inheritance’174.  Jeremy Bentham, as we have seen, further underscored the onus on 
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private property and its inherent exploitability that would come to shape the fortunes of 
the burgeoning liberal middle classes in the eighteen and nineteenth centuries, through 
his framing of the ‘established expectation’ to be able to ‘draw such and such an 
advantage from the thing possessed’175. 
A politics of plurality became, for a time, the norm in nineteenth-century society, ranging 
from mass revolutionary stirrings of a new urban working class (proletariat); to the 
socialist and cooperative experimentations of Owenism and Chartism that followed in the 
wake of the French Revolution and other radical philosophies, notably the work of Saint-
Simon; to cries from libertarians keen to impose their individualism and 
entrepreneurialism on the world and for greater shares of wealth through exploitable 
property rights.  No matter how substantively divergent these points on the spectrum 
were, they were united in opposition to longstanding conservative values and traditions 
that were the preserve of a relatively small and highly privileged class of aristocratic 
landowners.  For centuries this class had exclusive dominion over Chancery Equity, 
inasmuch as Chancery dealt, to a large extent, only with the interests, feuds and so on of 
those with enough property to warrant it.  But when the liberal bourgeoisie 
demonstrated property interests and substantial claims of their own it became clear, at 
least to the bourgeoisie, that the prevailing system of civil justice comprised of separate 
sites of Equity and Common Law adjudication did not work in their favour.  As we will 
see later in the chapter, the prevailing system of civil justice simply did not offer sufficient 
support to emerging forms of commercialism nor the increasing desire of the bourgeoisie 
to accumulate and secure rights and claims to property, money and therefore also power.  
Displeasure at the perception that Chancery was not commercially viable in its structure 
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and function manifested in a variety of ways.  For instance, in the view of the Chancery 
Commission established during the mid-nineteenth century to determine areas of reform, 
orders regulating Chancery's proceedings were considered ‘ill-adapted to the type of 
business generated in a modern commercial society'176.  
At the highest levels of legislative and executive power the taste for reform in order to 
dislodge the old order manifested itself during the early 1850s as the influence of the 
conservatives in Parliament began to wane and the imposition of progressive liberal 
ideas took root.  As historian Sir Llewellyn Woodward suggests: ‘The very names of 
parties were unstable for a time.  The terms ‘conservative-liberal’ and ‘liberal-
conservative’ came into use’, and the ‘allegiances of party leaders was as uncertain as that 
of their followers’177.  In the wake of this liberal ascendancy tensions over the most 
propitious form of economic organization that society ought to adopt arose, and in 
particular how new streams of wealth generation both private and commercial ought to 
be governed, regulated and administered178.  A major obstacle to these liberal aims was, 
as Bentham had argued, the prevailing civil justice system, which was perceived to be 
wholly inadequate to the task of improving economic conditions for the bourgeoisie 
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despite a number of attempts at reform between the 1820s and 1870s in which the 
appointed Commissions sought shorter, cheaper and more certain justice179.     
Following in the wake of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations the nineteenth century marked 
a definitive moment in the ascendancy of progressive economic thinking (what today is 
referred to as classical economics), which increasingly found fault and dysfunction in 
many of the social institutions of the State and, correspondingly, proffered remedies in 
the form of mass, largely liberal, reforms that relied on greater competition and markets.  
To establishment forces the rapid and influential growth of middle class industrialists 
and capitalist stakeholders signalled a threat, as this class, intent, as Marx argued, on 
‘having’, especially with regard to property rights and ownership, grew in strength and 
authority180.  Nouveau riche social climbers, parodied by the likes of the conservative 
Benjamin Disraeli in his 1828 novel The Voyage of Captain Popanilla, represented to those 
who clung to conservative notions and pseudo-feudal traditions a vulgar intrusion in 
society.  And yet this bourgeois middle-class managed to accumulate increased levels of 
property and wealth in their various domains of enterprise, driven in part by the fear 
born of competition and markets, whereby ‘one accumulates or one gets accumulated'181.  
Bourgeois stakeholders demanded more cost-effective and efficient civil justice that 
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would be capable of securing and making certain private property rights, therefore, 
freeing them to invest, to buy and sell, with greater confidence182.   
The aggressive but increasingly creative use of capital by the bourgeois middle-classes 
via newly formed markets for commodities stood in stark contrast to the stagnant notions 
of settlements in perpetuity enjoyed by the likes of the aristocracy.  Where feudal 
property interests had relied on inertia, capitalism demanded liquidity and a constant 
circulation of capital and commodities in markets, the new engines of progress that 
would, so it was (and still to large extent is) believed, provide a foundation upon which 
to build prosperity for all183.  The shift from the predominance of land as a basis for capital 
accumulation and wealth that had begun in earnest during the Reformation, represented 
a shift from fossilized and un-useful status symbols that were incapable of sufficient 
liquidity and equity184.  As a result, there was a rise in commodification and exploitation 
of forms of wealth, such as shares, as an outgrowth of incorporation in order to maximize 
capital gains185.  ‘[T]he means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation the 
bourgeoisie built itself up’, claimed Marx and Engels, ‘were generated in feudal society’; 
but ‘the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already 
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developed productive forces; they hindered production rather than advancing it … Into 
their place stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution 
adapted to it, and by the economical and political sway of the bourgeois class’186.  Further, 
with the rising tide of liberal middle class socioeconomic and political power came a 
proliferation of voices and discourse intent on shaping the direction society.  Reform 
during this period, as the Great Reform Acts are a testament to, was a major social and 
cultural project, as well as an economic, political, and legal one.   
Positing capitalism as a self-destructive system greatly distanced Marx and Engels from 
many prominent commentators, socialist and non-socialist alike, before them, including 
those, such as the influential economist David Ricardo, who had supported the 
practicalities of Robert Owen’s socialism, even though he did not support the theory 
behind it187.  ‘For Adam Smith, the capitalist escalator climbed upward, at least as far as 
the eye could see’, maintains Heilbroner: 
For Ricardo that upward motion was stalled by the pressure of mouths on 
insufficient crop land, which brought a stalemate to progress and a windfall 
to the fortunate landlord.  For [John Stuart] Mill the vista was made more 
reassuring by his discovery that society could distribute its product as it 
saw fit, regardless of what "economic laws" seemed to dictate.  But for 
Marx, even that saving possibility made it untenable.  For the materialist 
view of history told him that the state was only the political ruling organ of 
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the economic rulers.  The thought that it might act as a referee, a third force 
balancing the claims of its conflicting members, would have seemed sheer 
wishful thinking.  No, there was no escape from the inner logic, the 
dialectical development, of a system that would not only destroy itself but, 
in so doing, would give birth to its successor188.   
In the dialectical tradition that ultimately sought to criticize it, capitalist class power 
forged new syntheses between politics and economics.  Stakeholders invested financially 
but also psychologically in the new horizons of capitalism that were beginning to arise as 
the nineteenth century unfurled, were keen to cement their interests.  And just as 
Frederick Hayek would claim during the middle of the twentieth-century, stakeholders 
were conscious of the importance of securing a favourable legal framework that would 
give structure and support to profitable enterprise and the growth of capitalism, as well 
as help disseminate capitalist ideology, thus bringing it into harmony with conceptions of 
justice through the concept of property rights and ownership189.  The deliberate aim of 
stakeholders, as Marx’s materialist view of history discussed by Heilbroner in the passage 
above maintains, was to ensure that law and civil justice were brought under the 
influence of economic reason qua capitalist ideology. 
It was clear and perhaps no more so than in the accusations directed at the Court of 
Chancery, that civil justice in England and Wales was not in rude health when it came to 
the demands placed on it by stakeholders.  In a telling commentary on civil justice in the 
mid-Victorian era, John Stuart Mill makes a deliberate point of distinguishing Equity as 
‘the best substantive law' from its problematic home in Chancery190.  The reforms 
                                                        
188 Heilbroner, 2000, p.161 
189 See, for example: Hayek, 2013 
190 John Stuart Mill. 2008. Principles of Political Economy and Chapters on Socialism. Edited by Johnathan 
Riley. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.261 
68 
 
mentioned by Mill were aimed at modernizing Chancery and by extension the civil justice 
system as a whole that appeared to be struggling under the sheer weight of the business 
it had to increasingly contend with.  Michael Lobban argues that: 
After 1830, debates over Chancery reform were dominated by disputes 
over detail, rather than disagreements on principle. If there was general 
political agreement on the need for law reform in general, there was much 
technical disagreement about what could be achieved and how. Debates 
were generally dominated by expert and professional opinion, and the 
reforms that were made were piecemeal and often lacked coherence. So it 
was with the Chancery: reform of the court was not ideology-driven and 
was not informed by principled goals such as Benthamite codification or 
substantive fusion. Reformers were more concerned with promoting 
efficiency by responding to practical problems identified in the working of 
the court.  Reforms were experimental, building on the lessons of the 
Chancery commission and attempting to solve the problems of the litigant 
and the practitioner191. 
To return briefly to the influence of Bentham as raised here and by Lobban: whilst it is 
the case that Bentham’s name is not mentioned with regularity in the later years of the 
law and Chancery reform process according to Hansard, it is not true that Bentham was 
entirely vacant from the minds of reformers during the period of reform as a whole192.  
Further, Lobban’s notion of Chancery reform not being ideologically-driven (in the mould 
of Bentham or otherwise), but instead focused on efficiency is, I suggest, to underplay the 
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significance of efficiency as an ideological trope within capitalism.  The day-to-day 
concerns of and problems faced by litigants and practitioners that reformers need to 
address may well have been to do with the finer details of Chancery operations, of what 
it did well, what it achieved, as well as what it failed to achieve.  But litigants were 
especially concerned about what the court ought to achieve for them with regard to 
property rights, which is self-evident given litigants came to Chancery at all.  They were 
not, in other words, gratuitously or abstractly interested in Chancery as an institution nor 
efficiency as an end in itself as implied by Lobban.  Instead, Chancery provided access to, 
vindication within, and influence over the burgeoning liberal economic system.  What the 
Judicature Commission appointed in 1867 set out to do therefore was effect fundamental 
change through a more efficient and cost-effective court structure that was ideological 
because it was inescapably embedded in the political economy of the capitalist age.  If 
reforms were concerned with notions of justice as a universal good, the aim was, 
nevertheless, first and foremost cost and efficiency savings that would satisfy the 
demands of economic reason and, therefore, of capitalism.   
4. The age of Judicature   
The division of the systems of Equity and Common Law which it was now decided to 
abandon was peculiar to England and the colonies and states descended from her.  The 
inconveniences it created, and the additional cost and risk, and the unnecessary delays it 
occasioned had steadily increased with the elaboration and development of the law, and 
the great improvements effected in procedure, which had attracted and admitted into the 
Courts an enormously increased mass of judicial business, had only made the evils 
incidental to the separation less easy to be borne193. 
As the previous section has argued, Equity fetishism was symptomatic of a set of social 
conditions and in particular a bourgeois stakeholder mindset that was by the end of the 
nineteenth century accustomed to commercialism and economic reason as standards of 
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being in the world.  ‘The global triumph of capitalism is the major theme of history in the 
decades after 1848’, claims Hobsbawm, it was ‘a triumph of a society which believed that 
economic growth rested on competitive private enterprise’194.  Frederick Engels 
describes these conditions further: 
The struggle of capital against capital, of labour against labour, of land 
against land, drives production to a fever-pitch at which production turns 
all natural and rational relations upside-down.  No capital can stand the 
competition of another if it is not brought to the highest pitch of activity.  
No piece of land can be profitably cultivated if it does not continuously 
increase its productivity.  No worker can hold his own against competitors 
if he does not devote all his energy to labour.  No one at all who enters into 
the struggle of competition can weather it without the utmost exertion of 
his energy, without renouncing every truly human purpose195.      
I argue that stakeholders concerned with commercial certainties and guaranteeing 
economic futures constructed a fantasy of civil justice with complete justice at its core 
and applied it systematically, is was, for instance, the fantasy that lay behind what Kerly 
referred to as a ‘cheaper’ administration of civil justice196.  A fantasy, however, that posits 
complete justice as stakeholder denial of the trauma of castration, the paradigm 
negativity that capitalist ideology blinds stakeholders to by demanding immersion in a 
‘logic of success’ that maintains that the lost object is always (re)obtainable, and the 
symbolic (law) perfectible197.  The result, as this chapter section will describe, was 
                                                        
194 Hobsbawm, 1997, p.13 
195 Fredrick Engels. 1975. Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy. In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. 
Collected Works, Volume 3 1843-1844. London: Lawrence & Wishart, p.435 
196 Kerly, 1889, p.294 
197 Todd McGowan. 2016. Capitalism and Desire: The Psychic Costs of Free Markets. New York: Columbia 
University Press, p.36; Schroeder, 2004, p.241 
71 
 
Judicature and the creation of a ‘unified code of procedure' that brought Common law and 
Equity together as a complete form of justice198.  Echoing Robert Heilbroner, during the 
nineteenth century ‘the time for the economists had arrived’, and the civil justice system 
represented a target for rationalisation, which according to Max Weber was long overdue 
in comparison with the civil systems of Continental Europe199.  To perfect justice using 
economic calculation meant the ultimate ‘triumph over the threat of castration and 
protection against it’200.  But what precisely constituted the Judicature reforms and how 
and why did the notion of ECJ emerge from them?          
Conducted in the spirit of economic rationalisation, the 1873 Act is understood here as 
the legislative tail-end of a significant period of systemic legal reform which began with 
regard to the Court of Chancery under the sponsorship of the Parliamentarian M.A. Taylor 
during the early decades of the nineteenth century201.  Judicature, it has been said, was 
prompted by the need to tidy up a legal ‘field littered with the most venerable survivals 
from the Middle Ages’, and this notion pointed not simply to laws that appeared ill-
adapted to the needs of the modern economy, but the whole edifice of civil justice as 
well202.  The Judicature process as a whole, a process that Parliament and legal reformers 
were pursuing earnestly and in larger numbers from the 1850s onwards, fitted the 
general economic strategies being adopted and applied to systems and institutions of 
State elsewhere at this time203.   
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Reflective of the court system as it existed pre-Judicature (King's/Queen's Bench; 
Chancery; Admiralty; Exchequer etc.), the need for reform was viewed as one of cost and 
efficiency savings due in large to the proliferation of court procedures and judicial styles 
and traditions204.  The tone of reform was couched in terms of public interest, that is, the 
claim that society as a whole would benefit from a civil justice system that was more cost 
effective205.  In truth, however, civil justice was the preserve of a privileged and wealthy 
few who owned the lion’s share of the private property and were therefore focused on 
their rights as a priority over satisfying the demands of public interest.  Michael Lobban 
claims that, for the most part, law reform did not excite the public imagination’, by 
contrast, he continues, ‘law reform did interest the mercantile and trading communities, 
who were especially concerned about developments in the law of debtor and creditor, 
bankruptcy and company law’ and therefore it was often the case that the ‘chamber of 
commerce and mercantile associations played a major role in promoting reforms in these 
areas’206.  Reform was of significant interest to stakeholders who were intent on legal 
certainty to facilitate accumulation (the concentrating of wealth in order to further 
concentrate wealth) and thus grow a profitable economy, and, therefore, stakeholders 
fixed by the idea of growth.  As Ursula Le Guin suggests: ‘It seems that the utopian 
imagination is trapped, like capitalism and industrialism and the human population, in a 
one-way future consisting only of growth’207.  And stakeholders lobbied heavily to ensure 
these ends, and this growth, could be achieved.  Whether those same reforms ever 
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honestly targeted an all-inclusive social good in the public interest is, however, far less 
certain.  Given limited albeit incrementally evolving and expanding suffrage, the ‘public’ 
referred to in the reform debates in Parliament would not have reflected society as a 
whole.  Instead, much like capitalism today, it is a class of privileged property owning 
stakeholders with private interests to protect and exploit who are simultaneously the 
focus and focusers of political attention and thus those whose demands are registered.  
Not the bulk of an albeit less impoverished yet still relatively property- and power-less 
society for who debt rather than credit is the norm, and civil justice has limited direct 
influence208.        
The perceived ‘evils' in the civil justice system, therefore, reflected, I argue, the 
experience and individual interests of private and commercial stakeholders; it was a 
mirror held up to the proliferation of bourgeois ideology in nineteenth-century, but one 
that has not retreated.   In keeping with the more contemporary capitalist notion of so-
called ‘trickle-down’ economics that dominated economic policy development in Western 
capitalist societies in the aftermath of World War II, the reform agenda fitted notions of 
providing a rising tide of prosperity that would raise the fortunes of all members of 
society209.  Judicature was necessarily a politico-economic issue for those in Parliament 
who were keen to show that Britain was a progressive and powerful industrial nation 
that respected and celebrated its past, but would not be hampered by a lack of 
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progressive thinking in an age of new and expanding economic horizons210.  Moreover, 
Judicature reflected the desires of capitalist class power and projected or displaced them 
onto the civil justice system making civil justice in large part synonymous with the 
economic reason it gave force to.  To that end Judicature was a partial but far from 
insignificant element of the ‘age of reform’211.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
210 For some, notably members of the judiciary and lawyers more generally, Judicature represented a 
form of progress, but in the wrong direction.  For example, Sir Roger Bowyer speaking in Parliament at 
the second reading of the Bill that would become the 1875 Act: How the Act of 1873 was passed through 
Parliament no one could tell. He did not sit in that Parliament and therefore was not responsible. At the 
time there was a Government which prided itself very much on what was called progress. They did not, he 
thought, draw a distinction between progress and change. They did not see that though progress was 
good when you were going in a good direction, it was bad when you were going in a bad direction; or that 
a man going over a precipice might reasonably be glad of what had been stigmatized as a retrograde 
movement. The Act of 1873 was brought in as a measure of progress. A great portion of the other side of 
the House thought it necessary to follow suit. He would venture to say there was scarcely a member of the 
legal profession of any position or experience who did not regret that the Act of 1873 was passed. 
 ([Bill 162.] Second Reading. HC Deb 10 June 1875 Vol. 224 cc1631-68.) 
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Chapter 3 
The Road to Complete Justice 
 
Before the law, we have justice without law; and after the law and during the evolution of 
law we still have it under the name of discretion, or natural justice, or equity and good 
conscience, as an anti-legal element.  [Although] equity is a stage in the growth of law 
whereby it is expanded and liberalized after the period of fossilization, as it were, that 
inevitably follows primitive struggles toward certainty and definite statement, we must 
not forget that it is also a necessary reaction in certain periods of growth towards justice 
without law212.   
1. Introduction 
On the eve of the first Judicature Act, the Attorney General, Lord Coleridge, in a tentative 
defence of the outgoing Court of Chancery, was reported as stating in Parliament that:  
Without entering into a lengthened history of the subject, or a defence of 
the law of England as at present administered, or of the tribunals which 
administered that law, he might say, as one who had passed a large portion 
of his life in its study, that he had formed a strong opinion that, whatever 
might be the defects in the law, they were to be attributed, not to the 
learned Judges who administered it, but to the fact that the system on 
which it was founded, having grown up during the Middle Ages, was 
incapable of being adapted to the requirements of modern times. While 
saying, on the whole, that whatever might be its defects, it was founded on 
substantial justice and common sense, yet it was beyond controversy, that 
in many instances our procedure was impracticable and inconvenient, for 
no one practically conversant with its details could deny that there were 
certain great defects in them which ought to be remedied. First of all, there 
was the broad distinction which had become inveterate between what was 
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called in this country Law and Equity. In other countries, the distinction 
existed, and must always exist; but in this country alone, Law and Equity 
were made the subject of separate and even conflicting jurisdiction213.   
What is most notable about Lord Coleridge’s statement as part lament and part 
progressive edict, I suggest, is his reflection on the tension between past practices and 
allegiances and the needs and desires of ‘modern times’ stirred up by the period of 
reform, and due to the growing influence of capitalist stakeholders in Parliament. 
Coleridge is reflecting on a period which, as per Marx and Engels’ incendiary indictment 
of the age, had seen the transformation of the modern State into little more than a 
‘committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’, which, by 
extension, points the idea of ‘modern times’ as euphemistic, and representative of liberal 
expansionism214.   
The outgoing court system and Chancery, in particular, may have been ‘founded on 
substantial justice and common sense', yet Coleridge's reference to the Middle Ages 
betrays a sense that the earlier practices and allegiances were primed to be swept aside 
by a burgeoning middle-class intent, at least in terms of civil justice, on enforcing liberal 
individualism through ownership and proprietary rights215.  This emphasis on property 
ownership and rights, in turn, forged a new ethics and a particular form of stakeholder 
morality that derived its power and authority from the fetishization of economic idolatry.  
‘Once property had been officially deified’, says Hay, ‘it became the measure of all 
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things’216.  The spirit of capitalism channelled through wealth and private property 
signalled the emergence of belief in a new God and puritanical belief, what Weber calls a 
‘specifically middle-class ethic of the calling’, which the Church of England, as old religion, 
could not compete with217.  ‘In the consciousness of living in the full grace of God and 
being visibly blessed by him’, Weber claims, ‘the middle-calls businessman was able to 
pursue his commercial interests.  Indeed, provided he conducted himself within the 
bounds of formal correctness, and as long as his moral conduct was beyond reproach and 
the use to which he put his wealth gave no offence, it was his duty to do so’218.  Hence, the 
‘modern times’ of which Coleridge spoke on the eve of Judicature were those informed by 
the growth of commerce, business and markets, all of which had resolved no use for the 
‘supernatural sanctions’ of religion, yet mirrored religion as an eternal edifice built on 
faith, fealty, obligation and duty219.  ECJ, if it were going to meet the demands of 
stakeholders and satisfy the ‘moral’ cause of which Weber speaks, thus needed to be 
recognisable as a secularized system of justice whose spiritualism and Godly inferences 
were no-longer those of Christendom but of capitalism.   
It is worth noting that Coleridge did not so much predict as simply demonstrate a 
commitment to the new economic order emerging in the nineteenth-century220.  ‘A time 
always comes at which the moral principles originally adopted have been carried out in 
all their legitimate consequences’, claims Sir Henry Maine, ‘and then the system founded 
on them becomes as rigid, as unexpansive, and as liable to fall behind moral progress as 
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the sternest code of rules avowedly legal’221.  Maine identifies this moment in time quite 
precisely, at the start of the nineteenth-century and the Chancellorship of Lord Eldon, 
who dominated the Equity jurisdiction as Lord Chancellor for the better part of a quarter 
of a century.  Eldon, Maine argues, was, ‘the first of our equity judges who, instead of 
enlarging the jurisprudence of his court by indirect legislation, devoted himself through 
life to explaining and harmonising it’222.  By way of contrast, Maitland sees Eldon as the 
tail-end of a process of systemization, the bulk of which was achieved under a series of 
Chancellors during the eighteenth century223.  What is clear is that Lord Eldon, as Lord 
Chancellor from 1801-1806 and then again from 1807-1827 was in a prime position to 
shape Equity in accordance with the rising tide of economic efficacy224.  For example, it 
was arguably his particular contribution to the formalisation of trusts jurisprudence that 
aligned Equity so well with the individualistic and laissez-faire instincts of stakeholders 
for wealth accumulation and built so effectively on the mentality of the previous century 
that had managed to erode the ‘older moral economy as against the economy of the free 
market’225.        
Yet the story begins even before this, with a noteworthy transformation in Equity practice 
beginning as early as the Tudor period, as we have seen, and most certainly under the 
Stuart monarchy via the high-powered proclamations of Lord Ellesmere in the Earl of 
Oxford’s Case (1615) 1 Ch Rep 1.  Although not comparable to the wholesale 
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secularization that led the way to individualized belief under capitalism from the 
nineteenth century onwards, the earlier changes demand mention because they shift 
Equity towards a ‘common set of progressive principles and practices based in natural 
law and rights’, and away from ‘Christian antinomianism and radical assertions of the free 
Christian conscience’226.  As a consequence, by the time the taste for reform under the 
banner of capitalist economic reason took hold in the mid-nineteenth century, Equity’s 
basis as a contemporary body of law in Canon Law had all but been denuded and its 
notion of conscience suitably transformed from an ecclesiastical to a civil one227.  
Paraphrasing the words of Marx and Engels, Equity’s ‘most heavenly ecstasies of religious 
fervour’ had all but been drowned ‘in the icy water of egotistical calculation’228.  Equity 
was, therefore, primed and ready to serve an emerging economic moral order, and a 
bourgeois middle-class intent on having private property as well as perhaps, more 
importantly, using it to generate personal and commercial forms of wealth. 
Even as a practical philosophy of complete justice was forming in the minds of reformers, 
therefore, it was against a backdrop in which Equity was practised in light of the notion 
that strict compliance ‘was the servant of justice’229.  ‘[A]s it matured’, says Sorabji, ‘equity 
adopted as strict an approach to rule-compliance as the common law.  It did so not 
because such an approach was inevitable, as it was at common law due to the nature of 
the forms of action, but rather, because such an approach was understood to be the 
optimum means to ensure that the Chancery Court was able to achieve complete 
justice’230.  Further, to ensure it was primed for the requirements of stakeholders in the 
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private property order - that is, to make the day-to-day function of the private property 
order appear just and fair to and for stakeholders - civil justice needed to possess a degree 
of flexibility and judicial discretion.  ‘Equity’s inquisitorial processes for taking accounts’, 
argue Michael Bryan and Vicki Vann, ‘were superior to the common law’s accounting 
methods in adjusting rights and liabilities’231.  Moreover, Equity signified the law’s 
commitment to fairness and a superior wisdom that engendered ‘a pure and flexible 
restraint on the lumbering beast of the common law’232.  For Graham Virgo the matter is 
one of imagination and imaginativeness, and therefore whereas ‘the Common law has a 
tendency to be rigid and unimaginative in its application, Equity is much more 
imaginative in its application and development’, and Virgo points in particular to Equity’s 
intervention in contract by way of rescission233.   Chesterman, meanwhile, maintains that 
to consider Equity a sort of imaginary other ‘is to engage in self-deception’ because the 
earlier systemization of Equity had already made it resemble Common Law234.  Somewhat 
contrary to Chesterman's conclusion, I argue that self-deception was precisely the point 
and that Equity fetishism demonstrates the significance of fantasy in shaping the type of 
civil justice stakeholders wanted, as well as the type of civil justice they wanted to project 
onto society as a whole.   
Following a contemporary critique of Judicature and the so-called ‘fusion’ of Equity and 
the Common Law, Simon Chesterman argues that it is ‘not only impossible but 
undesirable to provide a complete programme for future decisions’, and instead points to 
the idea of displacing the ossification of doctrine by ‘a new ethic of responsibility to 
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justice’235.  The logic of Equity fetishism maintains however that this is not what happened 
following the Judicature reforms, and, indeed, the very fact that Chesterman is critiquing 
fusion is because he reaches a not dissimilar conclusion.  Instead the ossification of ECJ 
centred on the doctrine of unconscionability as a means of flexibility, agility and 
responsiveness that could be applied across the civil justice system allowing ‘equity to 
temper the harsh application of the common law and the countervailing need for 
certainty in the adjudication of legal rights’, but equally to sustain a fantasy of an 
economic and moral world-order based, at least in the mind of the stakeholder, on 
complete justice236.  ‘Seen through the eyes of one whom the enactment of the Judicature 
Acts is part of history’, claims J.A. Jolowicz, ‘the most important of the ideas contained in 
the phrase ‘complete justice’ is the creation of a single jurisdiction for the administration 
of both law and equity so that, in a single set of proceedings, the remedies of both should 
be available and the need for the parties to have recourse to more than one court should be 
eliminated, thereby achieving considerable savings of both time and expense’ [emphasis 
added]237.        
2. A problem called Chancery 
Of all parts of the English legal system, the Court of Chancery, which has the best 
substantive law, has been incomparably the worst as to delay, vexation, and expense; and 
this is the only tribunal for most of the classes of cases which are in their nature the most 
complicated, such as a cases of partnership, and the great range and variety of cases which 
come under the denomination of trust.  The recent reforms in this Court have abated the 
mischief, but are still far from having removed it238.   
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By the time of the Judicature Commission in 1867, it was made clear that in order for 
progress to be made in civil justice reform the continuing necessity of the Court of 
Chancery needed questioning.  It is important to note that what is here summarized as ‘a 
problem called Chancery' brought together a number of concerns for reformers and 
stakeholders alike, some of which were very longstanding indeed.  Chancery, after all, was 
not merely a Court.  It was a pillar of civil justice and the exclusive domain of Equity.  
Furthermore, Chancery embodied a heady mix of rules, principles and ideas that were a 
direct consequence of Equity's roots in Canon Law and the Christian intellectual tradition, 
thus informing, at least in part, the popularity of Equity jurisprudence239.   
Chancery reform began in the first half of the nineteenth century predicated on the need 
for speed, efficiency and cost-effectiveness, three things the Court was said to lack.  The 
reason for reform along these lines was attributed in large part to the failings, not the 
successes as Sir Henry Maine suggests, of Lord Eldon’s Chancellorship240.  D.M. Kerly, for 
example, maintained that: ‘The last years of Lord Eldon’s Chancellorship were marked by 
the commencement of a persistent and determined attack upon the abuses which had 
grown up in Chancery, or, inherent in its practice from the first, had developed until they 
could no longer be tolerated’241.  But while some may have believed Eldon could make the 
process of reform cleaner and more straightforward, the reality was that the flaws in the 
court were far more complex.  As the Judicature Commission later in the century would 
eventually concede, these perceived flaws were not something that could be remedied at 
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a granular level nor did the various matters of principle ‘generate a coherent reform 
strategy', but instead what was required was wholesale change at the very level of civil 
justice itself242.  For example, Michael Lobban maintains that ‘the years up to 1873 saw 
frequent discussion over whether the various functions of the Lord Chancellor should be 
separated out, though the matter remained unresolved.  Equally', Lobban continues, 
‘there was periodic discussion of whether there were enough judges to handle the court's 
caseload, or whether new ones should be appointed'243.  
Notwithstanding a lack of personnel during the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, Chancery’s problems in processing the increased levels of business it faced 
were arguably a product of growing commercial interest and the demands of capitalism 
as much as, if not more than, issues that were internal to the civil justice system as such.  
Chancery Equity provided stakeholders with the means, for example, to define and 
enforce commercial partnerships and ‘a central forum for both property disputes and 
property management’, which reflected, as Chantal Stebbings maintains, the emergence 
‘of the new professional and commercial middle class’ that was ‘confident, articulate and 
independent’ and the ‘new wealth of the country’244.  Commercial litigants continued to 
rely on Equity in growing numbers even when Chancery, condemned as flawed by various 
nineteenth-century reform associations, was creaking under the weight of a conspicuous 
case-load.  As such there was a notable contradiction between the popularity of the Court 
of Chancery and the laws it administered.  The virtues of Equity were enthusiastically 
extolled, especially with regard to property and trusts jurisprudence, but, equally, the 
evils of Chancery, litigant vexation at the court’s arcane structures and procedures that 
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led to long delays and high costs, and arguably corruption on the part of the court 
masters, lingered and provided the rationale and motivation to bring an end to the 
bifurcated civil justice system245.               
Justice, whilst desirable in principle, was nevertheless expected to function as support for 
economic reason, rather than the other way around.  Sorabji argues that, under equity, 
‘truth could not but be loved too well or obtained at too high a price’246.  That, at least, 
was the determination of a prevailing cohort of Chancery judges, Equity lawyers, and 
those narrow segments of society with wealth enough to sustain prolonged and often 
obtuse litigation.  If complete justice was to carry a price following Judicature it was going 
to have to be one that was acceptable to broader sections of society, namely bourgeois 
stakeholders.  That is not to say voices from within the edifices of Equity or Common Law 
were silent on the matter.   Chancery’s survival post-Judicature as a Division of the newly 
formed High Court system and homology of the lost Court was a decision made prior to 
the passing of the Judicature legislation and championed by the legal profession.  As 
Lobban maintains: ‘On the basis of the recommendations of the commission, Lord 
Chancellor Hatherley introduced a bill in March 1870. It sought to create a single High 
Court of Justice with separate divisions but left the details of the distribution of business 
between the divisions and of procedure to be determined by rules made by a majority of 
the judges’247.  The fears of the legal professionals trained exclusively in the ways and 
means of Equity (the Chancery bar and judges), although, I argue, a secondary influence 
in the Judicature process behind stakeholders was nevertheless made apparent in the 
reform agenda.   
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Given the desire for Equity but increasing attacks on Chancery, an inevitable question 
was how Equity’s future without its Court would unfold248.  What would it mean to 
deprive Equity of its independent basis in law and dilute the special knowledge held by 
members of the Chancery bar as well as its judges?  ‘Chancery reformers’, states Lobban, 
‘responded to the common law changes, and vice versa, generating a mutual movement 
towards fusion’, and this dialogue was instrumental in distinguishing Equity as much as 
it was in ensuring it would be subsumed into a monolithic legal discourse249.  With fusion 
becoming an increasing reality Equity judges and lawyers pressed the case for the 
preservation of ‘their special knowledge’ in order to ‘prevent it being eroded by greater 
powers being granted to the common law’250.  There was resistance to the reform agenda, 
therefore, especially from members of the Chancery bar but equally from other members 
of the legal community, precisely because the unification of the courts and corresponding 
notion of complete justice being pursued was seen as contentious if not impossible given, 
for example, the potential for conflict between the rules of doctrines of Equity and those 
of the Common Law.   
Viewed through the lens of psychoanalysis the resistance by members of the legal 
community to the stakeholder drive for complete justice revealed a neurotic attachment 
to certain laws and forms of procedure that continues in doctrinal approaches to law and 
legal reason that regard it as essential to modern society ‘that the law be closely and 
cogently reasoned’, not least because access to courts ‘is hugely expensive’251.  Evidence 
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from the legal community’s discourse concerning inter alia ECJ reveals individual and at 
times a broader community tendency towards the neurotic defence of the existing legal 
edifice, crystallized in the office of Chancellor for instance, and the self-justification of 
Chancery’s rules, doctrines and principles252.  This in stark contrast to the perverse belief 
of stakeholders of the importance of complete justice as an ally of economic reason, and 
thus the inevitable elision of law and economics.  The neuroses of the legal community 
described here is arguably symptomatic of legal expertise and reasoning founded on a 
fantasy of law’s inherent logic, that is, law without, above, or beyond the (traumatic) 
reality of capitalist influence bearing down upon it and its institutions253.  We will explore 
these ideas in more depth in later chapters.   
For commercial interests demanding certainty from the law and improvements in civil 
justice, the Court of Chancery appeared to represent all that was rotten in the prevailing 
system.  John Smith made plain in a Parliamentary debate in 1825 on delays in Chancery 
that, Chancery was perceived to be so bad that businessmen used to threaten one another 
with filing a bill as leverage in disagreements over commercial transactions254.  The 
growing bourgeois middle class, as the new stakeholders of capitalism hungry for 
improvements in both social and fiscal status, found themselves increasingly influential 
in shaping the nature of institutions able to benefit them.  No longer, for example, was 
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Chancery Equity the sole preserve of the aristocracy or feudal lords who, by and large, 
had been able to afford to suffer the inefficiencies and ‘diseases of the Court' of Chancery 
- inefficiencies that would eradicate the fortunes of less well-off middle-classes255.  On the 
one hand, Equity, its procedural mechanisms, jurisprudence and forms of reasoning, 
suited and satisfied the needs of stakeholders who were intent on having and using 
property and capital as a way of indulging their self- and commercial interests.  As 
Maitland so vociferously proclaimed: ‘Of all the exploits of Equity, the largest and the 
most important is the invention and development of the Trust.  This is perhaps the most 
distinctive achievement of English lawyers.  It seems to us almost essential to civilization, 
and yet there is nothing quite like it in foreign law’256.   On the other hand, the Court of 
Chancery, with its many layers of administration and bureaucracy, and its arcane systems 
of practice and pleading, elicited quite the opposite reaction.   
Chancery had many critics.  Beginning with M.A. Taylor as reported in the 1820s: ‘… as it 
existed at present, this Chancery jurisdiction was perfectly detested throughout the 
country; and, in an age like this, such cumbrous forms of proceeding could not much 
longer be endured’; to Lord Hatherley, Lord Chancellor at the first reading of the doomed 
High Court of Justice Bill (the immediate precursor to Judicature) in 1870, who was 
reported as saying: ‘… it had long been the opinion that we had suffered grievously in our 
whole system of judicature—nay, in our whole system of jurisprudence—from the 
unhappy separation of our Courts into two distinct branches, administering law on totally 
distinct principles’257.  The pressing question for reformers time and again, therefore, was 
what to do about the dysfunction in and persistent failures of Chancery.  ‘[T]he growing 
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wealth of the country and its increasing trade', claims Kerly, ‘brought forcibly home to 
every man of business the need for Courts where rights could be plainly declared and 
speedily secured'258.  He continues: 
During the last century the great estates of the country had at irregular 
intervals struggled slowly through Chancery, and their proprietors had 
come to regard the delays and expenses of the process as inevitable, if 
unpleasant incidents of ownership, but the merchant and middle classes 
were less patient, and, moreover, the Court was even less fitted for the 
decision of disputes in which they were likely to be interested than for the 
administration of estates259. 
When reformers spoke of the ‘evils’, ‘melancholy evidence of the mischief and misery 
inflicted upon society by the Court of Chancery’, and of the ‘Poverty, pauperism, madness, 
suicide…produced by the torturing delays, the inquisitorial proceedings, and the ruinous 
costs of a suit in Chancery’, these were not problems faced by a privileged few that were 
of primary concern260.  Although, as I argued earlier, neither was it a problem faced by 
the public at large for whom the type of justice under debate, indexed to private property 
and transactions of personal and commercial wealth, was a distant reality.  It was the 
burgeoning bourgeois class that Chancery was seen to be failing, or, rather, was 
maladjusted to serve.  So unpopular had Chancery become by the middle of the century 
among those who relied on it for adjudication that an article on Chancery reform talked 
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of a procession of advertising vans roaming London and denouncing the Court of 
Chancery as the British Inquisition261.   
With a settled aim of reconfiguring civil justice in order to better suit commercial and 
business interests Chancery reformists drew on the experience of other Common Law 
jurisdictions.  In particular, reformists looked for new thinking able to cut through the 
thick background of custom and tradition that at once held the British social order 
together, but, more importantly, was increasingly perceived as an encumbrance.  The 
systemic reform of the New York justice system and its civil procedure code during the 
first half of the nineteenth century proved particularly influential in this regard.  This was 
especially so given its source in a newly independent America which was directing much 
of its energy toward meeting successful commercial ends and promoting markets as an 
ultimate way to organize and manage society.  Alexis de Tocqueville noted that, America 
was a country where ‘individual entrepreneurship was the dominant norm’, and these 
were precisely the conditions favoured by the upwardly mobile stakeholders of the 
middle classes in Britain who were busy lobbying for civil justice reform throughout the 
nineteenth century262.   
‘The key political impetus for fusion came from America’, states Lobban, ‘LAS [Law 
Amendment Society] members had followed with great interest the process of reforming 
New York's civil procedure after 1847.  At the end of 1850, the society invited David 
Dudley Field to address them on these reforms and, having met the great reformer, set 
up a committee chaired by Robert Lowe to consider whether law and equity could be 
fused in England’263.  The Field Code of Civil Procedure established the basis for civil 
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procedure across America and clearly linked the worlds of law, business and finance.  The 
Code deliberately accounted and thus made space for the imposition and growth of 
capitalist ideology through the administration of civil justice, rather than treating 
economic and commercial interests as an afterthought to legal abstractions as the basis 
for defining justice.  
‘The common law courts have from time immemorial administered equity law.  The only 
embarrassment that has attended it, has arisen from the imperfect machinery of the 
courts of law’, declaimed the authors of the New York Civil Code in light of the 
shortcomings in its sister State Pennsylvania264.  ‘If they had enlarged their forms, as our 
code has enlarged them’, it continues, ‘their system would have been excellent’265.  What 
the New York experience demonstrated to reformers in Britain was that it was possible 
for Equity or Common law to administer the rules and doctrines of the other as justice 
(attuned to economic reason) required.  Uncertainty, derived from the inconvenience and 
expenditure of having to shuttle between different courts in the hope of a final judgment, 
it was hoped would, therefore, be mitigated by the unification of the courts.  The ambition 
of Judicature was thus posited as a need to manage a crisis in civil justice out of 
existence266.  But, again, the socioeconomic scope of this ambition is questionable 
because, first and foremost, it aimed at benefitting stakeholders rather than the public at 
large.  Any residual impact from the reforms that might benefit the public was, I argue, of 
secondary concern.   
                                                        
264 New York (State). Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings. 1850. The Code of civil procedure of the 
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The important message for stakeholders from American civil justice reform remained the 
benefits of and therefore the need to align law more closely with economics.   ‘Field’s 
democratic politics […] intersected with New York’s commercial culture at the heart of 
his procedural reform’, argues Kellen Funk, ‘[t]he ‘plain speaking’ valued by Jacksonian 
Democrats had become the language of the marketplace and was now made the language 
of the law’267.  A highly motivated belief in capitalism and the economic rationales of 
competition and efficiency it promoted already existed in England by the time of Field’s 
visit, not least by virtue of Bentham’s influence.  Unlike America, however, it did not 
reveal itself quite so readily on the surface of all social life in England in the ways de 
Tocqueville had described in the ‘New World’.  Given the liberal political context, 
however, the rationale for the fusion of Equity and the Common Law and the decision 
regarding the primacy of complete justice was indelibly marked by the ideals of 
capitalism, and a constant and progressive tension was maintained in the Common Law 
to ensure it was brought into harmony with society on these terms268.  A separate Court 
of Chancery was not required, therefore, and indeed would simply complicate the matter 
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The Jackson legacy on the intersection between American legal and commercial consciousness is 
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of a smooth fusion of the laws and more efficient and, above all, cost-effective system of 
civil justice.    
The decision of reformers to follow the experience of American civil justice reform is, I 
argue, a key moment in the construction of the fantasy of complete justice qua Equity 
fetishism.  The message from New York was that Equity could not be easily excluded from 
the machinery of justice.  This sentiment was clearly reflected in Parliament in the lead-
up to Judicature where Equity was referred to by the Attorney General at the time, Sir 
John Coleridge, as possessing a ‘superior breadth and wisdom’ compared to the Common 
Law269.  The role that Equity was to play in achieving the desired completeness of justice 
was therefore seen as vital.    
3. Equity as a means to complete justice 
The wager this thesis makes is that within capitalism, stakeholder desire to avoid the 
traumatic reality of castration encourages complete justice as a juridical mode, 
institution, and ideal of certainty and coherence that is seen as capable of making the 
capitalist economy work more efficiently and effectively.  In return for this expenditure 
of desire, capitalism provides the stakeholder with pleasure through guarantees of self-
interest and satisfaction in the pursuit of private property, but, more importantly, a 
means of denying and disavowing the traumatic reality of limitation qua castration.  Later 
we shall explore in more depth the role fantasy plays in the bargain between stakeholder 
and capitalism, and in particular the role of Equity fetishism in mediating desire and 
satisfaction within capitalism.   
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Moreover, the extent to which the failure of complete justice to be complete is crucial to 
the psychic life of the law, to legal practitioners, and stakeholders because it maintains 
unmet demand as desire.  But this constant striving for perfection of justice also makes 
the law neurotic.  For example, we find Lord Romilly in the Parliamentary debates 
regarding a High Court of Justice Bill in 1870s – an immediate precursor to Judicature – 
lamenting but not denying the possibility of complete justice: ‘You will never get a perfect 
union of Law and Equity unless you make a code of laws which will, to a considerable 
extent, alter the character of the laws that now exist. You are now making a prodigious 
alteration in English law, with which many persons will be shocked. The fusion of Law 
and Equity will require great care and time - it is a matter not to be done speedily, it 
cannot be done by altering the procedure merely, and I hope some delay will be given 
that the subject may be duly and more fully considered’270.  Moreover, the Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Selborne, speaking immediately prior to the passing of the first 
Judicature Bill in 1873 stating that, ‘This Bill had been carefully framed […] in order to 
clear the platform, to unite jurisdictions, to bring together the Courts, to abolish all 
technical and legal impediments to the perfect and complete action of the Courts upon 
every matter within their cognizance, but so to do this that the immediate transition 
should be made without violence, without danger to the rights of persons or property, or 
to the interests of the public at large’271.     
Complete justice has been introduced both as a thematic in the influential ideas and 
reform agenda of Jeremy Bentham, and developed in the context of the ‘fusion’ of 
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Common Law and Equity following the nineteenth century Judicature Acts272.  Further, 
Spencer Walpole discussing the Judicature Bill, 30 June 1873, was reported as stating 
that: ‘Let the House consider what the fusion of Law and Equity meant. It was a system of 
jurisprudence under which any Court should administer complete justice from the 
beginning to the end of a suit or cause’273.  Complete justice, as we have seen, was a phrase 
that appeared in parliamentary debates in the lead-up to Judicature in 1873, as did 
analogue notions of and claims to ‘unification’ and ‘perfection’ that, whilst stated as part 
of an agenda for ‘practical’ and ‘public interest’ reform nonetheless engender the 
fetishistic prerequisite that I claim explains complete justice within the private life of self-
interested stakeholders.   
Complete justice had long been associated with a combination of activities between the 
separate jurisdictions of Common Law and Equity, and represented a desirable outcome 
of the two, in effect, working together.  Complete justice can be viewed as predating the 
Judicature reforms and having a long association with Equity as a body of laws as well as 
an idea of justice274. The association with Equity is especially pertinent when 
distinguishing the former methods and practices of Equity in the Court of Chancery from 
those of the Common Law courts, with the latter representing a formalist mode of rule 
compliance that ECJ supplemented with more discretionary approaches to adjudication 
following the Judicature reforms.  Walpole’s statement echoes the earlier definition of 
complete justice made by Sir John Mitford (Lord Redesdale) at the end of the eighteenth 
century, which appears throughout his Treatise on the Pleadings in Suits in the Court of 
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Chancery by English Bill, a text that would define understandings of Equity adjudication 
during the nineteenth century in both Britain and America:  
It is the constant aim of a court of equity to do complete justice by deciding 
upon and settling the rights of all persons interested in the subject of the 
suit, to make the performance of the order of the court perfectly safe to 
those who are compelled to obey it, and to prevent future litigation.  For 
this purpose all persons materially interested in the subject ought 
generally to be parties to the suit, plaintiffs or defendants, however 
numerous they may be, so that the court may be enabled to do complete 
justice by deciding upon and settling the rights of all persons interested, 
and that the orders of the court may be safely executed by those who are 
compelled to obey them, and future litigations may be prevented275.     
 
Key to understanding its significance is the recognition that complete justice is not limited 
in definition to Equity but is a product of the relationship and the tensions between 
Equity and Common Law adjudication.  Since Judicature notions of complete justice have 
informed a civil justice system comprised of Equity and Common Law as concurrent 
jurisdictions, and it is more accurate to describe Equity as a means to complete justice, 
therefore, rather than the means to complete justice.  Following the reforms in the 
nineteenth century, complete justice was cemented in mainstream legal discourse 
through the implementation of the rules governing the new Supreme Court system (the 
Rules of the Supreme Court, or ‘RSC’).  The effect of ECJ has led to ‘the development of 
procedural devices distinct from those at common law; a strong commitment to rectifying 
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errors in decision-making’ – notably via a more robust appellate jurisdiction – ‘and a 
strict approach to rule-compliance married to a liberal approach to relief from adverse 
consequences for non-compliance’276.   
But what of the influence of capitalist ideology on civil justice and how the influence of 
unconscious desires and fantasies promulgated by capitalism both through the property 
concept and the civil justice system designed to administer it might contribute to ‘an 
image of ordinary plenitude that the subject has lost’277?  As a product of capitalist fantasy 
complete justice fits squarely within the definitional role of fantasy articulated by 
psychoanalysis because it enables the subject’s traumatic experience of lack [a product 
of castration] to be converted into ‘a more acceptable experience of loss in order to 
produce the illusion that there is somewhere a satisfying object of desire’278.  In addition 
to conventional accounts of civil justice that view its role purely in terms of facilitating 
knowledge and performance of and claims to the rights that civil law gives us, the 
assertion here is that ECJ has, as Aristodemou states with regard to legal discourse more 
generally, an ‘other side’ supported by ideologies, fantasies and unconscious desires279.       
Notwithstanding the balancing-act played by the legislative determination of 
concurrency in bringing Equity and the Common Law together, complete justice is a 
direct reflection both of a ‘triumph of equity over the common law’ and a justice system 
that was, following the Judicature reforms in the nineteenth century, recast ‘in equity’s 
image’280.  Equity’s relationship with and contribution to the contemporary civil justice 
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system since the nineteenth century is, if not exactly unique, both fundamental and 
defined in large part by what it means to complete justice.   
Complete justice is not a niche or marginal concern for critical analyses of civil justice.  It 
is vital to considerations of the nature of law and justice within the prevailing socio-
economic system, namely capitalism.  And, importantly, for considerations of how 
subjects exist within that system from the point of view of the effects that civil justice 
engenders.  If the civil justice system has an incontrovertible role and place in 
contemporary socioeconomic life as the means of organizing knowledge of and claims to 
the rights that the civil law gives us, then the importance of the reasoning that fuels that 
system, namely ECJ, is clear281.  The following description of the civil justice system is 
instructive in this regard: 
The civil justice system exists in order to enable individuals, businesses, 
and local and central government to vindicate and, where necessary, 
enforce their civil legal rights and obligations, whether those rights are 
private or public.  It exists to ensure that the mere assertions of the civil 
law are ‘translated into binding determinations’.  Equally, it provides the 
basis for individuals to resolve disputes concerning their civil legal rights 
and obligations consensually through any of various informal and formal 
means of alternative dispute resolution procedure, as well as, the means to 
enforce consensual resolution.  In this way, the system provides a secure 
framework through which social and economic activity takes place, 
property rights, civil rights and liberties are secured and government is 
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rendered subject to the due process of law.  In delivering justice in this 
manner, the civil justice system provides a public good by giving life to the 
rule of law282.   
Sorabji’s account of complete justice reveals a number of aspects or fragments that I claim 
are central to its appeal.  Alongside property as a major aspect constituting the bases for 
complete justice is the vindication of property rights, namely, the application of 
prescribed personal or proprietary remedies that enable a claimant to secure a 
proprietary interest.  Graham Virgo explains that once ‘a claimant has established that he 
or she has a legal or equitable proprietary interest which can be followed [in law] or 
traced [in equity] into the property which has been received by the defendant, the 
claimant can establish a restitutionary claim to vindicate his or her proprietary rights’283.  
In the case of Equity this can include constructive trusts that enable a full transfer of the 
property to the claimant by way of trusts in which the defendant holds the property as 
trustee for the claimant as beneficiary, or a proportionate share by way of the same 
mechanism284.   
As we have seen, Equity was and is a vital component of the civil justice system both 
procedurally and jurisprudentially.  This is notable in the administration of property, 
including the creation and vindication of proprietary and personal rights, and especially 
the influence that the doctrine of unconscionability, which will be discussed in later 
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chapters, has had on shaping the rights regime within the ambit of civil justice285.  ‘Equity’, 
as Dennis Klinck maintains in his survey of Equity and the notion of complete justice in 
the Ontario Court of Chancery, ‘not only restrains the common law where its strict 
application might be unjust, but it makes whole or perfect the justice of the common law’ 
[my emphasis]286.  John Sorabji meanwhile notes that ‘complete justice’ was the 
terminology favoured in the nineteenth century, whilst ‘substantive justice’ became the 
favoured terminology during the twentieth century.  But, he continues: ‘[d]espite these 
terminological differences, the idea they expressed was the same: justice was achieved 
when an individual claim or dispute concluded with a court judgment that was 
‘substantively accurate’287.  As a result, ECJ is ultimately defined as a marriage of formal 
rule-compliance with ‘a liberal approach to procedural amendment or the grant of relief 
from the adverse consequences of procedural error’288.  Or what is otherwise construed 
as a degree of flexibility that Equity brings to the administration of civil justice289.     
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A key issue surrounding ECJ as fetish is that it takes the place not of some actual or perfect 
form of justice that is waiting to be discovered by the subject, but masks the traumatic 
reality that there is no justice at all or as such.  In instilling the civil justice system with 
ECJ in the aftermath of the Judicature reforms the stated aims of reformers were 
improvements in efficiency in terms of time, by reducing delays in court business, but 
more importantly in terms of cost.  The aim of the RSC was to cement this economic 
reasoning and ensure it became standard practice to adhere to efficiencies in all civil 
justice proceedings290.  This, so it was believed, would lead to ‘complete justice’ between 
parties as has since been proclaimed in all manner of cases, including Prestney v 
Corporation of Colchester (No 2) (1883) 24 Ch D 376 at 380; In re Sussex Brick Company 
[1904] 1 Ch 598 at 609; Cloutte v Storey [1911] 1 Ch 18 at 35; and In Re Colgate (A 
Bankrupt), Ex parte Trustee of the Property of the Bankrupt [1986] Ch 439 at 44.   
As a fetish ECJ at once fills and disguises a lack of complete justice predicated in large part 
on the Aristotelian legacy of ideas concerning Equity’s role regarding general theories of 
justice291.  Much like Sorabji’s definitions, Aristotelian inspired narratives always remain 
vague as to precisely how Equity completes justice.  Any insistence that Equity is a means 
to complete justice that the general law cannot complete - Maitland's ‘gloss' on the law is 
another version of this – whilst instructive as to the areas of law in which Equity ought to 
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be deployed, tells us very little about what is actually achieved or at stake in the 
completion or perfection of the law292.  What these accounts have in common with this 
thesis, however, is an acknowledgement of a lack, most often in the form of a gap in 
justice; the same gap that, at least in mainstream thought, explains the logical basis for a 
corresponding law or set of laws (namely Equity) required to fill the gap.   
J Walter Jones offers just such an account: ‘[T]he unwritten law, in its aspect of what 
equity or fairness requires in the case … can be accorded an element of generality in that 
the attitude of approach represented by it towards special problems expresses a 
fundamental human striving to fill the gap which constantly opens between enacted law 
and the call of justice’ [my emphasis]293.  Jones’ account is interesting because it appears 
to go further than most commentators by asking questions of sociology (if not exactly 
psychology).  For Jones, the gap that requires filling is not necessarily institutional, 
systematic or even philosophical in nature, but human.  What Jones does not acknowledge 
is the gap that the desiring subject strives to fill is in and of itself.  The gap never exists in 
Equity or civil justice in the first instance, but in the subject who conceives of those laws 
and justice.  This point cannot be stressed enough because it goes to the heart of the 
present thesis and the theories of Equity and civil justice that will be developed during 
the course of the analysis, and as they relate to castration.     
The distinct and pronounced features of Equity’s completion of civil justice is particularly 
notable in the Australian Common Law tradition, and specifically the state of New South 
Wales (NSW) where Equity remained separate (un-fused) from Common Law until 1972 
following enactment of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), some one hundred years after 
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England and Wales.  Whilst the jurisdiction of Australia is not the main focus for this 
thesis, as a jurisdiction within the broader Western Common law capitalist tradition, the 
fact NSW kept a separate court of Equity long after comparable jurisdictions had fused 
their own civil justice systems raises questions of whether the experience of Equity and 
the reasoning that flows from NSW reveals any more detail as to the nature of civil justice 
unification and thus desire to perfect the system than comparable jurisdictions by virtue 
of the recent, living memory of the separate court.  The answer, it would appear, is mixed.  
On the one hand, there was merely a failure to attempt fusion in NSW for one hundred 
years following Judicature in England and Wales and rest of Australia due to ‘legislative 
inertia'294; on the other, the ‘influential opposition to postpone the enactment of the 
judicature legislation for the best part of a century’ played a role, and was rooted in 
judicial resources that ‘permitted equity specialisation, and the specialisation in turn 
reflected the volume of commercial and property litigation in Sydney which ensured a 
heavy workload for the equity judge’295.  Equity in NSW, therefore, survived as a discrete 
body of law because of demand by commercial stakeholders.   
The longer and more specialised training for Equity lawyers in NSW clearly reaped its 
rewards, however, in the recognition of Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, three prominent 
Australian lawyers from NSW, as amongst, Birks claims, ‘the greatest masters of equity in 
the modern world’296.  The three provide incisive analyses of the interventions of Equity 
into the business of Common law, which is to be expected given the prominence of 
commercial cases in NSW, and especially where the Common Law is perceived as falling 
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short in rendering justice complete by either lacking or not recognizing certain key 
aspects of the requirements of justice: 
The equitable jurisdiction, of enormous importance, comprised […] (ii) the 
enforcement of contracts on principles unknown to the common law – for 
example, sometimes recognizing contracts not under seal, long before the 
simple contract was accorded recognition at law; (iii) interference with the 
rigidity of the law in cases where the presence of fraud, forgery or duress 
would render the enforcement of strict legal rights unconscionable; (iv) the 
giving of remedies unavailable at law, for example, injunction or specific 
performance; (v) the development in the equitable action of account of a 
much more flexible and beneficial instrument than its common law 
counterpart; and (vi) the giving of common law remedies where they 
theoretically existed at law, but in practice were not available – owing, for 
example, to local rebellion, bias and “the violence” (as it was put in many 
petitions) of the defendant297.         
In this passage Meagher et al bring into play many discrete aspects of Equity, but they are 
equally those of importance to complete justice, for example, the emphasis on flexibility 
and unconscionability.  As discussed previously here, unconscionability and the flexibility 
it delivers relative to the strict application of Common Law rules or insistence upon rights 
is key to Equity’s contribution to civil justice.  In his analysis of the development of ECJ in 
the civil justice system, John Sorabji shows how these conscientious roots of Equity as an 
                                                        
297 Meagher et al, 1992, p.5 
104 
 
alternative to the formal rule-compliance of the Common Law have directly informed the 
notion of complete justice: 
[U]nlike at common law, procedural compliance was not a factor that 
equity had to consider when assessing the substantive merits of a case […] 
That difference stemmed from its development out of a form of canon law 
procedure, which required the Chancery Court to act as a Court of 
Conscience and thereby secure the reformation of sin through correcting a 
litigant’s corrupt conscience.  To achieve this is placed a positive duty on 
the court not to act unconscionably.  While equity over the course of time 
would transform an ecclesiastical concept of conscience into a civil one, it 
maintained its commitment to ensuring that it would, in the words of Lord 
Nottingham LC, ‘never … confirm an award against conscience’ […] It did so 
through ensuring that it would pursue, as Lord Talbot LC described it in 
Knight v Knight, ‘complete justice’298.  
The evolution of unconscionability has long been indexed to the evolution of 
commercialism and the nature of transaction as necessarily securing favourable grounds 
for fair bargaining and economic dealing.  Lord Hardwicke in Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen 
(1751) 2 Ves Sen 125 maintained that, ‘fraud presumed or inferred from the 
circumstances or conditions of the parties contracting: weakness on one side, usury on 
the other, or extortion or advantage taken of that weakness.  There has always been the 
appearance of fraud from the nature of the bargain’299.  Lord Denning MR further 
developed the theme of inequality in bargaining in Lloyd’s Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 
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326 stating that ‘without independent advice, [the claimant] enters into a contract upon 
terms which are very unfair or transfers property for a consideration which is grossly 
inadequate, when his bargaining power is grievously impaired by reasons of his own 
needs or desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with undue influences or 
pressures brought to bear on him by or for the benefit of the other'300.   
The Privy Council decision in Hart v O'Connor [1985] AC 1000 brought to bear a particular 
focus on the morality of transactions, in a case that involved issues of disability.  The 
morality question turned upon the transaction as unconscionable given one party's 
exploitation of the weakness of the other.  Pure commerciality has also given rise to the 
possibility of the application of unconscionability as Browne-Wilkinson J demonstrated 
in Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd v Marden [1979] 1 WLR 243.  Within the logic of 
commercialism and private property within capitalism the contemporary cases listed 
above are entirely justifiable.  Within economic reason, there is a morality that governs 
the nature of the transaction, and fair bargaining practices, especially with regard to 
contractual obligations that play a vital role in maintaining the structure of contemporary 
economic practices and conduct, but it is morality defined not by the inner life, 
estimations of fairness, nor conscientiousness of humans, but by economic calculation  
We will return to the matter of contemporary applications of unconscionability in 
Chapters 5 and 8.      
Following the theme of unconscionability briefly, however, I argue that as a facet of 
complete justice unconscionability ultimately functions as a field of representation that 
aims to fill a gap not simply in cases involving civil justice – as Jones or Meagher et al 
believe - but in subjects who both conceive of and seek complete justice.  The source of 
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this ‘gap’ is, not precisely as Walter Jones claims, but as Freud tells us, castration.  But 
while castration ‘is the nothing that generates the subject, and the encounter with it 
traumatizes the subject’ this does not mean that all confrontations and encounters with 
this paradigmatic form of negativity are universal301.  Fetishism, as later chapters will 
outline in more detail, is a perverse form that the subject’s encounter with castration 
assumes.  Although fetishism, like other forms of subjective deflection of traumatic 
experience, is far from a guarantee that the subject will be able to avoid the traumatic 
realisation of castration.  ‘The fetish merely appears to substitute something that could 
potentially or actually exist’, argues Samo Tomšič, ‘[i]ts main function is to reject 
castration from the symbolic, but this move always backfires and the fetish turns from a 
prosthetic organ into a monument of castration’302.  On this account, ECJ assumes a very 
different form: a ‘monument' to a lack of justice.  One, for example, laid bare through 
extensive vindication of the many fallacies that supposedly constitute complete justice, 
namely, the stakeholder belief that complete justice is the clearest example of what is 
flexible, fair and liberal.  
4. Conclusion 
The nineteenth century ‘was a period of great developments for the equitable 
jurisdiction’303.  ‘The enormous industrial, international and imperial expansion of 
Britain in this period’, says Jill Martin, ‘necessitated developments in equity to deal with 
a host of new problems.  The accumulation of business fortunes required rules for the 
administration of companies and partnerships; and the change in emphasis from landed 
wealth to stocks and shares necessitated the development of new concepts of property 
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settlements’304.  Whilst a settling of the body of laws had been undertaken before the start 
of the century, Lord Eldon ensured in the opening decades of the nineteenth century that 
the process of Equity’s systemization was both brought up to the standards of the 
Common Law and ultimately reconfigured to meet the demands of capitalism, all features 
that would be crucial in determining the nature of ECJ by the close of the century.      
Between the establishment of the Judicature Commission in 1867 and enactment of the 
first piece of Judicature legislation in 1873, the case for unification and perfection of the 
civil justice system qua complete justice was made-out.  With Chancery gone it only 
remained necessary to translate ECJ into the civil justice system as a whole.  This was the 
role for the Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC) in the aftermath of Judicature.  ‘From the 
1820s to 1873 there was a decisive shift away from the common law’s formalist approach 
to securing substantive justice towards equity’s complete justice approach’, explains 
Sorabji, ‘a shift’, he concludes, ‘that was finalised by the introduction of the RSC post-
1873’305.  Jolowicz echoes the significance that resulted from Judicature on the nature of 
justice. ‘Probably the most significant achievement of the Judicature Acts, and the most 
fundamental aspect of ‘complete justice’ was the ultimate separation of substantive law 
from procedure’, argues Jolowicz, ‘this alone made possible the belief, now almost 
universally accepted as self-evident, that legal rights and obligations are one thing, the 
machinery and procedures for their recognition and enforcement another’306.    
Equity procedure and jurisprudence were central to the type of civil justice that 
commercial and private stakeholders alike demanded and showed a just and unyielding 
devotion to.  This helped secure the victory of Equity over the Common law with regard 
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to complete justice and made ECJ a standard of civil justice underlying huge expansion in 
private property ownership and wealth for at least a few stakeholders during the 
twentieth century.  Equity fetishism ties the fantasy of capitalism, the (il)logic and belief 
that it is possible to locate one's ultimate desire, to a legal means of investing in and 
engaging with that fantasy.  Equity and ECJ allowed stakeholders access to and control 
over private property rights, it vindicated their belief as it vindicated their rights, and 
furnished stakeholder existence with a sense of inevitability that the lost object was (and 
is) always near and castration a lie.  Complete justice qua Equity fetishism fixed the gaze 
of the stakeholder and lured them with the promise of something special, something they 
would not give up.   
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Chapter 4 
Equity, Private Property & the 
Stakeholders of Capitalism 
1. Introduction 
The following chapter plays a vital role as it focuses on many substantive and doctrinal 
elements that will later be theorised in relation to Equity fetishism.  As the title of the 
chapter shows, the substantive areas in question concern the relationship between 
Equity, civil justice, private property and stakeholders, including their use of and reliance 
on trusts, contractual remedies and the law of fiduciaries as juridical mechanisms for 
managing and conducting economic activity within capitalism.  ‘I think that we can safely 
say', argued Holdsworth in the first half of the twentieth century, ‘that, without the 
evolution of a system of equity, English law could not have been made adequate to meet 
the social and economic needs of the modern state'307.  To determine what is stake from 
Holdsworth claiming of adequacy, this chapter will examine the role of Equity in the 
balance of power between law and economics within capitalism.   
Whilst Equity provides rules and procedures in conjunction with Common Law that 
informs the structures and frameworks of civil justice through which commercial activity 
is conducted, and in that sense facilitates economic activity in the form of personal and 
commercial asset management, exchange and transaction, law does not as a general rule, 
I argue, dominate economics within capitalism.  Instead law, its variegated 
jurisprudences, procedures and processes, judges, lawyers, academics, and so on, are 
beholden to economic reason, and this manifests in a variety of ways.  By, for example, 
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moulding regulations to be market-complementing, or, as Yip and Lee euphemistically 
maintain, in the resultant ‘primacy of commercialist pragmatism' within the field of 
Equity jurisprudence and competence308.  The focus here is on the property concept and 
private property in particular as a legally legitimate and mandated site that economics, 
namely capitalism and neoliberal capitalism, uses to reproduce itself ideologically and 
materially.  Equity derives a great deal of authority and legitimacy as a body of private 
laws from the property concept, and in conjunction with the property regime constructed 
by the Common Law at large.  As Peter Birks maintains: ‘There are legal property rights 
and equitable property rights, and there are legal obligations and equitable obligations.  
There is not really anything else’309.  Further, Bryan and Vann describe some of the key 
aspects of Equity’s peculiar contribution, including: 
The creation of special rules governing the assignment of property interest.  
An assignment is the immediate transfer of an interest in property.  
Property, for this purpose, includes intangible property, such as a chose in 
action, for example, the right to enforce a contract.  Common law and 
statute prescribe formalities for the transfer of most forms of property.  
Equity enables property to be assigned where the method of assignment 
does not comply with these rules.  It also enables ‘future property’, meaning 
property to which the transferor does not at present have title, to be 
assigned310.        
Equity is relevant within capitalism I argue precisely because it offers these sorts of 
mechanism for stakeholders in conjunction with and as an extension of the Common Law, 
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to manipulate and manage private property, extract value, and ultimately generate usable 
wealth.  In the form of trusts this manipulation is even more acute, as Jonathan Garton 
explains with regard to the purposes a stakeholder may have for establishing a trust: 
‘These purposes include concealing ownership, facilitating land conveyancing and other 
types of dealing in property, holding and controlling property for the sake of large groups 
of people (particularly in the fields of collective investment and charitable and other non-
profit orientated activity), providing for the founder’s family in various ways over long 
periods of time (both before and after his or her death), protecting property from 
creditors and from the extravagance of individual members of the  family, and cutting 
down tax liabilities, particularly on the transfer of private capital’311.   
Following Garton, we can also note Sarah Worthington’s view of Equity’s ‘manipulation 
of traditionally accepted concepts of property’, and the fact that ‘Equity would sometimes 
regard certain assets as property even when the Common Law did not’312.  As a species of 
private law, Equity, as Peter Birks explains, ‘concerns the persons who bear rights, the 
rights which they bear, and the actions by which they protect those rights’313.  Further, 
Graham Virgo claims that Equity is ‘even more imaginative in it recognition of property 
rights’ than Common Law, because ‘Equity is able to recognize rights to assets and the 
use of property, but also the value of property and rights that may arise in the future’314.   
Stakeholders, therefore, have a rich tapestry of ways in Equity with which to, for example, 
establish and manage private property interests, rights in assets such as debts, and so-
called securities, allowing them to be traded as forms of usable wealth.  Via these sorts of 
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mechanisms and interactions stakeholders do not simply conduct business, manage 
assets or undertake transactions as neutral, banal or common sense practices.  Rather 
they create and exploit (‘leverage’ to use the parlance of modern business), what Virgo 
refers to as, ‘particular events’ that create equitable property rights315.  ‘Equitable 
proprietary rights need to be created specifically’, argues Virgo, with ‘a variety of events 
that will operate to create equitable interests in property’, and he lists what he views as 
the major examples of these:   
By far the most significant is the express create of that interest, as occurs 
where an express trust is created.  Secondly, this may arise by virtue of a 
presumed intent that property should be held by the legal owner on behalf 
of the claimant [e.g. resulting trusts].  Thirdly, the equitable proprietary 
interest may arise by operation of law, often because the defendant can be 
considered to have acted unconscionably316.    
Virgo also describes the role of Equity’s creation of personal rights as ‘of real significance 
to the development of the law’, notably that of fiduciaries, which we will examine in more 
depth later317. 
‘It is all very well to identify a body of judge-made law, give it a name, identify certain 
vague characteristics, and then seek to justify this by reference to constitutional, political 
and legal developments many hundreds of years ago’, argues Virgo, concluding that the 
‘crucial question is whether Equity remains relevant today’318.  This thesis agrees with 
Virgo on the need to ascertain the relevance of Equity today, moreover that Equity ‘clearly 
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is’ still relevant ‘in terms of explaining long-established doctrines of private law and also 
as a mechanism for providing new solutions to contemporary problems’319.  What can be 
added to these evaluations of Equity is, however, an analysis of its contribution to 
stakeholder adherence to the ideological principles of capitalism by providing new 
solutions to contemporary problems, as Virgo would have it.  Equity fetishism, as a 
psychoanalytical interpretation of the role and function of law, construes Equity as a 
means of reinforcing and reproducing capitalist ideology through its defence of the 
fairness of transactions and the flexibility required to perform them within, for instance, 
commercial contexts involving the law of contract320.  In doing so, Equity does not 
represent a universal ideal of fairness or transcendent morality but one that functions 
and has relevance to stakeholders within the closed circuits of capitalism, what Mark 
Fortier refers to as ‘the moral narrowing of equity in the development of its 
imperatives'321.  And yet the social and political pervasiveness of capitalism and 
especially in its neoliberal form means the narrow deontological imperatives of Equity 
have arguably become normative standards in the wider field of subjective existence.    
‘Every legal relation is a relation between subjects’, argues Evgeny Pashukanis, the 
‘subject is the atom of legal theory, its simplest, irreducible element’322.  Therefore, before 
looking at private property in more detail it is necessary to examine the particular 
interpretation of economic subjectivity Pashukanis describes and one that underscores 
this thesis, namely the stakeholder. 
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2. The Stakeholder  
The stakeholder is an economic subject defined by a certain primacy they give to private 
property interests.  Marx called these subjects ‘the adherents of the monetary and 
mercantile system, who look upon private property only as an objective substance 
confronting men’323.  In the Introduction to this thesis, the stakeholder was described as 
one who willingly answers the call or ‘hail' of capitalism324.  We can now expand on this 
initial outline.  The stakeholder is one who engages in competition and the ‘free-market' 
logic of property distribution, regulation and efficiency, where the latter denotes 
‘allocation of resources in which value is maximised'325.  Further, the stakeholder seeks 
to accumulate, exploit and seize opportunities for economic advantage and gain, even 
where that might or does involve calling foul, unfair or unequal the bargaining practices 
and conduct of other stakeholders.  On this basis, the stakeholder defined here 
corresponds with what Karl Polanyi called ‘atomistic and individualistic' organic forms, 
and Louis Althusser referred to as ‘interpellated subjects'326.  While the stakeholder is 
historically contingent and socially varied, they are always already beholden to the 
authority and hegemony of economic reason, what Antonio Gramsci calls ‘economism’327.   
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The stakeholder is not simply defined by passivity in the face of the inevitability of 
economic reason brought about by capital’s domination of all or many aspects of 
contemporary social life, but by a complex of economic, legal and psychological referents. 
As the name suggests, the stakeholder is committed to a certain mode of being in the 
world centred on capitalist logic, reason and ideology, as well as belief in fantasies 
promulgated by capitalism.  The stakeholder does, I claim, enjoy capitalism, and thus by 
the logic of that form of social organization is one who adheres, perhaps slavishly so, to 
the ways, means and ideology of capitalism through the pursuit of private property and 
self-interest.  The fundamental fantasy of the stakeholder is, therefore ‘that of an 
individual existence that owes nothing to the larger social structure in which it resides’, 
making the stakeholder a private, perverse, and narcissistic figure who seeks meaning 
and understanding of the self in the materialism of private property and the opportunism 
it affords them328.   
In contrast to the notion of the ‘subject’ used at points during this thesis thus far to 
describe a broader psychosocial form of subjectivity, the stakeholder is a particular form 
of economic subjectivity defined by the private property order under capitalism, and use 
of civil justice to access and navigate that order.  On the one hand, the stakeholder reflects 
a category of subjects whose property and financial interests are construed by the 
Ministry of Justice as substantial.  This includes stakeholders deemed sufficiently 
‘important, complex or substantial’ to warrant being dealt with by the High Court rather 
than the county courts329.  The definition of stakeholder used during this thesis is not 
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always theoretical or general, therefore, but reflects an economic subject for whom 
complete justice between the parties in civil cases is a viable proposition only because 
they have the economic means and socio-political significance to trigger mechanisms of 
complete justice within the civil justice system.  Stakeholders with privilege thus 
engender the fetishistic prerequisite of Equity and ECJ through an encounter with civil 
justice because they can, broadly-speaking, afford it.   
These stakeholders might be asset-rich, maybe even high net worth individuals or 
corporations, and enjoy a strong position in terms of property rights as a result.  In 
questioning the nature of the privilege enjoyed by stakeholders, however, psychoanalysis 
points not to satisfied or fulfilled subjects, but the inverse.  Capitalist ideology instead 
‘aims at producing subjects who experience their existence as dissatisfied and 
simultaneously invest themselves completely in the ideal of happiness or complete 
satisfaction’330.  The completeness of the ‘investment’ sought by stakeholders manifests 
itself inter alia in material and abstract financial investments (forms of which will be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter), but, importantly, also via a visceral 
engagement with capitalist ideology itself as the hoped-for means through which to 
actualise a complete, non-castrated self.  Investment thus encompasses the banality of 
bureaucracy and the perversity and ecstasy of risk and competition, allowing 
stakeholders to seek what they desire and find enjoyment in bureaucratic systems of 
justice and property.   
On the other hand, the theory of Equity fetishism extrapolates to the wider ‘theoretical' 
population of as yet under- or unprivileged bourgeoisie stakeholders that exist within 
what Lorenzo Chiesa and Alberto Toscano call the ‘ideological force-field of 
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contemporary capitalism’331.  In other words, this population of bourgeois stakeholders 
want to be the privileged adherents of a juridical demarcation of substantial claims and 
of transactions defined by the Ministry of Justice, and in many respects Equity and the 
flexibility it brings to Common law and civil justice is there to help achieve that goal.  As 
Mark Pawlowski maintains, with particular regard to the flexibility Equity exercises 
through the doctrine of unconscionability:  
Although the jurisdiction to set aside unconscionable bargains was 
originally confined to reversioners and expectant heirs, it has since been 
extended to poor and ignorant persons and where the transaction in 
question was made at a considerable undervalue without the benefit of 
independent legal advice. More recently, it has been held that the modern 
equivalent of “poor and ignorant” is “a member of the lower income group 
. . . less highly educated.”  This broadening of the class of claimant eligible 
for relief has increased considerably the potential availability of the 
doctrine to a wider range of transactions where the terms are 
unconscionable and the victim does not receive independent legal advice. 
The essential elements of the doctrine were set out by Mr Peter Millett QC 
(sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court) in Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v 
Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd:  
“First, one party has been at a serious disadvantage to the other, whether 
through poverty, or ignorance, or lack of advice, or otherwise, so that 
circumstances existed of which unfair advantage could be taken . . . Second, 
this weakness of the one party has been exploited by the other in some 
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morally culpable manner . . . And third, the resulting transaction has been, 
not merely hard or improvident, but overreaching and oppressive.”332  
Within neoliberal capitalism, as Chapter 8 will discuss, the nineteenth-century notion of 
the stakeholder as a ‘man of property' in the vein of Soames Forsyte in John Galsworthy's 
Forsyte Saga has largely broken down or, rather, been rendered porous333.  This does not 
mean the capitalist stakeholder has vanished.  Instead neoliberalism induces a wider 
popular desire for economic privilege - the result of, what Jodi Dean calls, ‘the extent of 
the class power that has gotten us to think in terms of competition, efficiency, stock 
markets, bonuses, and financial success’334.          
For all stakeholders it is investment and generally maintaining high levels of economic 
engagement that is key because this provides the means to disavow castration as the lack 
that psychoanalysis maintains is at the core of the subject.  They do so by committing the 
stakeholder not simply to the limited scope of the personal fetish, but more completely 
to the fantasies aroused by capitalism of attaining a certain perfection or complete 
satisfaction in or through private property and other capitalist institutions, including 
markets335.  Further, the stakeholder’s investment includes a commitment to as many of 
the ways and means necessary to maintain this fantasy, hence ECJ, cast in this context, is 
elevated to levels of devotion whereby the notion of complete justice is itself a 
sublimation of stakeholder desire caught in the process of providing an object to be 
believed in.                   
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Equity drives or induces stakeholder engagement in many ways through different 
mechanisms and instruments, some of which are described in the following passage by 
the economist Anthony Atkinson: 
When politicians talk of Britain becoming a "property-owning democracy", 
they often mean property in the sense of housing.  This is, however, a rather 
special asset, generating a return in the form of imputed income.  Other 
forms of popular wealth, such as savings and bank accounts or pension 
funds, are held via financial institutions.  The latter hold the share 
certificates.  One consequence is that part of the capital income now 
accrues to the financial-services sector that manages these funds.  There is 
a wedge between the rate of return to capital and the income received by 
savers.  The growth of popular wealth has contributed to the increased 
"financialization" of the economy. (This, in turn, has implications for the 
separation of beneficial ownership and control…)336    
Housing, share certificates, capital income from intangibles, and, perhaps most 
revealingly, ‘the separation of beneficial ownership and control’ that is the sine qua non 
of trusts, all of these feature within the scope of Equity's jurisprudence.  Engagement with 
these areas suggests that stakeholders do not passively or reluctantly answer the 
ideological ‘hail' of capitalism.  On the contrary, they unreservedly put themselves at the 
centre of economic rationalisations conducted in the name of capital.  Moreover, it reveals 
that Equity is a crucial tool enabling stakeholders in their enjoyment of and belief in 
capitalism.   
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3. Private property power 
The basic requirement for understanding contemporary [Equity] is to look at the 
socioeconomic system thus produced and to observe its transposition, through the 
medium of law, into an imaginary construct that accommodates the progressive elements 
of the attack on classical law while ultimately securing the system’s appearance of 
legitimacy337.      
There can be no mistaking the relationship between what is here called the private 
property order and the fact that such an order consists of what Marx called commodities.  
As the lens through which to describe and understand the point at which capitalism, the 
stakeholder and Equity meet, therefore, Equity's part in the administration of the private 
property order is of crucial importance.  As Todd McGowan maintains, ‘enjoyment of the 
commodity in contemporary capitalist society requires a delicate balancing act between 
ignorance and knowledge’, and the suggestion here is, that in regard to the private 
property order, Equity facilitates enjoyment in this way338.  This involves dealing with the 
influence of capitalist class power on the property concept, and that concept as peculiarly 
private in nature and thus determined legally via, for example, the dictate of ownership 
rather than mere possession, as the source of what J.A. Jolowicz calls ‘selfish litigation’: 
‘litigation in which the actual concern of the parties is to promote or to protect only their 
own ‘private’ interests’339.   
‘Private’, Raymond Williams explains, ‘is still a complex word but its extraordinary 
historical revaluation is for the most part long completed’340.  Of the great number of 
instances of the term Williams traces, it is private as a ‘conventional opposition to what 
is public’ that is significant here341.  In her discussion on the contrast between public and 
private realms, Hannah Arendt suggests a similar definition.  For Arendt, privacy is only 
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given meaning by its opposition to the public realm, one in which everything ‘can be seen 
and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity'342.  Further, ‘the term 
“public” signifies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us and distinguished 
from our privately owned place in it […] The Public realm, as the common world, gathers 
us together and yet prevents our falling over each other’343.  Both Arendt and Williams 
point to an important factor in the context of property: what is private must somehow be 
taken from a more fundamental state of openness, and that taking subsequently enforced 
by right, hence Jolowicz’s contrast between private and public relating to the difference 
between ‘selfish’ and ‘unselfish’ litigation, where the former reflects a defence of private 
interests brought voluntarily by the plaintiff or claimant344.   
Private property, even when it exists in an open, public domain which allows non-owners 
some form of access to it is nevertheless always already in a state of withdrawal or 
opposition that drives non-owners away and prevents access or forms of adverse control 
or possession.  For Frederick Hayek, the private nature of property in terms of rules of 
demarcation makes possible ‘the delimitation of protected domains of individuals or 
groups', and is ‘as well as scientific truth as any we have attained in this field'345.  Whilst 
serving a deliberate ideological purpose in Hayek's thinking and work as means of 
defeating the socialist tendencies that he viewed as a significant threat to society, private 
property was also fundamental to Hayek's ‘inseparable trinity' along with law and 
liberty346.  There can be no law in the sense of universal rules of conduct’, argued Hayek, 
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‘which does not determine boundaries of the domains of freedom by laying down rules 
that enable each to ascertain where he is free to act’347.     
Following Hayek’s ideas it is important to understand the relevance of Equity as a mode 
of private and property law in order to further develop the connection between Equity, 
self-interest (what is arguably Hayek’s notion of freedom to act),  and capitalism.  In his 
reading of Marx’s Capital, Étienne Balibar makes a similar distinction, although he does 
not proceed further than questioning the distinction between property law and the 
concept that necessarily informs it, namely property as such.  ‘[D]istinguishing sharply 
between the connexion that we have called ‘property’ and the law of property’, Balibar 
maintains, ‘is of fundamental importance in characterizing the degree of relative 
autonomy of the economic structure with respect to the equally ‘regional’ structure of the 
‘legal and political forms’, i.e., in initiating an analysis of the articulation of regional 
structures or instances within the social formation’348.  As a form of private property law 
Equity contributes significantly to articulations of the regional structures Balibar 
highlights.  Advancing Balibar’s thesis to acknowledge Equity as private law is vital 
because it reveals the extent to which Equity is shielded from onerous doctrinal 
interventions in the fields of public and criminal law, namely in respect of ‘constitution, 
maintenance and regulation of government authority’349.  To echo Arendt, Equity’s 
private law status prefigures juridical conditions that resist on behalf of stakeholders the 
widest possible publicity.  Roger Cotterrell has argued that the ‘ideological significance of 
the distinction between private and public law is to affirm the existence of a private 
sphere (civil society) distinct from the state and unaffected by the public law which 
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structures the state; a private sphere in which individuals deal with each other as equal 
subjects and in which the existence of private power is legally unrecognised’, and the 
prerequisite of a substantial claim that we find in this instance clearly deepens the 
ideological significance referred to by Cotterrell350.  We will return to Equity’s particular 
contributions to property law shortly.   
3.1 The property concept 
‘Property’ is a notoriously difficult concept to define, not least because many aspects and 
characteristics of property tend to be emphasized in different ways by the various 
disciplines that seek to contextualise and explain it.  The classic contemporary statement 
on private property is that it is not simply a relationship between a person and a thing, 
but a collection or bundle of rights.  These rights underscore duties and obligations that 
individuals hold in respect of one another.  But, importantly, they also extend control over 
property from mere possession to ownership, thereby unleashing a range of further 
possible actions (or inactions) and interests the owner has rights over.  These include 
rights to use the thing in which the property right resides as the owner sees fit, as well as 
the right to exclude the world from it351.  Of all property rights, exclusion appears the most 
effective for explaining not simply the concept of property but the particular jealous 
nature of ownership that demands privacy.  Exclusion, notionally a right held against the 
whole world, is a very good way of both withdrawing and concealing property from 
public interference.  Whether property exists in a physical or tangible form, for example, 
land or chattels, or in an intangible form such as debts, securities or future interests, what 
remains consistent is the degree of control that factors such as exclusion allow.  Exclusion 
in conjunction with use, which, importantly, includes rights of transferability for value, 
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are central to explaining the augmentation of rights and benefits that Equity brings to the 
general scheme of property law beyond basic legal ownership, as well as the basis of 
Equity’s remedial action352.  ‘Law must also define possession by detailing those whom 
the possessor can exclude and under what circumstances she can exclude them’, 
maintains Jeanne Schroeder, concluding that in a world ‘in which third parties or 
dynamite exists, any limitation of a possessory right is equivalent to imposing n 
intersubjective valuation on the possessor.  Property remedies inevitably merge into 
liability remedies, and liability regimes presuppose a property regime’353.   
In the introduction to this thesis I claimed that private property (as the main focus here) 
is contingent on notions of resource scarcity that give form to social relations (and market 
relations in a neoliberal capitalist schema) through bundles of legal, moral and customary 
rights, concepts and practices including inter alia those of use, possession, ownership, 
enjoyment and exclusion.  In the private property context, these mechanisms can assume 
a particular quality as safeguarding functions that guarantee full assignment of separate 
objects (things) to individuals.  As Thomas C. Grey maintains: ‘Most people, including 
most specialists in their unprofessional moments, conceive of property as things that are 
owned by persons.  To own property is to have exclusive control of something - to be able 
to use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away, leave it idle, or destroy it’354.  And Grey sums 
up the perception of ownership as a safeguarding mechanism over private property 
maintaining that, ‘legal restraints on the free use of one's property are conceived as 
departures from an ideal conception of full ownership'355.  Similarly, Michael A. Heller 
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argues that private property requires that ‘one owner have full decisionmaking [sic] 
authority over an object, subject to some common law and regulatory limits’356.  Freed 
from these restraints the perception continues that rights to private property ought to be 
able to create or generate value, which when maximised and exploited contributes to the 
wealth of an individual or corporate stakeholder.  This includes, notably through 
exposure to market forces.   
‘The bedrock of the theory of the market economy is the assumption of private property 
rights’, argues Samuel Bostaph, and without ‘the command of property assured to the 
individual by his or her property rights, there can be no regularity and stability in the 
exchange of things.  Without stability in exchange, there will prices set in markets that 
reflect market conditions of demand and supply, themselves reflective of relative 
resource abundance.  Without such market prices, there is no basis for rational individual 
planning in consumption or production activities’357.  In his list of eleven bases of private 
property, Honoré notes, in particular, the ‘right to the capital value' of one's private 
property, including ‘alienation, consumption, waste, or destruction'358.  Although as 
Richard Posner points out, the generation of wealth in this way – through freely 
transferable rights to property for value - must also account for the costs of the property-
rights system in both obvious and subtle ways359.  Following Posner here we can see that 
as a consequence, and especially when considered in conjunction with questions of 
justice, property means something different to the lawyer than to the economist: the 
former focuses on rights and practice as the basis of the property concept, the latter on 
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the value of private ownership and the relative merits of modes of distribution360.  For 
the benefit of wider contextual considerations of the property concept within neoliberal 
capitalism, it is considered necessary to include legal and economic views on property.  
Further, as already implied it is worth looking closely at how property is defined within 
the conjoined fields of law and economics, and in particular in the work of Richard Posner.  
Posner's juridical reasoning bridges a number of aspects covered by this thesis: the 
utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, the liberalism of nineteenth-century reformists and 
classical economists, and the neoliberalism of Frederick Hayek.  We will examine Posner's 
idea of property shortly.    
Kevin and Susan Francis Gray begin their definition of ‘the elusive concept of property’ as 
follows: 
We commonly speak of property as if its meaning were entirely clear and 
logical, but property is a conceptual mirage which slips tantalisingly from 
view just when it seems most solidly attainable.  Amongst the 
misperceptions which dominate the conventional analysis of both lay 
persons and lawyers is the lazy myth that property is a ‘monolithic notion 
of standard content and invariable intensity'.  Our daily references to 
property, therefore, tend to comprise a mutual conspiracy of 
unsophisticated semantic allusions and confusions, which we tolerate – 
frequently, indeed, do not notice – largely because our linguistic shorthand 
commands a certain low-level communicative efficiency361.   
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As later discussions unpacking Equity fetishism in more detail will show, semantic 
allusions, the language (of Equity) that Gray and Gray highlight above, play a crucial role 
in structuring the fantasy of private property law within capitalism362.  Therefore, whilst 
Gray and Gray consider their task ‘to jolt ourselves out of our traditional, reassuringly 
three-dimensional, imagery about property’ by attacking ‘limitations of the property 
reference’ and the ‘mistaken reification of property’, this thesis will demonstrate why 
these features of the stakeholder relationship to property are in actuality critical, at least 
in terms of sustaining the private property regime within capitalism363.  And this latter 
point, as a political consideration, is one not overlooked by Gray and Gray it is important 
to add, but rather seized upon by them as the ultimate definition of property:      
Deep at the heart of the phenomenon of property is the semantic reality 
that ‘property’ is not a thing, but rather the condition of being ‘proper’ to a 
particular person (eg ‘That book/car/house is proper to me’).  For serious 
students of property, the beginning of truth is the recognition that property 
is not a thing but a power relationship – a relationship of social and legal 
legitimacy existing between a person and a valued resource (whether 
tangible or intangible).  To claim ‘property’ in a resource is, in effect, to 
assert a significant degree of control over the resource.  ‘Property’ 
ultimately articulates a political relationship between persons [emphasis 
added]364.                        
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The institutions and systems of civil justice have over time shaped the broad nature of 
the property concept as defined variously above and, therefore, also the social and 
political relationships that according to Gray and Gray constitute property as such.  In 
their insistence on the relational basis of property, Gray and Gray are echoing, at least to 
some degree, the ideas of Evgeny Pashukanis.  Within capitalism Pashukanis recognised 
the significance of a wide and integral set of legal relations:   
In as much as the wealth of capitalist society appears as ‘an immense 
collection of commodities’, so this society itself appears as an endless chain 
of legal relations.  Commodity exchange presupposes an atomised 
economy.  The link between isolated private economic units is maintained 
in each case by successfully concluded business deals.  The legal relation 
between subjects is simply the reverse side of the relation between 
products of labour which have become commodities365.      
The extent to which the property concept has deliberately or consciously been defined by 
law and civil justice for the widest possible benefit, that is, beyond the needs and desires 
of privileged networks of capitalist power within societies, has been covered and 
challenged by a number of critical theories in recent decades, including feminist and 
queer theories of property, and within that Equity and trusts366.  Margaret Davis, for 
instance, has shown how the nature of social relations in property are particularly 
pertinent from the point of view of a queer critique of property law, which echoes Gray 
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and Gray’s claims that property ‘has an unavoidably intersubjective element, meaning 
that although it may attach to a concrete or abstract object, ‘property’ is primarily a 
relation between legal subjects which has things as its focus’367.  For Davies the role of 
property law is to determine the quality ‘mine', moreover, that property is ‘also 
characterised by an immensely strong symbolic power and is both expressive and 
constitutive of the person'368.  This notion of property and legal relationships in Davies’ 
particular reading reflects certain social hierarchies ‘organised around sex and 
sexuality’369.  This thesis follows a very similar notion of property to Davies', albeit one in 
which the metapsychology of sexual desire manifests in the stakeholder's concealment of 
castration as fundamental basis of subjectivity and being in the world, a form of sexual 
desire projected onto and mediated by a conjunction of law (Equity and institutions of 
civil justice for example) and economics (capitalism and capitalist logic of efficiency, 
competition, and so on) that finds form, so to speak, in ECJ and Equity fetishism.           
Administration of the private property order in line with the notion of complete justice 
qua civil procedural and substantive merits-based justice cuts across legal and economic 
definitions of property and the ways in which property is administered, protected, 
transacted and distributed.  Key to civil justice administration is supporting a regime of 
private property ownership that enfolds the means of wealth extraction from property – 
Honoré’s ‘right to capital’370.  Within civil justice creative approaches to property rights 
and ownership are symptomatic of the ‘flexible’ contributions Equity makes to forms of 
private, personal and corporate wealth generation.  As Lord Neuberger maintains: ‘Like 
any organic entity, equity has always developed as a result of both the internal influences 
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from its genes received from its forebears and the external influences which permeate its 
environment. Its parental genes are fairness and flexibility, as equity was developed to 
mitigate the rigours and technicalities of the common law. Its environmental influences 
are multifarious, but they include the need for consistency and certainty, without which 
any legal code risks falling into disrepute’371.  Principle examples of Equity’s influence on 
the legal landscape include the trust, which in spite of assuming a variety of forms seen 
as socially progressive, including as charitable, is notable for tax avoidance and 
‘aggressive financial management’372.  This opportunistic and morally questionable, 
albeit entirely legal, use of trusts based on the desire to reduce stakeholder tax liabilities 
in ways that, as the Tax Justice Network argue, impoverish the national tax base and offend 
public interest presumably counts as one of Neuberger’s ‘environmental influences’373.  
We see in Neuberger’s euphemism, therefore, a reluctance to name capitalism (let alone 
neoliberal capitalism), as that which commands law and is the one that ultimately has the 
power to bring it into ‘disrepute’.  In later chapters, however, we will see that Lord 
Neuberger has not always been so veiled as to the realities of the role of law in 
contemporary capitalist society.    
Contra Neuberger’s reluctance to name the disreputee qua capitalist stakeholder, I claim 
that trusts, which will discussed further later in this chapter, signal a proliferation of 
wealth generating opportunities suited to stakeholders, who, in accordance with 
capitalist ideology are keen to demonstrate not so much that ‘a society that safeguards 
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property is wealthier than one that does not’, but certainly that the private stakeholder 
who does will be wealthier than the one who does not374.  Trusts and the property that 
constitute them are, as Gray and Gray contend, vehicles for ideology375.  Moreover, 
beyond the notion of property as an ‘epithet used to identify that which people most 
greatly value’, I argue private property within capitalism is valorised on an even more 
abstract level, that of wealth creation, to which desires more easily attached and around 
which fantasies more easily gather376.  As Freud maintained, ‘the mutual relations of men 
are profoundly influenced by the amount of instinctual satisfaction which the existing 
wealth makes possible’377.  Further, Penner maintains in his discussion of Hannah 
Arendt’s theories of public and private that circulate her interpretation of the private 
property concept as ‘a kind of necessary contrast to, and base from which a person could 
enter the public realm.  This is all to be sharply contrasted with wealth.  Wealth is merely 
economic power, undifferentiated and unrealized.  Wealth is necessary to sustain 
property and thus the private realm, but it is not to be exalted for its own sake’378.  The 
crucial point that Penner touches on is that private property signals ‘ontological privilege’ 
and above all else power, making it both something stakeholders desire and to a varying 
extent can be satisfied by if and when they are able to assert their proprietary interest379.   
Reflexively property as power can also be and is used to constrain and delimit the 
possibilities of those persons unable to assert such interests, including where they lack 
economic, social or political power380.  In order for that bargain and negotiation between 
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desire and satisfaction to be made or at least appear possible, therefore, requires 
mediating institutions and systems, hence the role of civil justice within capitalism.  
Moreover the particular contributions of Equity qua ECJ, as a means of constructing and 
maintaining fantasies around property.  ‘The fascination of property', argues Margaret 
Davies, is the ways ‘in which the various dimensions of the property as social myth and 
legal category interact in a multitude of inexpressibly complex ways'381.  Moreover Davies 
concludes, with an explanation worthy of a description of the role of Equity fetishism, 
‘because the central social symbolism of property is of something fixed, certain, delimited 
and absolute, this symbolic and material mobility is forgotten or even repressed in a 
gesture which reinforces the ideology of centralised power and masks the underlying 
circulation of meanings'382.   
3.2 Law and economics 
The economics of property, wealth and power leads us to a consideration of the property 
theory devised by the conjoined field of law and economics, and in particular by American 
jurist and Judge Richard Posner, whose major influence is acknowledged in the wide-
ranging literature on the subject that has developed since the 1970s383.  Law and 
economics has been pervasive in legal practice and academia for a number of decades 
and is a product of shifts in legal reasoning developed by the likes the Chicago school384.  
Roger Cotterrell writing in the closing decades of the twentieth century remarked that 
the economic analysis of law is a ‘form of legal scholarship now widely established and 
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recognised in American law schools and of increasing significance in the British academic 
legal world’385.  The aim of applying economics to law was for its proponents, as Cotterrell 
maintains, to fill a lack of rationality in legal reason within the Common Law, to ‘promote 
an efficient allocation of resources in society’, a competitive free-market influenced 
‘invisible hand’ theory insofar as it claims that, whether or not the judges knew what they 
were doing in terms of economic rationality in developing common law rules, the case-
by-case evolution of common law has in fact led to outcomes with a high degree of 
allocative efficiency’386.  And it is on this latter point that Cotterrell cites the work of 
Richard Posner.  
For William Davies, Posner is key to understanding the major shift in legal reasoning that 
occurred in the latter half of the twentieth century, whereby the disciplinary line that 
separated law from neo-classical economics (lawyers from economists) blurred and 
arguably even vanished, paving the way for the comprehensive economization of law387.  
Echoing the unification and resultant complete justice of Equity and Common Law after 
Judicature, Davies makes a case for the fusion of law and economics with Posner as a 
central actor388. The fusion of law and economics meant neo-classical economics acquired 
a ‘liberal spirit’ and economists emerged as ‘quasi-judicial in their authority’, which 
included ensuring ‘all combatants [claimants and defendants, creditors and debtors, and 
so on] are equal before the measure of efficiency, in the same way that judges ensure that 
all citizens are equal before the law’389.  Furthermore, the economic empiricism applied 
to legal situations by the likes of Posner revealed a ‘purported fairness and blindness’ that 
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was central to neoliberal juridical thinking - the former of those, at least, being an 
equitable referent.   
Duncan Kennedy, to, is sceptical of the mix of law and economics espoused by the likes of 
Posner, not least because, as Cotterrell claims, it leads to over-rationalisation.  Kennedy’s 
scepticism parallels Yip and Lee’s concerns, at the level of Equity doctrine, of the effect of 
‘commercial pragmatism’ on Equity390, an effect, I argue, symptomatic not of a failure or 
flaw in the internal logic and reason of law but of the dominion of economic over legal 
reason that punctures the carapace of doctrinal reasoning and injects rationalities of inter 
alia market solutionism391.  For Kennedy classical economics ‘needed a theory of law if 
they were to make good their basic claims about the nature of economic life’, and were 
content ‘with frequent allusions to the “sacredness” of property and to the disastrous 
consequences of “government interference with contracts”’392.  Further, and here we can 
see the attractiveness of Equity to economic thought, Kennedy claims that proof ‘of the 
validity of economic laws relied crucially on concepts like freedom and justice.  They 
[classical economists] spent much of their time trying to persuade their readers not of 
the existence of particular facts but of the “naturalness”, “fairness”, or “optimality” of 
those facts’393.   
Posner’s description of the property concept begins in the Common Law as ‘applied by 
the royal law courts of England in the eighteenth century’, and is subdivided across three 
domains: the law of property, the law of contracts, and the law of torts394.  For the 
purposes of this thesis, it is the first two, the laws of property and contract, which are of 
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most interest and the influence of Equity jurisprudence (what Posner refers to as a 
specialized subcategory) on them395.  Posner's reference to the historical roots of the 
property concept and thus his description of property more generally must be read in 
light of the conjunction of the socio-psychological with the economic that draws him to a 
fundamental relationship between property, efficiency, rationality and self-interest. For 
Posner, economics must explore the implications of ‘assuming man is a rational 
maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions – what we shall call his "self-interest"396.  In 
that sense Posner’s analysis of property is remarkably similar to the one undertaken by 
this thesis, the crucial difference being the political motivations and justifications Posner 
relies upon are not ones that are shared here, and perhaps most notably with regard to 
justice, which is allied to robust and definitive ownership of private property in Posner’s 
private law examples (he also relies on public and criminal law examples in his account 
of law and economics which account for different ideals of justice), and over which he 
claims, ‘economics can provide value clarification by showing the society what it must 
give up to achieve a noneconomic ideal of justice’397.  Posner’s logic here is both 
fascinating and somewhat contradictory, not least because he insists on economics for 
evaluating justice in order, or so it seems, to justify how to define justice without 
economics, a point he justifies by suggesting that the ‘demand for justice is not 
independent of price’398.    
Substantively Posner's approach to property turns on the legal protection of transferable 
property rights in order to ‘create incentives to use resources efficiently'399.  ‘The proper 
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incentives are created by parcelling out mutually exclusive rights to the use of particular 
resources among the members of society’, claims Posner, and whilst his initial example 
chooses land as the property in question he is quick to acknowledge that the same 
principle ‘applies to all valuable resources’400.  To all intents and purposes, Posner's ideas 
here do not depart greatly from conventional notions of the property concept outlined 
above.  But the centrality of the logic of competition and efficiency to his idea of property 
demonstrate the univocal economic potentialities Posner considers all forms of property 
to possess.  Like buried treasure or a seam of coal, the wealth-giving properties of private 
property are, on Posner's account, simply waiting to be found and realised by the one 
who owns.  And in this determination he is arguably more honest in his definition of 
property than many others reluctant to admit the indisputable nature of property's 
ideological role within capitalism, rather than property being inherently defined as a 
product of legal determinacy401.  What is more Posner's notion of precedent as a product 
of legal rulemaking that constitutes ‘capital stock' is another means by which he reveals 
the grasp capitalism has on law, albeit one he supports rather than contests, so too in his 
application of calculation to civil procedure rendering it the goal of procedure 
economic402.     
Furthermore, Posner considers this approach a viable route for governments.  In other 
words, the shaping of public property in the mould of private property reasoning – 
precisely the type of strategy used by neoliberal stakeholders, as Chapter 8 will discuss.  
‘The economist can assist the policymaker not only by explaining the effects of a policy 
                                                        
400 Posner, 1986, p.30 
401 It is important to note again that Posner’s political motivation for a law and economics appraisal that 
reveals the capitalist logics operating through private property and its juridical administration are not the 
same political motivations for a turn to, or rather appreciation of, law and economics here.   
402 Posner, 1986, p.509 and p.517 
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on the efficiency with which resources are used’, claims Posner, ‘but also by tracing its 
effects on the distribution of income and wealth’403.  In conjunction with property law, 
Posner also considers the role of contract in shaping his definition of the property 
concept.  As a precursor to a closer look at Equity's interventions in the private property 
regime and to conclude this section, therefore, we will look at aspects of contract law 
within Posner’s property theory and also consider how the place of contract has been 
extended due to the influence of law and economics.   
Citing US valorisation of freedom of contract as ‘necessary to preserve, or simulate the 
results of, free markets' during the nineteenth century and continuing through the latter 
part of the twentieth century (Posner was initially talking about the 1970s, although the 
text referenced here is an edition from the 1980s), Posner traces the commercial 
influence of contract on the transformation of US law and judicial reasoning, through the 
revival of thinking that had, since the 1930s, turned against contract as a ‘grotesque 
distortion' of constitutional principle404.  As the preferred legal mechanism of classical 
economics and thus central to ‘maximisation of wealth’, what Jeanne Schroeder’s calls the 
proposition most closely associated with Posner, the revival of contract also elevated the 
status of economics in law, which in turn elevated the status of, indeed emphasised, 
economic rights and liberties that, through the medium of contract, reflected ‘dominant 
public opinion'405.  Thus what the public desired, claims Posner, was to be freely 
contracting economic citizens, and it was wrong for judges to deny this fact, or for the law 
to countermand it, both of which signalled a justice system that was ‘out of step'406. 
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Posner does not simply make the case for freedom of contract as an economic right or 
liberty exercisable at a constitutional level, however, instead he locates contract as 
fundamental to intersubjective bargaining, and thus implies factors of shame and 
contentiousness as structuring all forms of transaction.  ‘Someone who is known not to 
perform his side of bargains will find it difficult to find anyone willing to make exchanges 
with him in the future', claims Posner, ‘which is a costly penalty for taking advantage of 
the vulnerability of the other party to a contract, the vulnerability that is due to the 
sequential character of performance'407.  And following Hobbes’s conception of the social 
contract, Posner defines the rationale for contract being, ‘to deter people from behaving 
opportunistically toward their contracting parties, in order to encourage the optimal 
timing of economic activity and make costly self-protective measures unnecessary'408.  
The ‘familiar' and desirable role of contract is, therefore, economizing transaction costs, 
and whilst this may begin or relate directly to an actual commodity of financial 
transaction, the efficiency gains ought, by Posner’s reasoning, to extend to the behaviour 
of contracting parties409.  Further, the regulation of party behaviours that Posner sees 
contract performing perhaps explains why he places less emphasis on the role of 
fiduciary obligations to achieve that end, in contrast for example to his contemporary 
Tamar Frankel who suggests characterizing fiduciary relationships as contract ‘renders 
irrelevant the main focus of fiduciary law: the relative power relationship among 
parties’410.   
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For Posner, the fiduciary principle is simply ‘law’s answer to the problem of unequal costs 
of information’, but concludes that most ‘consumers’ are intelligent enough to protect 
themselves, presumably by contract, without needing to rely on fiduciary law411.  A 
position that is contested by Daniel Markovits who views fiduciary duties as ‘natural 
response to the structural problems out of which fiduciary relations generally arise’ and 
which cannot be construed by the contract412.  Fiduciary obligations, therefore, substitute 
‘for the specification of contract duties and the verification of importance'413.  This can 
also be seen as a so-called ‘agency problem' that arises from incomplete contracting and 
sets into action an expansive application of core fiduciary duties of loyalty and care414.  
Posner’s treatment of the fiduciary principle may appear cursory and certainly a second-
order mechanism compared to contract, but I conclude with it here as a means of moving 
on to look in more detail at Equity’s peculiar contributions to private law, including 
fiduciary doctrine.  Moreover, with Markovits’ notion of substitution, and the ideal of 
completing the contract as, I argue, symptoms of Equity fetishism residing in the folds of 
the laws of property, contract, and fiduciaries.              
3.3 Fiduciaries  
We have reviewed key areas of the property concept and property rights, including 
Posner’s particular interpretation through the lens of law and economics.  Further to the 
definitions above and in order to understand the connection between Equity 
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jurisprudence, property, and stakeholder desires under capitalism it is necessary to look 
in more depth at Equity’s administration of property and the nature of property as it is 
defined through private civil law obligations and practices.  Historically, as earlier 
discussions have shown, the concerns of Chancery and of Equity in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence have been rooted in property and economic rights, including concerns over 
‘the man forced to pay a debt twice because there is no paper trail; the heir or widow 
robbed of a trust; those seeking equal pay for work of equal value; those investing their 
retirement funds in “equities”’415.   Hence, as a branch of private law Equity has a variety 
of objectives including coercion, compensation, disgorgement, restitution, and 
vindication of the personal and proprietary rights that underpin private ownership; 
ensuring performance of contracts; and maintaining and regulating definitions of duties 
and obligations within fiduciary law, including those of trustees416.   
‘In general’, maintains James Penner, ‘equity worked to amend or supplement rules of law 
over the breadth of private common law’417.  Equity's responsibility on behalf of 
stakeholders to uphold private interests in property extends to obligations and duties, as 
well as to material forms of property and to property rights, and Equity creates, maintains 
and enforces specific relationships that enable individuals to work on behalf of each 
other.  These relationships are not neutral politically, however, nor are they entirely or 
explicitly altruistic.  Rather, I argue, the relationships are predicated on jurisprudence 
and forms of procedure that have over time evolved to better promote ‘selfishness' and 
self-interest by ensuring a private property rights regime that corresponds with capitalist 
and commercialist logic, and that privacy is legitimatised at the level of the social and 
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political418.  ‘The widespread notion that persons have some sort of natural right to own 
property draws upon the idea that human personhood necessarily contains with it an 
ability and need to control external resources’, claims Margaret Davies, ideologically 
‘property defines an area of privacy, of personal autonomy and personal sovereignty so 
that the owner has a much greater sphere of protected rights than the non-owner’.419  
Equity’s contribution to and shaping of fiduciary law, introduced above, is a good example 
of both Penner’s and Davies’ claims and will, therefore, be the focus of this particular 
section.  
Millett LJ described some of the essential characteristics of the fiduciary in Bristol and 
West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1: 
A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for on behalf of another 
in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of 
trust and confidence.  The distinguishing obligation of the fiduciary is the 
obligation of loyalty.  The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty 
of his fiduciary.  This core liability has several facets.  A fiduciary must act 
in good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place 
himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict; he may 
not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the 
informed consent of his principal.  This is not intended as an exhaustive list, 
but is sufficient to indicate the nature of fiduciary obligations420.       
The fiduciary relationship has, as Anthony Mason suggests, ‘been the spearhead of 
equity’s incursions into the area of commerce’, and it is vital to a number of commercial 
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relationships, which indicates its significance to stakeholders, but also, as Joseph F. 
Johnson Jr has highlighted in terms of modern corporate business practices, 
shareholders421.  ‘Shareholders, as the residual risk takers, have entrusted their funds to 
the corporation for the purposes of gaining profit’, argues Johnson, and this creates ‘a 
relationship of trust that, in law and equity, takes precedence over the inclination of 
managers to be charitable with other people’s money.  It is entirely justifiable’ he 
concludes, ‘that corporate managers should consider the legitimate interests of 
employees, customers, suppliers, and other constituencies, including the community, but 
only so long as there is a rational and perceptible nexus between actions favouring other 
constituencies and long-term shareholder benefit’ [emphasis added]422.  This final passage 
is provocative, not least because it highlights the necessity of economic and self-
interested benefit as transcendent of the key features of fiduciaries often foregrounded 
in normative legal thinking and statements, including notions of good faith and fealty that 
the fiduciary must represent.  Johnson’s honest appraisal of the brute economics that lie 
at the heart of fiduciary law is an interesting counterpoint to Henry Smith’s 
interpretation.  For Smith, the fiduciary comes with a risk of opportunism that he 
considers Equity well-suited to mitigate, as a means of anti-opportunism within the 
private law context423.  Fiduciary law is, for Smith, an ‘outgrowth’ of Equity and thus 
prompts innovation of a ‘high moral standard’424.   
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Within the context of modern corporate practices, the promotion of fair dealing practices 
in commercial settings and across markets, the fiduciary has parried with contract425.  As 
a complete justice solution within the Common Law traditions of Western capitalism (the 
US especially, but also the UK, Canada and Australia) the laws of contract and fiduciary 
law have, together, provided structure that business has come to rely on426.  A powerful 
statement on the significance of fiduciary law, and by extension Equity’s role, in this 
regard was offered by Justice Cardoza: 
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise 
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible 
in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those 
bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the 
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor 
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has 
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising 
rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to 
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of 
particular exceptions (Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 444). Only thus has 
the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that 
trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment 
of this court427     
Justice Cardozo's deliberate reference to the market as a place in which honour ought to 
prevail is telling.  Not least, if Posner is to be believed, because this judgment was given 
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on the cusp of the re-emergence of contract (after the 1930s) as a mechanism of 
commercial good faith that did not require the nebulous presentiments of altruism and 
honour that non-contractualism involved but of which Cardoza was in favour428.  As 
Michele Graziadei contends: ‘Looking at the history of fiduciary relationships from a 
contemporary perspective one notices a tension between the increasing tendency to view 
contracts from a market-orientated and utilitarian perspective and the ideals of liberality 
and honorary service’429. 
The equitable fiduciary construct aims to countermand, as Smith suggests, opportunistic 
actors, and here we need to understand that in relation to corporate, capitalist, and 
commercial practices in particular.  We have earlier discussed the inference of self-
interest in the practices of capitalism, as well as the role conscience, has played 
historically in marking Equity as a moral and just jurisprudence for counterbalancing the 
tendencies of self-interest.  For Graziadei the rejection by English law of the notion of 
fiduciary obligations as contractual in nature stems from ‘the fundamental idea that 
under English law contracts are self-regarding acts in which each party to the transaction 
must be presumed to be pursuing his or her own interests'430.  This means that contract 
has always served ‘one purpose and fiduciary obligations another, and both are 
conceptually distinct even where obligations generated by the two work to the same 
purpose’431.  As we saw above, a key to the fiduciary role is completing incomplete 
contracts by initiating core fiduciary duties and obligations, notably that of loyalty.  But 
such duties are problematic because they are uncertain and potentially inconsistent with 
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the ‘common sense' of contemporary commercial practices432.  Accordingly, it might be 
assumed that loyalty ought to remain distinct from contract, at least conceptually-
speaking, in order not to risk sullying the relative certainty of the contractual ideal.  
Economic analysis of the interrelationship between fiduciary and contract law disagree, 
however, and Robert Cooter and Bradley J. Freedman, in particular, argue that ‘the duty 
of loyalty, far from violating the postulate of self-interested behavior, is based upon it.  
The duty of loyalty must be understood as the law's attempt to create an incentive 
structure in which the fiduciary's self-interest directs her to act in the best interest of the 
beneficiary’433.   
Amid shifting emphases in the nature of the fiduciary within economic and legal terms, 
as well as wrangles between fiduciary and contract law, the fiduciary, and in particular 
the loyal one, both mediates and reconfigures the notion of ‘mine’ that Margaret Davies 
attributed to the basic role of law in defining private property434.  At the fundamental 
level of the property concept, instead of realising direct attribution of the thing to me and 
what is called at Common Law or in Equity ‘mine’ by means of ownership and possession, 
the fiduciary interposes a managerial role that does not negate or defeat what is ‘mine’ 
but releases me from the onerous need to patrol the boundaries of what is mine in order 
to exclude others, as well as finds imaginative if banal ways to use and exploit what is 
mine for economic advantage and gain.     
3.4 Trusts, securities and the fantasy of finding the lost object 
During this final section we will take the opportunity to explore the themes discussed 
thus far in the context of further discrete areas of Equity’s civil and property law 
                                                        
432 Cooter and Freedman, 1991, p.1074 
433 Cooter and Freedman, 1991, p.1074 
434 Davies, 1999, p.328 
146 
 
business435.  Equity’s long and notable jurisdiction over what Maitland calls the ‘fruitful 
field’ of the trust arguably provides one of the most enduring pieces of evidence of 
Equity’s commitment to ensuring that the ideology of capital is reproduced and that 
capital class power is further entrenched436.  The trust as a rudimentary yet innovative 
legal mechanism predates the rise of capitalism.  Moreover, it brings to light that fiduciary 
obligations and duties, located here in the trustee, are equally longstanding principles 
only latterly shaped by capitalism.  ‘The survival of the Anglo-Saxon word ‘trust’ is 
evidence enough that a connection has been maintained with an Anglo-Saxon original’, 
argues Gary Watt, ‘despite the subsequent overlaying of the Latinate language of ‘use’, 
‘conscience’ and ‘fiduciary duty’437.   
But an unmistakable shift in trusts law practices occurred once exposed to the forces of 
capitalist ideology, however, and in particular the demands of commercialism, leading to 
a significant growth in trusts and an industry to support them for ‘valid and legitimate 
reasons', but equally ‘abusive ones'438.  Remarking on the evolution of trusteeship during 
the nineteenth century, Chantal Stebbings maintains that the ‘new commercialisation of 
the English society and economy, begun in the late eighteenth century and reached its 
zenith in the Victorian period, changed the character of the office of trustee […] the 
Victorian period saw the transformation of the trustee from amateur to professional, 
from layman to businessman’439.  This exposure to commercialism within capitalism also 
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impacted beneficiaries as it shaped both their demands and entitlements440.  These 
factors made and continue to make the trust a pervasive example of the use by capitalist 
class power of legal mechanisms to further disseminate ideology through exploitation of 
permissive and flexible laws441.  As Roger Cotterrell maintains, via trusts (and thus also 
via the assets held on trust) Equity channels capitalist class power ‘rather than obscuring 
or disguising of it’442.  And Alastair Hudson maintains that a ‘politics of trusts law would 
have to account, ironically, for the way in which structures which are built on conscience 
are used to facilitate crime and to avoid taxation’443.     
Like Equity, the trust offers stakeholders a fetish insofar as it enables the stakeholder to 
believe in the promise made by capitalism for unencumbered wealth creation that will 
satisfy their unmet desires444.  In that sense, trusts, in accordance with the fantasies 
promulgated by capitalism in order to maintain stakeholder investment and engagement, 
depend ‘on the idea of obtaining the object’445.  And fetishization is, therefore, perhaps 
the most effective explanation of the ability of stakeholders to consistently use trusts for 
morally questionable ends without, in effect, being comprehensively morally comprised 
at the political and social level.  Trusts assume a wide variety of forms, especially in 
contemporary use within commercial capitalist settings.  As Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
maintains in Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] AC 421: ‘In the modern world the trust 
has become a valuable device in commercial and financial dealings’, and, indeed, this led 
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his reasoning to demand that the nuances of commercial trusts be recognised and 
differentiated from that of so-called ‘traditional trusts'446.  At a fundamental level, a trust 
offers a ‘unique way of owning property under which assets are held by a trustee for the 
benefit of another person, or for certain purposes, in accordance with special equitable 
obligations'447.  Importantly, however, trusts offer ‘versatility’ to the domain of private 
property that other legal mechanisms do not, and this applies in commercial and non-
commercial contexts alike as Jonathan Garton explains: 
The secret of the trust's success is to be found in three things.  First, in 
establishing a trust, a founder (or a court, in the case of ‘imputed trusts') 
can play a whole range of ‘tricks' with three particular aspects of property 
ownership: nominal title, benefit and control.  The founder (or the court) 
can juggle these around in a variety of ways.  Second, the rights and 
obligations expressly created in a trust are fortified by effective remedies 
and supplemented, so far as is necessary, by a substratum of detailed legal 
rules.  Third, in the areas where it is predominately used, the trust 
performs its ‘tricks' with property better, and has stronger legal 
reinforcement, than other competing legal institutions448.  
It is no mystery I suggest that trusts are a crucial weapon in the capitalist stakeholder 
arsenal because of their ability, not least via the ‘tricks’ Garton talks of, to increase private 
power through secreted wealth and capital holdings.  In a robust argument regarding 
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trusts and capitalism, Mitchell Franklin, in his reference during the 1930s to the Anglo-
American capitalist deployment of trusts, asked:  
What is the significance of the dominant role of the trust in Anglo-American 
juridical theory?  Why is it that the jurists, who have jeered at the spectacle 
of parallel systems of law, in which "equity" is expected to contradict "law", 
and in which there is a hierarchy of courts with the "equity" courts holding 
rank of the first class and the "law" courts holding rank of the second class 
(though the same judge may now play both roles at once), have refrained 
from liquidating the trust? Why has the trust survived repeated legislative 
assault except when the fisc [sic] is harassed?   
The answers come when the role of trusts under the regime of liberal 
capitalism is understood. The trust is an effort to escape from the ever-
deepening and ever-recurrent crises in capitalism. It is the confession of 
the upper middle class - the class that has most used the trust - that the 
contradictions in capitalism cannot be resolved. The risks of capitalism, 
therefore, must be minimized as much as possible through the employ of 
an astute, intelligent, ever-watchful class of professional managers of 
capital who are placed, because they are élite, beyond the control of the 
owner for consumption. But American lawyers do not have to be reminded 
that capitalism is so sick that even this device to protect the only class that 
benefits from capitalism has failed pathetically449.   
The global significance and popularity of trusts within capitalism as Franklin described 
them has not disappeared in the years since he was writing.  Instead, they have become 
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more pervasive because, I argue, at a fundamental psychical level they offer a reassuring 
promise to stakeholders that they will be brought nearer to obtaining the object of desire.  
But as psychoanalysis routinely tells us the object can never be obtained and the fantasies 
and illusions of fetishism are testaments to the ways in which stakeholders (subjects) 
manage this reality.  Far from discouraging the stakeholder, the fantasy acts as a primary 
motivation unleashing myriad ways in which it is believed the object might be obtained.  
This notion returns us to the fundamental ‘creativity' attributed to Equity mentioned 
earlier, whereby approaches to rights and ownership that have allowed private property 
to remain vital to wealth generation are symptomatic of Equity’s contribution to the 
governance and administration of the private property order450.  To echo Franklin, 
‘professional trustees, the habitual managers of capital, especially as they have been used 
in the states where the middle class is most class conscious, enjoy a role of the highest 
importance under capitalism: they are the Fuehrers of liberal capitalism’451.  As such, 
trusts provide an attractive proposition for stakeholders in search of proprietary and 
personal rights, to secure assets, and to generate wealth – a conjunction and causality of 
factors underscored by the desire for the lost object.  In order to further describe how 
Equity manipulates the property concept to these ends, security interests and charges 
offer instructive examples in addition to trusts.    
Charges are forms of security that only take effect in Equity and grant the ‘secured party 
some right by virtue of the parties’ contract to sell the assets provided by way of a 
security, whether that property is held at the time of the creation of charge or whether it 
is only capable of first coming into existence once the specific property comes into the 
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hands of the chargor’452.  As such, Equity creates a new form of proprietary interest ‘that 
is quite distinct from ownership or possession’, by demarcating certain rights for 
secondary parties over property legally owned by another453.  Equity ‘took a personal 
obligation that related to property’, such as a contractual obligation to discharge a debt, 
‘insisted it was specifically enforceable, and then protected the right against interference 
by strangers’, namely other secured (and unsecured) creditors454.  A key and 
‘outstanding’ feature of Equity’s intervention is therefore temporal, as it creates 
proprietary rights in future interests where the Common Law does not455.  In Equity, as 
Beale et al state, a debtor is able to ‘raise finance on the basis of an ever-changing asset 
base such as present and future book debts’456.   
Equity has fostered a crucial role for itself in modern finance and commerce by making 
charges and associated future interests in intangible assets highly prized commercial 
entities that circulate via special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”).  In contemporary liberal 
financialised and commercialised societies where a vast majority of activity, whether 
domestic or multinational, is defined by a constant tension between debt and credit, 
demands for safeguards to prevent financial loss and mitigate unjust claims are 
commonplace.  What is more, the ability of one party to confidently transfer property and 
the bundle of rights over it to another party on credit, thus effectively replacing the 
immediate discharge of a debt in favour of an obligation to do so at a later date is, 
arguably, and at least on a par with trusts as an engine of wealth and desire. 
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By ‘hiving off’ certain rights from property’s overall bundle Equity not only introduces 
flexibility into property law, but also reveals how a veritable matryoshka doll of different 
interests (of property within property within property) can emerge to be freely traded 
and thus generate wealth often many times in excess of the initial value of any single 
asset.  This form of pure use (trade, transfer and profiteering), where the right of 
exclusion is only really a concern for a chargor in so far as it facilitates and guarantees 
further profitable use - onward transferability of assets, for example, as in forcing the sale 
of property that is subject to a charge and where the debt has failed to be discharged - 
complicates the notion that exclusion, as described earlier in this chapter, is nevertheless 
fundamental to understanding stakeholder reliance on private property in contemporary 
capitalist society457.   
4. Conclusion 
Over the course of the last two hundred years, capitalism and the growth in competitive 
free-markets has accelerated exclusion, exclusivity and demands for private property 
alongside the self-interest of economic and legal subjects who are defined by and seek 
narcissistic self-definition in portfolios of property holdings and the wealth and capital 
gains they produce.  It has placed a significant onus on Equity to preside over ever more 
private domains that are both domestic and commercial, and abstract value that is 
                                                        
457 Penner, for example, argues that: ‘the law of property is driven by an analysis which takes the 
perspective of exclusion, rather than one which elaborates a right to use.  In other words, in order to 
understand property, we must look to the way that the law contours the duties it imposes on people to 
exclude themselves from the property of others, rather than regarding the law as instituting a series of 
positive liberties or powers to use particular things’ (Penner, 1997, p.71).  The argument made here is 
that the forms of property created by Equity that service wealth creation in the financial and commercial 
sectors, in contrast to Penner’s claim, are absolutely the preserve of positive liberties to use the property 
of or in another, especially where this guarantees a profit.  While rules and regulation exist that prevents 
arbitrary interference with the property of another where that property is subject to a charge, including 
those covered under the Law of Property Act 1925, thus mitigating unencumbered profiteering to some 
extent, this still not does amount to exclusion overriding use as the way to understand property, at least 
not in today’s society.     
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increasingly divorced from any tangible or material counterpart in order to ensure, to 
echo Maitland, the fruitfulness of those private domains.   
The profound influence vouchsafed by capitalism to Equity's various mechanisms such 
as trusts and securities has been predicated on the need to force a shift in emphasis from 
a particular material asset held at any one time, feudal land for example, to the abstract 
value of what is owned.  Freed from constraints of material holdings and also of the 
responsibilities, obligations and duties that accompany property stewardship and 
management, trusts and securities have been particularly effective in providing far-
reaching benefits and gains for stakeholders whose conscious concern is for the most 
efficient maintenance of the ‘value which presently held trust assets represent’, whilst 
unconsciously enjoying the opportunity that greater levels of property give them to 
escape the traumatic truth of their castrated subjectivity458.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
458 Cotterrell, 1987, p.85 
154 
 
Chapter 5 
A Different Theory of Civil Justice: 
Setting the Scene 
 
We are justified in speaking of a commodity-orientated ideology, or, as Marx called it, 
‘commodity fetishism’, and in classing this phenomenon as a psychological one.  What we 
need to establish, therefore, is not whether general juridical concepts can be incorporated 
into ideological processes and ideological systems – there is no argument about this – but 
whether or not social reality, which is to certain extent mystified and veiled, can be 
discovered by means of these concepts459.  
1. An introduction to Equity fetishism 
‘Equity in Law, is the same that the Spirit is in Religion, what everyone pleases to make of 
it’ said John Selden in his Table Talk published in the sixteenth century460.  Selden's 
description points to a certain truth that concerns the slipperiness of Equity.  The 
heterogeneity of legal contexts that Equity works across and through make it 
disorientating and hard to define461.  It is, by turns, interpreted as fixed and flexible, wide 
and narrow, objective and subjective462.  Equity’s impact upon the many legal domains 
on to which it is projected occurs through an incorporation and subsequent radiation of 
meanings and powers ascribed to it, whereby it is said to extend the general Law by a 
‘process of deduction from existing principle’463.    As we have seen, Equity is applied 
flexibly and reflexively in a variety of legal contexts in order to address perceived 
conceptual, systemic or experiential inequities and inequalities that stem from overly 
                                                        
459 Pashukanis, 1989, pp.73-74 
460 John Selden. 1856. Table Talk of John Selden. London: J.R. Smith [Online] Available at 
https://archive.org/details/tabletalkofjohns00seldiala (accessed 9th January 2017), p.49 
461 ‘Equity can be described but not defined’ - Meagher et al, 1992, p.3.   
F.W. Maitland comes to a similar albeit somewhat less confident conclusion: ‘in no general terms can we 
describe either the field of equity or the distinctive character of equitable rules.  Of course, we can make a 
catalogue of equitable rules, and we can sometimes point to an institution, such as the trust strictly so 
called, which is purely equitable, but we can make no generalization'. (Maitland, 1969, pp.13-14) 
462 Jill E. Martin. 2012. Modern Equity. 19th Edition. London: Sweet & Maxwell, p.3 
463 Margaret Halliwell. 2004. Equity and Good Conscience. 2nd Edition. London: Old Bailey Press, p.150 
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formal rule compliance.  This involves, for instance, an application of Equity’s 
jurisprudence that begins with questions of what is just and fair.   
Central to this view of Equity is what Simon Chesterman has called, ‘the recurrent theme 
of unconscionability’, which has long been instrumental in shaping the nature of Equity’s 
intellectual development and application in practice, as discussed in Chapter 4464.  From 
the point of view of civil justice, unconscionability assumes something of a universal and 
unifying form465.  It does so in dialogue with a ‘problematic of judicial decision-making 
(the necessarily impossible demand to do justice)’ that occurs within the interrelated 
domains of private and property law466.  This is a condition underscored by Equity’s 
liberalization of legal principles and maxims, rules and doctrines that operate in the main 
to support the private property order467.  That is, I argue, a socioeconomic order 
predicated on the vindication of property rights as a basis for ownership and certainty of 
title that not only relates to the interest of individual stakeholders but is crucial for the 
survival of capitalist ideology and capitalism as a mode of social organization.  Marx 
claimed that capitalism ‘begins by seeming to acknowledge man (his independence, 
spontaneity, etc.); then, locating private property in man’s own being, it can no longer be 
conditioned by the local, national or other characteristics of private property as of 
something existing outside itself.  This political economy, consequently, displays a 
cosmopolitan, universal energy which overthrows every restriction and bond so as to 
establish itself instead as the sole politics, the sole universality, the sole limit, the sole 
bond’468.  As a concurrent body of law alongside the Common Law and a keystone of civil 
                                                        
464 Chesterman, 1997, p.351  
465 Lord Walker in Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd and another [2008] 1 WLR 1752 at 92 
466 Chesterman, 1997, p.358 
467 Virgo, 2012, pp.26-39  
468 Karl Marx. 1975. Third Manuscript: Private Property and Labour. Political Economy as a Product of the 
Movement of private Property, in, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. 1975. Collected Works, Volume 3 1843-
1844. London: Lawrence & Wishart, p.291 
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justice with regard to property, Equity is demonstrably political on Marx’s terms, and 
thus forms a significant part of what Louis Althusser calls the ‘legal ISA’ (ideological state 
apparatus)469.   
It is important to realise that the influence of private actors and those in the field of 
business and finance, in particular, alters ideology in this regard.  Whilst the civil justice 
of which Equity forms a part is definitively an entity of the State (and part of a political 
unity in public services at any one given moment in time, normatively a term of 
government), the private actors whose influence on the system is transformative points 
less to State ideology than the ideology of powerful private economic interests.  This is 
perhaps unsurprising given the trend in State ideology since at least the nineteenth 
century in supporting economic growth, reason and expedience in ways that do not 
diverge from capitalist ideology as it exists in the private domain but shadow it.  The civil 
justice system, like all or many other State entities, is drawn along the lines of a logic of 
production and economy characterized, as André Gorz has argued, ‘by the desire to 
economize’ and ‘use the factors of production as efficiently as possible’470.  State ideology 
is in that sense always already the ideology of private interests.  Fetishism in the context 
of ECJ is complex and variegated because it involves real-world effects that manifest 
through practices of economic reason and the implementation of capitalist ideology 
through civil justice, thus making it a mode of production.  This is a point of view that 
Gary Watt acknowledges to some degree when he says that ‘[i]t is true that economic 
language has embraced the idea of equity almost to the point of suffocating it’471.  
Although Watt remains optimistic that ‘it is within our power to loosen its grip’472.   
                                                        
469 Althusser, 2008, p.17 
470 André Gorz. 1989. Critique of Economic Reason. London: Verso, pp.2-3 
471 Watt, 2012, p.37 
472 Watt, 2012, p.37 
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At heart, Equity fetishism is, as the earlier discussion on Bentham also implied, a product 
of psychological affect and a mode of subjection ‘concerned with the relation between 
practices and a symbolic order constituted within history’473.  This makes it a 
psychological mechanism through which economic subjects sustain belief in the certainty 
and completeness, that is, an uncastrated and un-lacking nature, of civil justice within the 
confines of the capitalist superstructure.  This belief from within the ambit of capitalist 
ideology insists that ‘[w]ithout Equity, the common law would be an incomplete means 
to achieve justice’474.  The clear influence of political economy and economic reason in 
this instance prompts the need to consider a particular formulation of fetishism able to 
account for that influence.  It is suggested here that, with roots in the property basis of 
civil justice Equity fetishism brings together the political and economic considerations of 
commodity fetishism under capitalism, and the fetishism related to the fantasies and 
desires for complete justice also promulgated under capitalism.  In order to reconcile 
these two positions requires, I claim, a discussion of the relationship between Marx and 
Freud’s theories of fetishism, a discussion that will follow later in this chapter.     
In the fantasy life of stakeholders, Equity fetishism does not exist magically or 
transcendentally so much as institutionally, systemically, bureaucratically and thus 
somewhat prosaically.  Equity is rarely if ever spectacular in the sense that it encourages 
any radical or serious refinement of the law, where the ramifications of such refinements 
would be felt at the very core of the economic base or the very heart of capitalist ideology.  
Neither is Equity uncertain by any normative economic definition of the term.  Rather, 
                                                        
473 Étienne Balibar. 2017. The Philosophy of Marx. Translated by Chris Turner. London: Verso,  p.72 
474 Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, Master of the Rolls. 2010. Has Equity Had Its Day? Hong Kong 
University Common Law Lecture 2010. 12 October 2010. Hong Kong. [Online] Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131202164909/http://judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/D
ocuments/Speeches/mr-speech-hong-kong-lecture-12102010.pdf (accessed 24 April 2017), p.1   
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Equity's jurisprudence and its status as a means of complete justice rely on inflexions of 
conscience and a syntax of fairness that contributes to a particular distribution of 
economic power that benefits those able ‘to shape the rule of law to provide a framework 
within which they can exploit others'475.     
Instrumental to the implementation and practice of economic reason, Equity can, to some 
degree, still be understood in terms of a legacy of practical reason traceable to the pre-
capitalist notion of sinderesis, that Piyel Haldar maintains in its early modern form ‘was 
elaborated both by theologians and by jurists […] the spark of conscience (scintilla 
conscientiae) given to and shared by each individual rational creature’476.  Yet, the net 
effect of capitalist ideology and economic reason has not been to celebrate or promote 
this legacy of Equity in law.  Nor to use it as a truly effective way of addressing distortions 
in the economy fostered by advocates of legal frameworks who claim to be promoting an 
efficient economy477.  Instead, any potential threat felt by the capitalist class towards 
their interests relating to uncertainty engendered by Equity and crystallized in the notion 
and practice of conscience has been reconfigured, as we will see in the later chapters of 
this thesis, by that same power in order to mask and conceal a reality of social relations478.   
2. The language of Equity  
In his mission to classify the whole of the law as means to greater certainty, the late Peter 
Birks focused intently on the failure of language to properly describe what it was the law 
was either doing or expected to do479.  Central to his critique was Equity and the 
                                                        
475 Stiglitz, 2013, p.238  
476 Piyel Haldar. 2016. Equity as a Question of Decorum and Manners: Conscience as Vision. Pólemos, Vol. 
10. Issue 2 (September), p.313 
477 Stiglitz, 2013, p.235 
478 Including the reality of power relations as a core of the property form and the fact that property 
always ‘articulates a political relationship between persons’, where capitalism would rather and does 
insist ex cathedra on the illusion of property as mere cold dead things’ (Gray and Gray, 2009, p.88) 
479 Birks, 1996 
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vocabulary and language associated with it, including fairness, justice or what is 
construed as just, unconscionability and definitive elements of fiduciary law480.  For Birks 
this language is, on the whole, ‘so unspecific’ it simply conceals ‘a private and intuitive 
evaluation’, and the difficulty with fiduciary law ‘is that its meaning has been allowed to 
become completely uncertain’481.  Yet, as a discrete jurisprudence and a mode of practice 
and reasoning, historical portraits of Equity paint it as a site for the reconciliation of 
antagonistic concepts found at the intersection of the objective and subjective struggle 
over justice, and as such has relied on the language Birks dislikes482.  As suggested earlier, 
in order to fully understand what Equity is expected to achieve in the capitalist civil 
justice system it is necessary to unpack what it means for the justice that Equity 
represents to be complete.  To do this requires an analysis of the function of Equity’s 
language and how it is used to construct the notion of complete justice in, for example, 
case-law judgments, as well as in the form of individual principles, doctrines and rules of 
practice and procedure, such as those explored in Chapter 4483.   
There is no material form of Equity able to perform the role of ritual object, talisman or 
amulet qua fetish.  But language can serve this purpose by providing an anchor of 
meaning for the subject, whether subtle or specific, which in turn is able to motivate 
demand and desire.  For instance, at the level of interpellated economic subjects and their 
relationship with property, Equity promises to provide a solution to the stakeholder’s 
problem of what is fair (albeit a response which in itself may not be a fair one) or just 
                                                        
480 Birks, 1996, pp.16-17 
481 Birks, 1996, p.17 
482 This is, in part, the view Aristotle expressed on Equity when he claimed the nature of Equity to be ‘a 
correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality’ (Aristotle, 2009, p.99).  Throughout this 
thesis, notably in the previous chapters regarding the history of Equity, are a wide variety of examples of 
the use of terms such fair and just, and therefore they do not need to be restated here in order to support 
this statement.     
483 The principles, doctrines and rules referred to will not be recounted again at length here.  The aim of 
Chapter 4 was to establish them as a foundation for the present analysis.  
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with regard to the means of and necessity to create proprietary and personal rights from 
what Virgo calls ‘particular events’484.  Unconscionability, the long-standing doctrine at 
the heart of the notion of Equity is especially important when it comes to shaping 
narratives surrounding ECJ and thus to establishing it as a fetish.  In the framework of 
Equity fetishism, unconscionability creates an important veil of belief behind which the 
subject confidently conceals the fallacy of complete justice in particular and the fact that 
‘no object is whole or fulfilling for the subject’ in general485.  Or, as Birks argues, in order 
to conceal the presence, prevalence, and problematic of ‘private and intuitive 
evaluation’486.  Whilst Equity may be encountered through particular and sometimes 
visceral juridical gestures (the constraint of an agent subject to a fiduciary obligation for 
example), or through decorum or manners as Haldar has suggested, it is both as a body 
of juridical texts that are applied and an object of desire in the field of adjudication that 
is identified and named in and through other juridical texts that establish the specific 
form that Equity fetishism ultimately takes. 
That the language of Equity (or any language for that matter) does not amount to all it 
promises the subject is revealed in Freud’s belief that ‘unconscious mental disturbances 
produced symptomatic linguistic formations or deformations’ [my emphasis]487.  In other 
words, the use of language and its application in a given situation is accompanied by a 
degree of ‘turbulence, disorder, or misalignment’488.  ‘Equity’ is never just ‘Equity, but is 
always already unsatisfactorily defined by a growing series or chain of other signs that 
betray ‘the subsurface burbling of psychic disturbances’489.  The subject who comes to the 
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485 McGowan, 2016, p.24 
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487 Geoffrey Galt Harpham. 2002. Language Alone: The Critical Fetish of Modernity. London: Routledge, 
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civil justice system is, therefore, always confronted by language as a precursor to action 
(a judgement or order for instance); language that is ‘caught in a system of assemblage 
and separation, in a code'490.  But, Baudrillard concludes, ‘[c]ircumscribed in this way, 
they [the fetish] become the possible objects of security giving worship’491.  What first 
appears as the apparent disorder of a resolutely indefinable ‘Equity’ (a series of signs to 
nowhere) therefore, is, in fact, a crucial element of Equity fetishism, because language is 
necessary to create the gap-filling, fetishized object validated and legitimized at the 
moment of enunciation and adjudication of civil justice.       
The divergent language basis to Equity fetishism is particularly noteworthy in portraits 
that paint Equity as a spectacular, rarefied or an extraordinary mode of justice, morality 
or conscience capable of transcending the harsh if somewhat banal and normative 
functions of Law (as justice beyond the law).  This fetishization is rooted in the subject 
knowing that Equity as ‘the word’ on justice is not ‘the thing itself’, yet persisting in 
‘ignoring this knowledge’ and doing so through recourse to a litany of other words, 
fairness, equality and so on, which appear to represent Equity but are in fact chains of 
signs that lead nowhere492.  Jacques Lacan’s assertion of ‘a locus in which language 
questions us as to its very nature’ is thus instructive on the matter of what I referred to 
previously as Equity’s slipperiness493.   
‘[N]o signification can be sustained other than by reference to another signification’, 
claims Lacan, and ‘in its extreme form this amounts to the proposition that there is no 
language (langue) in existence for which there is any question of its inability to cover the 
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491 Baudrillard, 1981, p.95 
492 Aristodemou, 2014, pp.23-24 
493 Jacques Lacan. 2001. Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious, in Écrits: a selection. Translated by Alan 
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whole field of the signified’494.  Further, ‘[i]f we try to grasp in language the constitution 
of the object [the thing], we cannot fail to notice that this constitution is to be found only 
at the level of concept’ [my addition]495.  This last point is particularly relevant in terms 
of understanding Equity fetishism because it points to an interpretation of the 
slipperiness of Equity that, I argue, actually supports rather than undermines 
fetishization496.  In the context of fiduciaries, Birks, for example, insists that ‘we ought to 
recognise that the language of fiduciary relationships and obligations is wholly 
unsatisfactory’, but he errs on Lacan’s account by further insisting that is essential ‘to find 
other words to denote with precision the different things which in different contexts the 
overworked fiduciary language has been trying to denote’ [emphasis added]497.  In 
attempting to ‘grasp’ Equity or is associated mechanisms as Birks suggests via fiduciaries 
as a particular thing, Lacan argues that it will and does inevitably break up into myriad 
other signs, which inevitably result in vagueness, as fairness, equality, justice and so on.  
Contra Birks’ insistence that failed attempts for law to counteract the vagueness of terms 
such just, and fair, and unconscionable or to suitably and accurately denote fiduciaries 
can be remedied, language is always indeterminate when it comes to signifying and 
representing the subject or object - it is not possible, for instance, that complete justice 
be complete or completed as such in or by language.  More or different language, as Birks 
argues, cannot change this.  More or different language instead provides new openings 
for the stakeholder to exercise lack of satisfaction in the thing offered to them, and an 
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496 Whilst Lacan provides an interpretation of fetishism that is certainly instructive to this thesis, Freud 
and to a lesser extent Marx remain the major sources of a formulation of the concept discussed 
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opportunity to (continue to) demand and desire when satisfaction does not materialize 
or come.  
Instead of language signalling an end to Equity as a fetish due to a lack of linguistic 
coherence, however, two possible forms of fetishism occur in order for the subject to 
sustain belief in the authority and legitimacy of ECJ.  Firstly, there is fetishism of the very 
lack of coherence itself, in the form of new constitutions of language that recycle the 
defiance of incoherence and uncertainty.  We can see this sort of fetishism, for example, 
in Gary Watt’s claim that, ‘[i]t is in some respects easier to know what equity is not, than 
to know what equity is’498.  Secondly, although related to the first, is fetishism indexed to 
an initial neurotic vindication of ECJ by the legal community as purveyors of expertise, 
knowledge and meaning (judges, lawyers, legal academics, and so on).  This neuroticism, 
born of the need to stave of the frustrations of uncertainty within capitalist civilisation by 
defining limits and constraints in law on forms of economic existence, is displayed in 
Birks’ project of taxonomy, Bentham’s pannomion, and Posner’s reduction of the law to 
the calculable logic of economics, all of which work hand-in-hand with the perverse 
insistence of stakeholders in the lost object-locating potentialities of civil justice within 
capitalism499.   
At its most basic this form of fetishism turns on Lacan’s notion as highlighted above that, 
faced with the failure of language to grasp the object, the constitution of the thing can 
only reside at the level of concept.  There is, therefore, a professional process of 
conceptualisation which produces and vindicates a particular concept qua fetish.  Hence 
                                                        
498 Watt, 2012, p.39  
499 ‘It was discovered that a person becomes neurotic’, claims Freud, ‘because he cannot tolerate the 
amount of frustration which society imposes on him in the service of it cultural ideals, and it was inferred 
from this that the abolition or reduction of those demands would result in a return to possibilities of 
happiness’ (2001, p.87)   
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the notion of complete justice relies on an initial neurotic conceptualisation by the legal 
community prior to stakeholder inference in order not only to subsequently produce but 
also legitimize and vindicate the fetish.  As I claimed a moment ago, Birks offered a 
particular example of this neurotic conceptualisation with his project of legal 
taxonomy500.  ‘One advantage of a good classification is that it keeps all relevant 
possibilities in view and reduces the risk that one might be overlooked’, claimed Birks, 
moreover that ‘it militates against the tricks that complex language can play in concealing 
similarities and unnecessarily proliferating entities’501.  This strict observance of the 
proper place and definition of law was not for everyone Birks claims, however, it can 
doing nothing ‘for an observer who lacks the exacting taxonomic mentality' and that, for 
example, the ‘lawyer who deals with ‘unconscionable behaviour' is rather like the 
ornithologist who is content with ‘small brown bird'502.   
As neurotics the legal community aim to justify and defend legal expertise though 
language and knowledge that possesses discrete value and, following Birks, levels of 
categorical accuracy befitting internal and external (economic) demands for certainty, 
especially demands that have commercial and financial consequences.  As Millett robustly 
maintained: ‘Businessmen need speed and certainty; these do not permit a detailed and 
leisurely examination of the parties' conduct. Commerce needs the kind of bright-line 
rules which the common law provides and which equity abhors'503.  Graham Virgo’s 
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insistence on the role fiduciaries play in, what he calls, the cynicism of Equity, is yet 
another example504.       
It would be wrong to say that the sorts of concepts discussed above, in spite of their lack 
of concreteness in language, do not have real-world effects.  The language (if not precisely 
the knowledge) of Equity is, after all, inferred and appropriated at the superficial yet 
potent level of the concept by a wide community of stakeholders for whom the concepts 
the language describe a means to leverage new economic events and commercial 
opportunities that have real-world consequences, both good and bad.      As such it can be 
argued that the ‘concept’ in question here is not ethereal nor has it ever been, even during 
the earlier periods of Equity’s history.  Narratives on the nature of Equity from the likes 
of Sir Henry Maine and F.W. Maitland highlight the influence of ecclesiastical (Roman 
Catholic) thought and practice on Equity jurisprudence that returns though concepts 
relating to a language of conscience, most notably in the doctrine of unconscionability.  
Insofar as these concepts and language feature as a basis for judicial reason and thus 
inform the implementation of complete justice, as well as, for example, the application of 
remedies that have real-world effects, it is hard to see them entirely lacking material 
constitution505.  In other words, the apparent conceptual concreteness of 
unconscionability can be evidenced by numerous judgments that have applied the 
doctrine (in spite of Birks’ fervent dislike of the term and the problematic of intuition it 
encapsulates) and produced material effects at some discernible level in the world – the 
reversal of an unjust enrichment for instance, and its impact on parties to a commercial 
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transaction506.  This suggests the production of an object or thing that can be more readily 
fetishized than reference to a concept alone507.   
‘Without good taxonomy and a vigorous taxonomic debate’, argues Birks, ‘the law loses 
its rational integrity’508.  And in order for rationality to prevail expertise within the law, 
of the lawyer, the judge, the academic, must seize language and direct it to the thing as 
such, they must consent Birks’s claims ‘to be prisoners of their own expertise’509 .  
Further, it is ‘essential to come to the law armed with a belief in the fallibility of intuition 
and a consequent aversion to all forms of thought and expression which are no more than 
vehicles of the gut reaction’ and that ‘a sophisticated modern legal system should in 
general regard direct appeals to ‘justice and good conscience’ and ‘large principles of 
equity’ with deep suspicion510.  I argue, however, that Birks' proposal does not (or could 
not) solve the problem he names, but instead drives the type of neuroticism within legal 
thinking that focuses on, at least with regard to Equity, the strange conjunction of 
flexibility and certainty articulated through language as the only valid and rational end 
point of law.  Gabel and Feinman, in their assessment of an analogous relationship 
between contract and ideology, state that ‘[m]ost of the time the socioeconomic system 
operates without any need for law as such because people at every level have been 
imbued with its inevitability and necessity.  When the system breaks down and conflicts 
arise, a legal case comes into being.  This is the ‘moment' of legal ideology, the moment at 
which lawyers and judges, in their narrow, functional roles seek to justify the normal 
functioning of the system by resolving the conflict through an idealized way of thinking 
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about it’511.  Yet actual closure or resolution of the problem presented to law in and with 
language is not possible. On the terms discussed here, language is instead redirected 
towards the construction of fantasies around the constant (re)conceptualizing of legal 
expertise, which, I claim occurs within capitalism on behalf of stakeholders as part of the 
broader perfectibility demanded by economic reason.  Law in that sense aids economic 
reason in constructing and maintaining fetishized frameworks of civil justice. 
3. Freud with Marx 
‘To this enlightened political economy, which has discovered – within private property – 
the subjective essence of wealth’, claims Marx, ‘the adherents of the monetary and 
mercantile system, who look upon private property only as an objective substance 
confronting men, seem therefore to be fetishists’512.   Equity constitutes a type of 
stakeholder fetishism that, I have argued, begins in the private property order.  Equity 
fetishism is not simply commodity fetishism, however, but a perverse compliment to it.  
It is a form of fetishism that always returns to a specific unconscious desire for complete 
justice as a means of avoiding castration, which reflects the structure and meaning of the 
various rules, doctrines and principles that comprise Equity’s jurisprudence and its 
contribution to civil justice.  Accordingly, neither Marx nor Freud’s concepts of fetishism 
alone are sufficient, but argumentation that is built around both.  It is important at this 
stage therefore to provide a rationale for conjoining the theories of Freud and Marx, and 
in particular how together they underpin the concept of Equity fetishism.   
Fetishism generally describes a psychological effect and a mode of subjection ‘concerned 
with the relation between practices and a symbolic order constituted within history', 
                                                        
511 Peter Gabel and Jay Feinman. 1998. Contract Law as Ideology, in, The Politics of Law: A Progressive 
Critique. 3rd Edition. Edited by David Kairys. New York: Basic Books, p.508 
512 Marx, 1975, p.290 
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where those practices and that symbolic order describe the conduct of civil justice within 
capitalism513.  This definition is important because it goes a long way to reconciling the 
historical materialism of Marx, which views social existence as the determinant of the 
subject’s consciousness, with Freud’s notion of castration as key to the subject’s place 
within the symbolic realm of social existence.  Locating this dual definition of fetishism in 
the context of Equity fetishism reveals it as a psychological mechanism through which 
the stakeholder sustains a belief in the certainty and completeness - that is, the 
uncastrated and un-lacking nature - of civil justice within capitalism.  Whilst Freud tells 
us that a subject sustains belief due to unconscious desires, Marx’s historical materialism 
brings to light essential details relating to belief determined by the political economy of 
capitalism and, latterly, neoliberal capitalism.   
Freud’s work on fetishism from 1927 onwards forms the larger part of the consideration 
of fetishism here. But, and somewhat contrary to the idea that at a theoretical level Freud 
prefigures Marx, his concept of fetishism will be drawn initially from Marx’s earlier use 
of the concept in relation to commodities.  To be clear, therefore, I claim that Equity 
fetishism brings together the political and economic considerations of commodity 
fetishism under capitalism, and the psychological fetishism related to the fantasies and 
desires for complete justice promulgated by capitalism.  Freud in this instance, broadly 
speaking, picks up strands of Marx and develops them in accordance with psychology, 
rather than a material or politico-economic understanding of social relations.  Slavoj 
Žižek maintains that ‘in Marxism a fetish conceals the positive network of social relations, 
whereas in Freud a fetish conceals the lack (‘castration’) around which the symbolic 
network is articulated’514.  The two interpretations are, therefore, not irreconcilable and 
                                                        
513 Balibar, 2017, p.72 
514 Slavoj Žižek. 1989. The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso, p.50  
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in Equity fetishism there is a site in which it is possible to describe how they come 
together in what is yet another point of fusion515.  The notion of concealment, in 
particular, helps reconcile fetishism in Marx and Freud.  Georg Lukács, as the following 
passage demonstrates, is instructive in this regard: 
The fetishistic illusions enveloping all phenomena in capitalist society 
succeed in concealing reality, but more is concealed than the historical, i.e. 
transitory, ephemeral nature of phenomena.  This concealment is made 
possible by the fact that in capitalist society man’s environment, and 
especially the categories of economics, appear to him immediately and 
necessarily in forms of objectivity which conceal the fact that they are the 
categories of the relations of men with each other.  Instead, they appear as 
things and the relations of things with each other516.  
For Lukács, economics play an important role in masking the reality of social relations 
under capitalism.  This notion is one accepted by this thesis but not an accusation 
reserved for economics alone.  Rather, it is argued that ECJ, and arguably by virtue of the 
conjunction of law and economics it represents, performs a complimentary role both as 
an extension of economic reason and in the more specific and unique terms of being a 
source of fantasy concerning the nature of civil justice, one that ultimately translates into 
a disavowal of castration.  ECJ acts as a mask that stakeholders rely on to perform the 
types of concealment that Lukács describes.    
                                                        
515 This will inform an analysis of Equity apropos a ‘psychoanalytic process of perverse structure at the 
level of the process of ideological production’ (Baudrillard, 1981, p.90). 
516 Georg Lukács. 1971. History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. Translated by 
Rodney Livingstone. London: Merlin Press, p.14  
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Just as the notion of concealment ties Marx and Freud together in this instance, so too 
does completeness.  Capitalism relies to a large extent on the failure of the subject to 
perfect or complete itself, because this failure drives demand and desire, and thus the 
constant and repetitious renewal of systems, institutions and, importantly, fantasies at 
the level of the capitalist superstructure able to offer opportunities for satisfaction, for 
finding the lost object.  Capitalism thrives on lack of perfection as a general rule, whether 
at the level of the commodity, institution, system or subject, whilst simultaneously 
offering the promise to subjects that perfection is always near.  Central to the notion of 
Equity fetishism is its ability to provide the subject, via language, with the means to 
disavow doubts regarding these promises capitalism makes, whilst simultaneously 
disavowing castration.  And rather than a form of capitalism that does not work, and the 
traumatic realisation of castration that comes along with it, the subject instead believes 
because they have knowledge that Equity is not the thing and, importantly, subsequently 
choose to disavow that knowledge and enjoy an existence in fantasy under capitalism 
anyway517.  Enjoyment that encompasses, in this instance, bureaucratic processes of civil 
justice that support stakeholder engagement in economic activity, competition with 
peers (fellow stakeholders), and the variegated risks of the market.         
Freud in conjunction with Marx is, therefore, crucial to understanding the desires that 
underpin Equity and civil justice as part of a ‘specific transformation of desire within and 
through the implementation of the capitalist worldview in social and subjective 
reality’518.  ‘If we were to force the analogy between Freudian fetishism and Marxian 
                                                        
517 For Walter Benjamin this made capitalism ‘a religion of pure cult, without dogma’. ‘The nature of the 
religious movement which is capitalism’, Benjamin claims, ‘entails endurance right to the end, to the point 
where God, too, finally takes on the entire burden of guilt, to the point where the universe has been taken 
over by that despair which is actually its secret hope’ (Walter Benjamin. 1996. Capitalism as Religion, in 
Walter Benjamin Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926. Edited by Marcus Bullock and Michael W. 
Jennings. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p.289) 
518 Tomšič, 2015, p.154 
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fetishism’ says Jean-Joseph Goux, ‘we might say that the void that is filled and veiled by 
the economic fetish is the “transcendental” element of interpersonal relations, of the 
exchange of vital activities’519.  He concludes: ‘But this “transcendental” aspect of 
exchange is precisely the location of the surplus value, which is concerned not only with 
the political economy but with social power in general’520.  
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Chapter 6 
Fetishism in Context 
1. Introduction 
This chapter consists of two parts.  First, a discussion on the relationship between 
fetishism and ideology that will look in more depth at the ideas raised earlier in the thesis.  
Second, given that fetishism is not a self-contained concept within Freud’s work but exists 
in dialogue with a number of other formulations, in order to fully develop a theory of 
fetishism relevant to this thesis it is necessary to examine some of these other areas521.  
Covered during this chapter will be Freud’s formulations of perversion, castration, 
phallus, and narcissism.   
2. Fetishism and ideology 
The characteristics of fetishism and ideology as they appear and are discussed during this 
thesis overlap.  They are individually significant, but so is the dialogue between them.  To 
echo Henry Krips, I claim that a joint account of fetishism and ideology reveals ‘how social 
structures, and specifically ideological practices, shape psychic structures at the 
communal level’522.  The type of fetishism described here is thus reflective of the influence 
of capitalist ideology.  Concomitant with the fantasies that capitalism arouses in order to 
shape society and the existence of subjects within it, by, for example, equating wealth and 
property ownership with subjective ideals of satisfaction, the subject engages in a 
fetishistic disavowal that permits knowledge and ignorance of the realities of capitalism 
                                                        
521 The task of defining and cross-referencing Freudian themes and concepts, even just those captured by 
his discussion of fetishism, far exceeds what is possible during the course of this thesis.  Consequently, 
outlines will be limited to those considered and understood here to be most relevant.  That is, concepts 
that feature in Freud's articles of 1927 and 1938, and around which Freud builds his formulation of the 
concept in those two articles.    
522 Henry Krips. 1999. Fetish: An Erotics of Culture. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p.73  
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and capitalist ideology to coexist523.  For instance, the disavowal of the fact that wealth 
and property ownership offer no guarantees of personal satisfaction, and, moreover, the 
subject is cynically prompted by capitalism to engage in an ongoing encounter between 
the loss of their object of primal desire and a series of substitutions that the subject is 
encouraged to believe will make up for that loss.  It is the subject's search for the lost 
object and accumulation of fetishes as substitutions for what is lost that brings them into 
contact with socioeconomic and legal forms and institutions that promise to both deliver 
the object and help facilitate the subject's search for it.  From the point of view of this 
thesis that means Equity, private property and civil justice, which together give the 
stakeholder the appearance of an answer to the question of the lack at the centre of their 
unconscious desires.  In short, a fantasy built around the stakeholder's search for the lost 
object.  And to the extent that Equity and institutions such as trusts become substitutions 
for the object themselves, they are fetishized. 
At the heart of Marx’s definition of ‘the fetishistic character, which attaches to the 
products of labour so soon as they are produced in the form of commodities’, is the notion 
that ‘the commodity form and the value relation between the labour products which finds 
expression in the commodity form have nothing whatever to do with the physical 
properties of the commodities or with the material relations that arise out of these 
physical properties’524.  Marx situates this definition in an analogy from the ‘nebulous 
world of religion’, whereby ‘the products of the human mind become independent shapes, 
endowed with lives of their own’525.  Hence even though Marx himself borrowed the 
concept of fetishism in order to address purely economic questions, as Žižek maintains: 
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‘the dialectics of the commodity-form present us with a pure – distilled, so to speak – 
version of a mechanism offering us a key to the theoretical understanding of phenomena 
which, at first sight, have nothing whatsoever to do with the field of political economy 
(law, religion, and so on)’526.   
Where Equity fetishism is shown to be rooted in the private property order, any notion 
that Equity and political economy can have nothing in common, as Žižek claims with 
regard to the law more generally, is clearly false.  Nevertheless, the notion that ‘in the 
commodity-form there is definitely more at stake than the commodity-form itself’ 
entirely accords with the argument made here that Equity fetishism begins with 
commodity fetishism, augments or channels it and thus fosters a peculiar (if not exactly 
new) modality rooted in the subject’s belief in and devotion to the administrative and 
bureaucratic object(ive)s of Equity and ECJ527.  This echoes Henri Lefebvre’s suggestion 
that ‘[w]here economy and philosophy meet lies the theory of fetishism’, and it is possible 
to theorise therefore that where economy and Equity meet we find Equity fetishism528.    
Althusser’s notion of interpellation explains Equity as a special signifying system qua 
fetish, via the significance of the overlap between fetishism and ideology.  That ‘Equity 
can be described but not defined’ and that ‘[i]n order to understand the diversity and 
resultant power of equity it is vital to see it in action’ - in other words, Equity can be 
defined only by the contexts in which we ‘find’ it - is an indication of its slipperiness and 
sheer instability as a sign529.  Equity, as we know, harbours other signs and chains of 
meaning: fairness, equality, ‘good’ conscience, and so on that allows it not only to lure 
subjects (a function of its fetishization; Böhme for example talks of the ‘magnetic power’ 
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528 Henri Lefebvre. 2014. Critique of Everyday Life. London: Verso, p.198  
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of the fetish, as well as its ability to mesmerise and entice530), but, in accordance with 
Althusser’s notion of interpellation, to ‘hail’ and thus recruit subjects and transform them 
into more engaged economic subjects by means of a system of civil justice steeped in 
capitalist ideology531.     
As we have seen, the stakeholder who seeks, among other things, vindication of their 
private property rights or a remedy in the civil justice system, engages Equity and ECJ at 
a specific level of capitalist ideology.  Étienne Balibar points to the significance of private 
property and the role of private law in determining the State infrastructure (the economic 
base) and superstructure (the politico-legal and ideological levels constructed on top of 
the economic base).  ‘[T]he floors of the superstructure are not determinate in the last 
instance’, says Althusser, ‘they are determined by the effectivity of the base’, a notion that 
Balibar builds on in his consideration of the law of property when he states the 
importance of ‘characterizing the degree of relative autonomy of the economic structure 
with respect to the equally ‘regional’ structure of the ‘legal and political forms’532.  Within 
the ambit of what Balibar calls legal forms we can count certainty and flexibility as core 
intellectual and practical contributions that the conjunction of Common Law and Equity 
qua complete justice has made to the economic base of capitalist society.   
Central to understanding civil justice and what it is expected to achieve on behalf of 
capitalist ideology in order to bring subjects into proximity with what Althusser 
considers the need ‘to perform their tasks conscientiously’, is the range of processes and 
strategies shaped by ideology that ECJ facilitates and enforces533.  As we have seen, 
                                                        
530 Hartmut Böhme. 2014. Fetishism and Culture: A Different Theory of Modernity. Translated by Anna Galt. 
Berlin: De Gruyter, p.264 
531 Althusser, 2008, p.48 
532 Althusser, 2008, p.9; Étienne Balibar. 2009. On the Basic Concepts of Historical Materialism, in Louis 
Althusser and Étienne Balibar. Reading Capital. Translated by Ben Brewster. London: Verso, p.254  
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nowhere is this more apparent than the complicity of Equity in particular in the 
ideological processes underpinning the private property order.  Under capitalism, 
property has unassailable significance as a potent ideological fiction of ‘permanent and 
unstoppable progress with no foundations whatsoever in economic or political reality 
but which the self-proclaimed economic experts persistently substantiate with statistical 
data, economic mathematics and political [as well as legal] reforms throughout history’ 
[my addition]534.  Equity fetishism engenders a degree of enjoyment that relates to the 
ideological belief that, engagement with and in the private property order, epitomized by 
the use, abuse or alienation of property, enables ‘a stable and full-functioning social 
relation’ to emerge from the present social inequalities535.   
Through the practices of civil justice and the bureaucratic means set in motion by Equity’s 
rules, doctrines and principles, the fantasy of complete justice is sustained without ever 
being actualised or attained.  Or rather, without it ever being known by the stakeholder 
that complete justice can never be attained.  This point is crucial not simply because it 
adds further to the explanation of fetishism as a function of ideology in the domain of 
property, but because it reveals the vital ingredient of perversion which is central to 
Freud’s interpretation and understanding of fetishism.  That is, the perversion of a subject 
who finds enjoyment in the idea or knowledge of never locating the lost object, and, 
perhaps more interestingly, also in only ever mapping the coordinates of its possible 
location, namely an enjoyment in the bureaucracy of civil justice.  This pint recalls the 
earlier discussion of the significance of the neurotic legal pursuit for certainty of legal 
meaning in language, and its relationship to the perverse desire of the stakeholder, what 
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I referred to previously as the two working hand-in-hand in structuring a fantasy of 
Equity fetishism.      
Further, the fixing of enjoyment onto an object, or in this instance a bureaucratic juridical 
pursuit of certainty, other than the object of desire reflects Krips’ notion of a ‘chaperone’, 
which he links with Lacan’s objet a as ‘both objects of the drive and object-cause of 
desire’536.  ‘A chaperone’, says Krips, ‘may take on the characteristics of an objet a.  
Although not herself desired by the suitor, she is nonetheless the cause of his desire as 
well as the center of the evasive activities through which he produces his pleasure’537.  
Accordingly, we might say that Equity chaperones the stakeholder in the private property 
order by creating a layer of bureaucracy that alienates and distances the subject from the 
notional object of desire.   
Baudrillard claims that fetishism attaches to a particular sign object ‘eviscerated of its 
substance and history, and reduced to the state of marking a difference, epitomizing a 
whole system of differences’538.  In order to understand fetishism, therefore, we must look 
for a particular object that has not simply been dissolved in the broader capitalist 
superstructure but completely eviscerated in respect to it.  In other words, the fetish is 
never simply a material or conceptual prosthesis, but a monument to castration; it at once 
reveals and masks a site of lack that is always already in the subject.  Ideology, in that 
sense, is an additional layer, a fictive cloak, which further conceals what the fetish already 
masks.  Or, rather, there is a dialogue between fetishism and ideology that involves a 
doubling of concealment.  In some cases, ideology precedes fetishism, in others the 
reverse is true.      
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3. Concepts in relation to fetishism 
Fetishism, as succinctly put by Jean Baudrillard, is a ‘psychoanalytic process of perverse 
structure’539.  This formulation of fetishism refers, as Christopher Gemerchak has 
claimed, to Freud’s ‘mature’ conceptualization found in his 1927 article Fetishism, as well 
as in his 1938 article The Splitting of the Ego in Defence Processes, and finally in his 1938-
40 discussion of ‘The External World’ in An Outline of Psycho-Analysis540.  All three sources 
build upon but differ from Freud’s earlier work on fetishism stemming from his Three 
Essays on Sexuality in 1905541.   
Across this body of work we see Freud’s thinking on fetishism develop from the fetish as 
a replacement for the ‘normal sexual object […] by another which bears some relation to 
it, but is entirely unsuited to serve the normal sexual aim’, to the idea that the fetish 
replaces ‘a specific and very special’ object, namely the mother’s phallus542.  Freud’s 
earlier work on fetishism was also further developed in an unpublished paper, ‘On the 
Genesis of Fetishism’, presented to the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society on 24 February 
                                                        
539 Baudrillard, 1981, p.90.   
It is acknowledged here that fetishism was something Freud translated (conceptualized) via his own 
particular brand of psychoanalysis, rather than fetishism being a conceptual product of psychoanalysis as 
such.  Moreover, Freud was not the first to discuss fetishism in the vocabulary of psychopathology, a 
move first made, it has been argued, by President de Brosses in his ethnographic work on religions during 
the eighteenth century (see: Jean-Joseph Goux. 2004a. Vertigo of Substitutes: Fetish and Trophy, in 
Everyday Extraordinary: Encountering Fetishism with Marx, Freud and Lacan. Edited by Christopher M. 
Gemerchak. Leuven: Leuven University Press, p.71).   To clarify, whilst this thesis will focus mainly on 
fetishism as it is defined by Freudian psychoanalysis, other sources are relied upon.  These include, most 
notably, fetishism as it is conceptualized in relation to the commodity (associated here with the concept 
of property rights qua private property order) in the work of Marx.  And because of the importance of 
language to Equity fetishism the work of Jacques Lacan.    
540 Christopher M. Gemerchak. 2004b. Fetishism and Bad Faith: A Freudian Rebuttal to Sartre. Janus Head, 
7(2), p.263; and Slavoj Žižek. 2008.  For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor. 
London: Verso, p.249.  My primary source for Freud’s two articles is: Sigmund Freud. 2006. The Penguin 
Freud Reader. Edited by Adam Phillips. London: Penguin Classics; and the discussion of fetishism in ‘The 
External World’ is in: Sigmund Freud. 1964. Moses and Monotheism, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis and 
Other Works: The Standard Edition Volume XXIII (1937-1939). Translated and Edited by James Strachey. 
London: The Hogarth Press, pp.202-203 
541 Freud, 2001a. 
542 Freud, 2001a, p.153; Freud, 2006, p.90 
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1909543.  The timing of this unpublished article is notable because it immediately 
followed Freud’s introduction of the castration complex in 1908 in an article ‘On the 
Sexual Theories of Children’, and immediately preceded Freud’s introduction of the 
Oedipus complex in his 1910 article, ‘A Special Type of Choice of Object Made by Men’, 
both of which would eventually come to underpin his mature theories on fetishism544.  
Chapter 7 will deal specifically with Equity fetishism and three of the primary features 
that structure fetishism based on Freud’s mature conceptualization, namely, belief, 
disavowal (Verleugnung) and memorialization.  In preparation for that later discussion, 
the remainder of this chapter will focus on four Freudian concepts that are important to 
understanding and explaining fetishism generally and in relation to the subject of this 
thesis, but are themselves not limited to fetishism as such.  The four concepts are 
perversion, castration, phallus, and narcissism. 
3.1 Perversion 
In the Three Essays on Sexuality, Freud describes perversion under the heading 
‘deviations in respect of the sexual aim’545.  ‘The normal sexual aim is regarded as being 
the union of the genitals in the act known as copulation’, says Freud, ‘which leads to a 
release of the sexual tension and a temporary extinction of the sexual instinct – a 
satisfaction analogous to the sating of hunger’546.  For Freud, there is a baseline instinct 
attributable to the subject's sexual aim which, once met, is extinguished.  Importantly this 
A to B undertaking by the subject in attempting to satisfy the instinctual drive is 
considered normal.  Freud continues: ‘But even in the most normal sexual process we 
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may detect rudiments which, if they had developed, would have led to the deviations 
described as ‘perversions’’547.  At a causal level perversion quite simply disrupts the A to 
B undertaking of satisfaction and describes a deviation in the form of A going not to B but 
to either C, D, E, F, and so on.  Perversions are thus ‘sexual activities which either (a) 
extend, in an anatomical sense, beyond the regions of the body that are designed for 
sexual union, or (b) linger over the intermediate relations to the sexual object which 
should normally be traversed rapidly on the path towards the final sexual aim’548.  It is 
amid this description of perversion that Freud first situates fetishism as cases ‘in which 
the normal sexual object is replaced by another which bears some relation to it, but is 
entirely unsuited to serve the normal sexual aim’549. 
As stated previously this thesis does not settle on Freud’s initial formulation of fetishism 
in the Three Essays, but draws instead on his work on fetishism from 1927 onwards.  
Accordingly, it is important to understand how, if at all, Freud's notion of perversion 
changed.  Furthermore, it is important to understand that perversion transcends 
description only in terms of sexual practices.  In other words, we can talk about 
perversions in terms of the sublimation of broader social practices and as a meta-
psychology, even though, as Freud argued sublimation is an outcome of sexual instincts 
and drives.  Further, a conjunction between Marx and Freud can be seen when Freud 
himself, in Civilisation and Its Discontents, offers a bridge between the personal (psychic) 
economy of the subject and the economic structure of society (supported by the private 
property order) across which perversion leaves its mark in the form of often subtle 
aberrations from the norm550.  That is, to revert briefly to Freud’s earlier formulations of 
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perversion, non-pathological forms of perversion that exist alongside the norm rather 
than ousting it551.     
The later Freud, in ways that are of particular note here, locates perversion sublimated 
into the realm of property (whether tangible or intangible) and specifically ‘the attraction 
in general of forbidden things’ that countermands ‘an undeniable diminution in the 
potentialities of enjoyment’ brought about by a greater surrendering by the subject to the 
reality principle552.  In search of enjoyment, the subject turns in fantasy to the 
‘irresistibility of perverse instincts' in order to satisfy desires553. This enables a 
negotiation of the frustrations presented by the external world, by unlocking forms of 
satisfaction and enjoyment that, even when not absolutely satisfactory, nonetheless 
possess a ‘special quality’ that seems ‘finer and higher’ than the norm554. That, in short, 
generates a fetishistic inversion akin, as Žižek suggests, to the commodity form in Marx’s 
analysis.  In the commodity form, as Žižek maintains, there is ‘definitely more at stake 
than the commodity-form itself’555.  As far as Equity fetishism is concerned, as with other 
examples of fetishism that help explain the vagaries of social relations in fields beyond 
the economic interpretation offered by Marx, it is the ‘more’ that Žižek highlights that is 
key to understanding what he calls ‘the fascinating power of attraction’ wielded by the 
fetish over numerous fields of social relations556.    
Insofar as perversion is defined as a deviation from normality, despite Marx not using the 
term himself, it is possible to make the case that Marx’s use of fetishism relies on a reading 
of socioeconomic structures that are, in themselves, perverse.  This is because these 
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relations, as Marx says, are based in the ‘very queer’ nature of the commodity which is 
‘full of metaphysical subtleties and theological whimsies’557.  Inversely Marx’s use of 
fetishism is anything but perverse precisely because it posits objectively the normal 
socioeconomic conditions as they exist under capitalism.  For Marx, there is no escaping 
the fetishistic character of the commodity form because it mirrors fundamental social 
relations.  Similarly, I claim, Equity fetishism is a product of the normal functioning of civil 
justice, insofar as its function is in accordance with economic reason and logic.  
Following Marx, we can see that Equity fetishism begins from a point in which the 
fetishistic character at the heart of private property order represents the status quo.  And 
it is possible to understand the perversion of Equity fetishism in this sense by 
reconsidering Gray and Gray’s definition of property not as a thing but a power 
relationship, whereby ‘a relationship of social and legal legitimacy’ exists ‘between a 
person and a valued resource (whether tangible or intangible)’558.  Inasmuch as the 
relationship Gray and Gray highlight mirrors the nature of commodity fetishism outlined 
by Marx, then it is normatively fetishistic in nature.  In other words, Gray and Gray’s 
outline can be adjusted to read: ‘a relationship of social […] legitimacy existing between 
a person and a valued resource (whether tangible or intangible)’.  A relationship that 
retains or emphasizes only the social dimension of the property order’s legitimacy.   
The perversion of Equity fetishism thus lies in interventions in the realm of civil justice 
by Equity that, literally-speaking, pervert a purely social legitimacy existing between a 
person and a valued resource by constructing or imposing the fantasy (latent in 
capitalism) of complete justice and Equity’s legitimacy onto the private property order.  
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In this instance, the focus is on the point at which property and law intersect and 
establish, in Gray and Gray’s terms ‘legitimacy’, and in the terms of this thesis, Equity 
fetishism.  Further, if the ‘theory of fetishism demonstrates the economic, everyday basis 
of the philosophical theories of mystification and alienation’ as Lefebvre claims, then the 
perversity of Equity fetishism can also be said to lie in Equity’s alienation of already 
alienated commodity (property) forms559.  This means that Equity fetishism enacts a 
further masking of the immediacy of economic and social realities beyond that already 
maintained by the commodity form as such, and thus further envelops and disguises the 
human relations that constitute the property form560.   
What is at stake from this deeper mystification of social relations enacted by Equity 
fetishism is precisely that which describes the difference between the economic (Marxist) 
and (meta)psychological (Freudian) fetish.  Namely, suspension of the social link and an 
increased atomization of the subject that reflects the notion that the economic fetish ‘may 
be the privileged embodiment of value, but it is also the support of exchange’, as Samo 
Tomšič explains, whilst the fetish in Freudian terms, by contrast, ‘excludes the economy 
exchange and bends the libidinal economy back onto itself’561.  As a consequence, it is 
‘strictly private’ perverse subjects who recognise only themselves in the property form 
as ‘selfish’ litigant and de-socialized (de-humanized) individuals, in ways that equally 
accord with the concept of narcissism, as will be discussed shortly562.  So, whilst ‘[m]an 
has developed and has raised himself above the animal and biological condition of his 
lowly beginnings via socio-economic fetishism and self-alienation’, as Lefebvre contends, 
it has resulted in very particular outcomes in terms of the concept of the subject of 
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capitalism as it is defined here, namely, ‘[t]he human has been formed through 
dehumanization – dialectically’563.  As Tomšič states: ‘Capitalism is not perversion, but it 
demands perversion from its subjects’, and via Equity fetishism, the stakeholder is able to 
realise this perverse duty564.  
3.2 Castration 
Castration is a central theme in fetishism, as it was for much of Freud’s work.  Given the 
notable privileging of the male gender in his formulation of theories of sexuality, Freud 
often evokes a literal sense of castration (the cutting off of the penis) in his discussions.  
This literality occurs in Freud’s discussion of fetishism, as elsewhere in his work (the 
basis of the anxiety that initiates the latency period in boys and which informs the 
castration complex), when, for example, the fetishist (Freud refers to the ‘patient’) is 
confronted by the ‘proof of the possibility of his being castrated himself’ by the fact that 
females have no penis565.  In her thesis on the erotics of markets, Jeanne Schroeder 
discusses the particular gendered aspects of castration.  ‘The two sexes are two positions 
one can take with respect to castration’, claims Schroeder, ‘denial and acceptance.  The 
masculine, which feels that he has lost a precious part of himself, falsely claims to possess 
and exchange the object of desire.  The feminine, which feels that she has lost her 
selfhood, accepts the role of identification with the enjoyment of the object of desire’566.   
Freud considers castration a male concern (the patient ‘who is almost always male’), 
albeit in dialogue with a corresponding discovery of anatomical difference to the female 
body567.  This point of difference is important not in and of itself, but rather in as much 
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that it is always accompanied by a threat of parity.  That is, the fact (the threat) that the 
male, via castration, can be made like the female, adding further to the anxiety of the 
subject.  For the fetishist, the fetish object serves partly as a means of dispelling or 
displacing this anxiety.  ‘The creation of the fetish’, says Freud, ‘was due to an intention 
to destroy the evidence for the possibility of castration, so the fear of castration could be 
avoided’568.   
Whilst Freud often evokes a literal sense of castration through direct reference to the 
penis, his reliance on myth (namely the Oedipus myth) as a basis for much of his aetiology 
betrays the fact that castration and the particular reference to anatomical organ (penis) 
is not meant literally as the site of primal desire that is central to the development of 
human sexuality.  Rather, as Henry Krips suggests, ‘[i]n the case of fetishism staged within 
the Oedipus myth, as for fetishism generally, the object of desire must reside somewhere 
other than the fetish’569.  Hence, as the paradigm of negativity (‘the symbolic operation 
that constitutes the subject as split and decentralised’) castration corresponds closely 
with psychic functions such as fantasy and the concept of loss570.  Or, given the terms of 
the present discussion, ‘the capitalist fantasy of an uncastrated subject’571.  The castration 
and Oedipus complexes both focus on the child’s fantasy concerning his father, or as 
Freud frames it in Totem and Taboo, ‘the part of a dreaded enemy to the sexual interests 
of childhood’, who threatens to punish the child by castration ‘or its substitute, 
blinding’572.  The threat, therefore, further to that discussed above, relates to fantasy as a 
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means of deflecting the trauma of castration whilst facilitating the repetition of primal 
desires that are structured around the infliction of loss573.   
The connection between castration and the inauguration of the super-ego function has 
particular resonance with respect to the language of Equity because it is through the 
super-ego that Freud traces the roots of conscience574.  The super-ego function, namely, 
the internalized inheritance of the parental influence, that ‘garrison in a conquered city’ 
that ‘takes the father’s place, depersonalizing the father figure and incorporating it in the 
subject in the form of a higher and punitive law’575.  With regard to legal critique, this 
makes castration an important theme because it talks to the social (externalized) function 
of law.  In a description of conscience that would befit historical narratives of Equity, 
namely those pertaining to a time when Equity was the preserve of Roman Catholic 
lawyers such as Thomas More, Freud maintains that: ‘As long as things go well with a man 
his conscience is lenient and lets the ego do all sorts of things; but when misfortune befalls 
him, he searches his soul, acknowledges his sinfulness, heightens the demands of his 
conscience, imposes abstinences on himself and punishes himself with penances’576.  The 
function of the super-ego, whilst clearly important to a critique of Equity, does take the 
matter of castration away from the central theme of fetishism and is therefore not overly 
relevant here.  It warrants mention however because, as Freud maintains, the ‘super-ego 
is in fact the heir to the Oedipus complex and is only established after the complex has 
been disposed of’, which, as a description of the psychic basis to the formation of 
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subjective conscience, is clearly significant for understanding the extension of conscience 
as a juridical mechanism within Equity577.         
Above all castration needs to be read as a symbolic gesture.  As such, castration ceases to 
represent anatomy (the penis) and instead describes the loss of an object of desire, 
namely the phallus, which the subject is always searching for.  So, whilst Freud states on 
the one hand that ‘the fetish is a penis substitute’, it is nevertheless also a substitute for 
‘the woman’s (mother’s) phallus’578.  How fetishism is structured around the symbolic 
gesture of castration – how, for example, ‘the fetishist denies [disavows] the unwelcome 
fact of female castration’ – will be considered in Chapter 7579.  It is worth noting at this 
point however that castration is central to the issue of compromise as a vital feature of 
memorialization in fetishism.  A compromise, as Böhme maintains, ‘that is made in the 
unconscious between the fear of castration and the saviour of the phallus’580.   
3.3 Phallus 
With regard to fetishism, a crucial question is as the quote from Freud above suggests, 
the extent to which the phallus and penis are interchangeable.  That is, where a strictly 
anatomical or biological reference ends and symbolism begins; a shift in reference 
between genitalia that the male possess and that the female lacks, a gap in which (in the 
in-between) a prosthesis or substitute in fantasy for the penis can be imagined, one 
capable of preventing the subject from trembling ‘for the continued possession of one’s 
own penis’581.  For Freud, the phallic phase of sexual development is signalled by a 
divergence between the sexes from the premise of ‘the universal presence of the penis’582.  
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This divergence lies at the root of Freud’s particularly patriarchal distinction between the 
development of male sexuality versus the vain attempts of female sexuality to ‘do the 
same as the boy’, which for Freud ultimately leads to (penis) envy, a sense of inferiority, 
and the ‘first disappointment in rivalry’ for the girl against the boy583.    
Post-Freud, and most notably in the work of Jacques Lacan, the phallus ceases to be a 
mere synonym for the penis, and functions instead, as Böhme maintains, as ‘the symbolic 
counterpart to castration’584.  This Lacanian shift in phallic status indicates the 
significance of the organ to fantasy and in distinction to Freud ‘that the accession to 
subjectivity involves introducing the subject into an economy of lack defined in relation 
to the phallus’585.  Henry Krips calls this the ‘omnihistorical’ significance that Lacan gives 
to the phallus helps to further distinguish the penis from the phallus, and thus, as Krips 
further argues, ‘Lacan’s reworking of the Freudian architectonic promises to avoid’ the 
privileged place Freud’s theory of castration gives to ‘the penis in the constitution of the 
human psychic economy’586.  For Krips, the ‘Lacanian reworking of the Freudian 
architectonic enables a reconceptualization of the fetish', most notably in terms of Lacan's 
designation of the object of desire (objet a) qua phallus587.  However, it has also been 
argued that Lacan’s designation of the phallus simply ‘responds to the logic implicit in 
Freud’s formulations on the penis’, and, therefore, ‘Lacan’s terminological innovation 
simply clarifies certain distinctions that were already implicit in Freud’s work’588.   
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The distinction Lacan makes between the penis and phallus is important, especially 
where it allows for a conceptualization of the socioeconomic significance and function of 
the phallus that highlights the importance of lack in understanding, not only certain 
motivations underpinning fetishism, but the broader ideological effects that lack is 
complicit in defining.  For example, how the phallus is conceptually important to a 
critique of law qua bureaucratic systems, administrations and institutions of authority.  
The ‘phallus as the signifier of lack in the Other, where the place of the Other (which may 
be occupied by the mother, a policeman, or any other authority figure) is’, Krips 
maintains, ‘the externally projected position from which the subject looks for an answer 
to the question of his or her own desire’589.   
Translated into the terms of the present thesis: Equity or ECJ as a substitute phallus 
(fetish) is a response to the lack in complete justice (Other), which is the externally 
projected position of desire for the economic subject.  Specifically, it is a position 
engendered by the displacement onto individual or atomised private property or the 
private property order more generally of a primal subjective desire for the lost object.  
Whether as an abstract socio-legal concept, a politico-economic institution (a 
sedimentation of longstanding customs and traditions) or order (something that is both 
organized at the social level and in turn organizes the social), in private property the 
subject has a site to which they are able to return time and again in search of the lost 
object and an answer to their own desire.  As a mediator of this interaction between the 
stakeholder and property Equity occupies the position of the (substitute) phallus, a 
position in fantasy that points to a fundamental lack in complete justice, whilst staving 
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off the anxieties of stakeholders locked into a pattern of repeating their own primal lack 
with no hope of resolution or satisfaction.                      
3.4 Narcissism 
While Freud introduces narcissism as a perversion (‘an individual treats his own body in 
the same way in which he might treat that of any other sexual object’), an analytic status 
that would perhaps more readily explain its relationship to fetishism (as itself a perverse 
mechanism), he is quick to acknowledge that, via what he calls ‘the difficulties 
encountered in the psychoanalytical treatment of neurotics’, narcissism is also found in 
‘the normal sexual development of human beings’590.  Further supported by the same 
biological inferences that Freud applies to his theory of the drives, notably the object-
cathexis discussed earlier in this chapter which plays a central role in the theory of 
narcissism, Freud offers two statements in On the Introduction of Narcissism that will 
structure the extent of the definition deemed necessary here.   
Firstly, Freud’s notion of the double-existence of the individual ‘both as an end in himself, 
and as a link in a chain that he serves against his will, or at any rate regardless of his will’; 
he continues (finally summarizing his point with an uncanny reference to property law): 
He even supposes sexuality to be one of his own designs – whereas on 
alternative view he appears as a mere appendage of his germ-plasm, to 
whose purposes he devotes all his energies in return for the reward of a 
mere sensation of pleasure.  On this view, he is but the mortal vehicle of a - 
perhaps – immortal essence; like the lord of an entailed estate, he is but the 
temporary occupant of an institution that will outlast him591.     
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Secondly, that the ‘development of the ego consists in an ever-increasing separation from 
one’s primary narcissism, and gives rise to an intense struggle to retrieve it’; Freud 
continues: 
This separation occurs through the displacement of libido on to an ego-
ideal imposed from without; gratification occurs through fulfilment of that 
ideal.  At the same time, the ego sends forth libidinal object-cathexes.  It 
becomes depleted for the sake of these cathexes and for the sake of the ego-
ideal, but replenishes itself through object-gratifications and through 
fulfilment of the ideal592. 
Both statements turn upon an account of narcissism predicated on the subject’s 
investment in an object other to the self.  Further, investment in the object as an external 
conductor (material or ideal) through which to channel what Freud refers to as the 
‘intense struggle to retrieve’ a primary narcissism being lost relative to ‘an ever-
increasing separation’593.  Narcissism is not a process without consequences for the 
internal psychic structure of the subject.  Indeed, the fact that the second statement 
focuses so intently on the ego betrays Freud’s orientation of narcissism simultaneously 
across internal and external worlds.  As the two statements suggest, narcissism is a far-
reaching concept in Freud’s work that intersects with his other formulations.  To ensure 
that the consideration of narcissism undertaken here remains within the margins of the 
concept of fetishism we must return to Freud’s direct reference to narcissism in his 
mature formulation of fetishism.  Here is the passage in full in which Freud applies the 
concept of narcissism to fetishism: 
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[A] fetish is a substitute for the woman’s (mother’s) phallus, which the little 
boy once believed in and which – for reasons well known to us – he does 
not want to give up.  What has happened, then, is this: the boy has refused 
to acknowledge the fact that he has perceived that women have no penis.  
No, this cannot be true, because if women have been castrated, then his 
own penis is in danger, and the piece of narcissism, with which nature 
providently equips this very organ, recoils at the thought [my emphasis]594.   
Here Freud applies narcissism in a very similar vein to that regarding the child’s 
reconciliation of the ego and sexual drives in the body (breast) of the mother.  On the 
matter of that particular formative stage in the development of the drives Freud 
maintains that: ‘There is no doubt that, to begin with, the child does not distinguish 
between the breast and its own body; when the breast has to be separated from the body 
and shifted to the ‘outside’ because the child so often finds it absent, it carries with it as 
an ‘object’ a part of the original narcissistic libidinal cathexis’595.   
That Freud conceptually connects the organ (penis) equipped with ‘a piece of narcissism’ 
and the external object (breast) as a part of the original narcissistic libidinal cathexis is 
entirely accurate given the proximity of the two as stages in Freud’s development of 
human sexuality: the mother is the child’s first seducer and the ‘prototype of all later love-
relations’596.  Thus it is from the object-breast to object-penis and the child’s 
manipulation of each in turn in order to both satisfy a need and derive pleasure that 
means narcissism is translated along the chain of sexual development, eventually finding 
its way into the theory of fetishism as and when a perverse shift occurs in sexual 
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development.  As maintained above, therefore, it is across both internal and external 
worlds that narcissism features in fetishism and in particular at the point of the ego’s 
recoiling at the thought of castration, allowing the fetish to inhabit a space in fantasy 
‘opened up by the demise of primary narcissism’597.   
Narcissism apropos fetishism plays a vital role on two successive counts.  Firstly, as an 
indication of a primary inseparable unity or totality (the child with the mother).  This 
primary narcissism is directly related to the primal desire qua mother-child relation, 
hence why it is so powerful a force acting on the psychic economy of the subject long after 
childhood.  Moreover, why the subject repeatedly invests a great deal of energy trying to 
find the lost object and restore a sense of unity and completeness that the object is 
believed to represent.  That restoration of the primal unity is clearly an impossible task 
explains why the subject willingly invests so much energy (time, money, property, 
exposure to risk, and so on) in trying to recreate the unity or instituting fetishes able to 
support the fantasy of completeness.  Complete justice, as described thus far, is 
symptomatic of this attempt at replication of primary narcissism within the 
complementary fields of private property and civil justice.   
Secondly, a secondary narcissism emerges as a form of alienation that constantly reminds 
the subject that they have settled for less than their heart's desire.  That is, they have not, 
and never will return to primary narcissism because the lost object is, by definition, 
always already lost and unrecoverable.  This secondary (traumatic) narcissism is central 
to fetishism because the fetish offers the subject a belief in the possibility of a return to 
primary narcissism, albeit a fantastical belief accompanied by a necessary process of 
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disavowal that at once sustains the fantasy and mitigates the subject’s anxiety concerning 
the lost object of desire.    
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Chapter 7 
Equity Fetishism 
1. Introduction 
Previous chapters have discussed the theoretical as well as material foundations of 
Equity fetishism, which can be summarized in the following three points.  Firstly, Equity 
fetishism draws upon and combines key elements of the theoretical work of both Marx 
and Freud, and is a phenomenon particularly associated with the socioeconomic and 
juridical existence of stakeholders within capitalism.  Secondly, central to Equity 
fetishism (as with all forms of fetishism) is a stakeholder qua subject whose search for 
complete justice is a response in fantasy to the traumatic fact of castration and the need 
to disavow it.  And thirdly, the private property order overseen by civil justice is where 
stakeholder’s Equity fetishism is located and plays-out.  That is, a site in which the 
stakeholder finds particular, perverse enjoyment in the form and substance of civil 
justice, including vindication of property rights as a basis to support a culture of 
ownership and wealth provision.   
Building on these three foundations the following chapter will return to Freud’s 
formulation of fetishism in order to finalise the theoretical outline and give a clearer 
picture of why it is Freud’s and not simply Marx’s interpretation of fetishism that 
ultimately counts during this thesis.  This exploration will concentrate on three of the 
main psychical functions that structure fetishism and which, to paraphrase Freud, make 
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it a very energetic action to maintain denial of castration, belief; disavowal; and 
memorialization598.   
2. Belief 
Freud’s core statement on fetishism involves a crucial instance of belief that occurs within 
the broader Oedipal aetiology and thus turns on the fundamental issue of castration and 
loss.  ‘[A] fetish is a substitute for the woman’s (mother’s) phallus, which’, claims Freud, 
‘the little boy once believed in and which – for reasons well known to us – he does not 
want to give up’599.  The nature of the belief that Freud highlights is one which necessarily 
prevails in order for the fetish to function.  Belief marks the subject (little boy) in the past, 
the present and is expected to endure into the future.  Moreover, holding onto belief as 
such vouchsafes it for the subject into the future, endowing it with a certain narcissistic 
quality that Freud also attributes to the general function of the fetish600.   
Belief exists within the oedipal aetiology as complicit in an unavoidable confrontation 
that reveals a further important dimension to the belief in question.  That is, belief is 
always already primed for a confrontation with a reality in which loss has occurred, a 
reality the fetish ought or is expected to mask.  Following Freud's ‘little boy', Christopher 
Gemerchak maintains that ‘because reality does not conform to what he hopes and 
expects it will be, he simply prefers it otherwise.  He chooses, in effect, not to know what 
he knows'601.  Whilst Gemerchak is effectively pointing to the importance of disavowal to 
the fetish structure in his statement, something that will be discussed in detail later in 
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this chapter, it equally reveals a deliberate and, importantly, conscious commitment to 
belief made by the subject.     
‘At its most fundamental’, Žižek argues, ‘authentic belief does not concern facts, but gives 
expression to an unconditional ethical commitment’602.  Žižek’s evaluation of belief here 
is not one derived from an analysis of fetishism.  Yet, the ethical commitment of which 
Žižek speaks is one that resonates with the type of belief evoked by the fetish as a 
counterfactual function that ought, is expected or anticipated to mask the duality of the 
traumatic reality of castration and loss on behalf of the stakeholder.  In other words, the 
commitment of the fetishist is precisely not ethical, but belief, consciously determined 
and thus not ignorant, maintains that it is603.  As far as there is a perverse ethical 
commitment within the structure of fetishism, therefore, it is a commitment that the 
subject reserves for or turns back (imposes) upon themselves.  A form of self-
commitment contained within a closed circuit of desire that exists only between the 
fetishist and the object. 
Whilst it remains the case that the fetishist is not absolved of an ethical responsibility, 
albeit a responsibility to themselves (to that piece of narcissism within the subject), it is 
a commitment that manifests as loyalty to the self or a self-regarding ethics, one that 
speaks to Freud’s concept of the ideal ego which in transferring the individual’s 
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narcissism, ‘finds itself possessed of every estimable perfection’604.  Self-regarding ethics 
and an associated belief structure that helps support it find particular form in private 
property and the corresponding alienation of the self that occurs with the desire to have 
rights and to own what is ‘mine’605.  On this matter, we can again see how Equity fetishism 
marries two of the most significant contributions on the sociocultural and economic 
impact of fetishism, namely the commodity fetishism of Marx and the psychology of 
Freud.  The alienation caused by the great ascendancy in the social sphere of the status of 
property rights and ownership beyond all but the most wealthy during the nineteenth 
century was a product of parallel sociocultural and economic shift.  Pashukanis maintains 
that the ‘dialectical development of the fundamental juridical concepts not only provides 
us with the legal form as a fully developed and articulated structure, but also reflects the 
actual process of historical development, a process which is synonymous with the 
process of development of bourgeois society itself’606.  Hence, I argue, it is important to 
consider Equity in that century, and thereafter, in terms of fetishism, and why the 
significance of the Judicature reform agenda as conceived within the ambit of capitalism 
cannot be overlooked.   
‘It can be argued’, says Böhme, ‘that the nineteenth century is […] the saeculum of 
things’607.  He continues: 
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Statistics about things show that compared to the eighteenth century, the 
number of available things, for example in a household, vastly increased.  
Industrialisation led to the proliferation of artificial things in daily use and 
consumption, and not just in the upper classes.  Newly appearing 
department stores were described as cathedrals of commodities, 
displaying hundreds of thousands of things to bewitch the customer in an 
almost ritually staged presentation […] The average person extended the 
borders of his or her self into more and more object-spheres too.  Stronger 
forms of capitalism promoted the pursuit of property, which often led to, 
for example, the bourgeois apartments of the Gründrzeit, stuffed with an 
almost unimaginable number of things […] People collected, traded, 
procured, desired, exhibited, consumed, used, bought and sold, hoarded 
and wasted, ordered and classified, evaluated and valued things with a 
mania and intensity unprecedented in the history of everyday life608.    
The forms of fetishism that Böhme directly attributes to the proliferation of material 
property and which I argue extends equally over a desire for property (and personal) 
rights made possible by civil justice, reveals the root system of self-regarding ethics and 
belief in contemporary capitalist society.  And explains why Equity fetishism is central to 
the economic life of self-respecting (and self-regarding) stakeholders.  Further, Equity 
fetishism aptly fits the measure of this type of belief insofar as it is or can be viewed in 
terms of ‘premodern forms and institutions of magic, myth and cult, religion and 
festivities’, which, as Böhme maintains, ‘begin to disappear in the modern era’, although 
‘the energies and needs bound up in them does not’609.  Instead, Böhme argues, ‘they are 
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released and now pervade all levels of modern social systems’, a view that, whilst 
speaking to a far broader consideration of fetishism, nevertheless captures a sense of 
Equity and specifically the legacy of ecclesiastical conscience on its jurisprudence and 
procedure – an idea discussed earlier with regard to the ongoing influence of Thomas 
More on contemporary civil justice610.   
3. Disavowal 
In order to develop the role played by belief in structuring fetishism it is vital to consider 
disavowal, which is understood here, simply, as a ‘simultaneous acknowledgment and 
denial’611.  Disavowal is key to explaining why fetishism engages conscious processes as 
much if not more than those of the unconscious and why an analysis of fetishism does not 
begin and end with the unconscious.  ‘The first movement of disavowal is avowal’, states 
Gemerchak, hence there is ‘no disavowal without prior knowledge, and so it is clear that 
one cannot claim [retention] of belief out of ignorance’612.  For present purposes, the 
significance of disavowal in fetishism begins with Octave Mannoni’s well known 
formulation (“Je sais bien, mais quand-même...”), in which the fetishist knows very well 
that the fetish is not the thing (das ding), but nevertheless chooses to turn away from such 
a reality by believing otherwise.  For Mannoni the question at the heart of fetishism is, 
therefore, one of ‘the possibility of simultaneously embracing two contrary beliefs, one 
official and one secret', which triggers a subjective paradox in the fetishist613.  Moreover, 
on Mannoni’s account, this simultaneous abandonment and retention of belief is an 
everyday perhaps even banal occurrence, rather than the perverse undercurrent of life, 
                                                        
610 Böhme, 2014, p.8 
611 Gemerchak, 2004b, p.262 
612 Gemerchak, 2004b, p.262 
613 Octave Mannoni. 2015. Freud: Theory of the Unconscious. Translated by Renaud Bruce. London: Verso, 
p.151 
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which further adds to the notion of Equity fetishism as normative   A key difference that 
Mannoni highlights between the types of belief found in Freud’s formulation of fetishism 
and other psychic mechanisms for the repression and negation of ideas is precisely the 
fact that the belief is repudiated but not repressed nor denied as such614.  In short, 
Mannoni points to the importance of disavowal in maintaining both the structure of belief 
and by extension the structure of the fetish itself.   
Gemerchak echoes Mannoni in viewing disavowal as responsible for fetishism.  ‘[O]nly by 
expanding Freud’s notion of disavowal’, argues Gemerchak, ‘will we be able to 
understand fetishism as a fundamental possibility for the human subject’615.  Disavowal 
is, Gemerchak further explains, ‘the psychic anomaly that underpins Freud’s mature 
conception of fetishism […] an anomaly which henceforth served as a model for analysing 
structures as diverse as Marxist commodity fetishism, the Lacanian objet a, and primitive 
belief’616.  Disavowal is thus crucial on a number of different but interrelated fronts, all of 
which provide an explanation for certain forms of subjective existence in society.  The 
outline of split ego defence with which Freud further developed his ‘mature' 
understanding of fetishism speaks to divisions within the subject which not only bring to 
bear a certain belief but also sets in motion a partial repression of that belief in which 
disavowal plays a key role.  Recalling the point made earlier, disavowal begins with an 
avowal and thus we find an indication of the split at a pivotal point in the establishment 
of the fetish.  The partial repression of belief and the turning away from reality that 
simultaneously forms that belief structure does not occur in ignorance of the hitherto 
disavowed reality.  It does not qualify, so to speak, for (full) repression insofar as there 
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does not exist an overriding motive of avoiding unpleasure617.  On the contrary, the 
repression of belief is partial precisely because it occurs after a conscious avowal of the 
knowledge held by the subject.  In other words, the content of the avowal remained in 
consciousness and was not turned away from it618.   
The particular repression of belief, important I claim to an understanding of Equity 
fetishism, can be illustrated more clearly if contrasted with another corresponding fetish 
structure in which knowledge is repressed.  Following Žižek, consider the position in 
which the subject proclaims, ‘”(I know that God exists, but nevertheless) I act as though I 
believe that there is no God” – what he represses’, claims Žižek referring to the part in 
brackets, ‘is the knowledge of the existence of God’619.  This is contrasted with repression 
of belief, whereby, as Žižek explains, a ‘gap between (real) knowledge and (symbolic) 
belief determines our everyday ideological attitude: “I know that there is no God, but 
nevertheless I operate as if (I believe that) he exists” – the part in brackets is repressed 
(belief in a God whom we witness through our activity is unconscious)’620.  For present 
purposes this example can be rewritten in order to take the perspective of a stakeholder: 
I know that there is no such thing as complete justice, but nevertheless I conduct my 
business as if there is, and, what is more, Equity is proof of it.   
What is more, disavowal enables the stakeholder to enjoy that existence, which again 
highlights the peculiarly perverse rather than simply neurotic structure of fetishism, the 
latter being that part of Equity fetishism provided by the legal community as purveyors 
of legal expertise, knowledge and meaning.  In making his distinction, Freud posits 
neuroses as ‘the negative of perversion’, and that like a ‘stream of water which meets with 
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an obstacle in the river-bed’, the motive forces leading to the formation of hysterical 
symptoms in neurotics ‘draw their strength not only from repressed normal sexuality but 
also from unconscious perverse activities’621.  In terms of the stakeholder’s belief in the 
reality of complete justice as a basis from which to pursue their interests, the distinction 
between perversity à la fetishism and neurosis adheres to the problem a neurotic 
stakeholder would have in committing to the necessary belief.  This is because, where 
there is only partial repression of the avowed belief in fetishism, repression in cases of 
neuroses is more vigorous.  This means it is less likely that the stakeholder would or could 
form the necessary belief because the unconscious material is unable to be rendered 
conscious and thus form the basis for the initial avowal, the ‘I know' that precedes the 
‘nevertheless' in Mannoni’s formulation, and why the perverse stakeholder needs the 
neurotic lawyer as complement.  
‘Belief can survive its own denial by reality’, and, explains Gemerchak, ‘belief can persist 
even after the believer has been disillusioned, and therefore knows the belief is false’622.  
This helps explain how belief can function in prescribed circumstances because it persists 
‘without the subject even knowing about it, simply because of a projection that allows 
someone else to believe in one's place'623.  Trusts provide a good example of a 
bureaucracy that involves the type of split that is central to disavowal mimicked in the 
split between legal interest in the trustee and beneficial interest in the beneficiaries.  The 
office of the trustee alone offers further examples of that ‘someone else’ able to believe in 
one’s place that Gemerchak highlights.   
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There are various modern instantiations of the office of trustee in which, to varying 
degrees, forms of disavowal that correspond to the notion of conscious partial repression 
that structures belief can be found.  In the parlance of Equity jurisprudence, this 
disavowal and repression of belief takes different forms but is perhaps most notable in 
what Sarah Worthington refers to as ‘restrictions on personal autonomy' in the office of 
the trustee (and fiduciary more generally)624.  Doctrines of self-denial always already 
assume that trustees will commit breaches for personal gain, and therefore the loyalty 
basis of the fiduciary duty, which is also of note in the more specific field of trusts, is a 
good example of the source of such fictions625.  Like other remedial modes that form part 
of Equity's trust jurisprudence, constructive trusts, for example, they interpolate a legal 
fiction predicated on the notion of conscience into the social transaction, but which point, 
I argue, to a formalization of disavowal and repression626.  Irit Samet, for example, 
explains that:   
By invoking this rich concept of loyalty the courts of equity advise 
fiduciaries that the serious commitment they took upon themselves calls 
for the adoption of an unusual disposition.  A detached and purely 
instrumental approach to her relationship with the principal may get the 
fiduciary to abide by her legal duties.  But this unique position of great 
power over other people, combined with an information gap that renders 
detection of abuse quite unlikely, generates a temptation for wrongdoing 
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that can be very hard to overcome.  And this is true for an honest, well-
intentioned fiduciary627.         
As well as disavowal operating through these examples there is also an associated and 
important degree of compromise on the part of the stakeholder.  The stakeholder, as 
trustee, for instance, disavows opportunities for personal gain.  In doing so, however, she 
equally reaches a compromise regarding ways of continuing to enjoy the process, the 
bureaucracy, of which she forms so vital a part.  This includes an enjoyment of the process 
that extends over the moral character of the trustee.  Hence, trusteeship has long secured 
social and moral status for the stakeholder in lieu of personal financial gains628.  At first 
sight, the compromise would appear a sole part of the function of disavowal.  Both 
compromise and disavowal relate to the fundamental split in the subject that sets in 
motion the establishment of the fetish and the associated belief structure that supports it 
based upon the ambivalence of the subject's ‘simultaneous acknowledgement and 
denial'629.  Compromise warrants examination on its own terms insofar as it involves 
processes that can be distinguished from disavowal and thus serves to further define 
what disavowal is and why it is so important to the nature of fetishism.  Freud introduces 
compromise in the following way:  
It is not true that the child’s belief in the female phallus remains unchanged 
after he observed a woman.  He both retains this belief and renounces it; in 
                                                        
627 Irit Samet. 2014. Fiduciary Loyalty as Kantian Virtue.  Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law. 
Edited by Andrew S. Gold and Paul B. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University, p.140  
628 Discussing trusteeship during the nineteenth century Chantal Stebbings remarks that: ‘[t]rusteeship 
was an act of true affection and esteem, a demonstrable adherence to the social and moral codes, and as 
such it ensured the respect of the trustee’s own social class.  Moreover, since this ethos was reinforced 
and encouraged by the teaching of the Christian Church, a man falling short of the expected moral code 
would have to answer ultimately to God.  In the context of the intense religious fervour in Victorian 
England, trusteeship was significant.  It showed, no less, the moral standing of a man: to his family, his 
fellows, and to God’ (Stebbings, 2002, p.9).   
629 Gemerchak, 2004a, p.37 
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the conflict between the force of the unwelcome perception and the 
intensity of his aversion to it, a compromise is reached such as is possible 
only under the laws of unconscious thought, the primary processes.  In his 
psyche, yes, the woman still has a penis, but this penis is no longer the same 
thing as before.  Something else has taken its place, has been appointed its 
successor, so to speak, and this now inherits all the interest previously 
devoted to its predecessor.  But because the horror of castration has been 
immortalized in the creation of this substitute, this interest also becomes 
intensified to an extraordinary degree630.      
This rich passage covers a lot of ground.  The final sentence talks of immortalization and 
conveys the notion of a temporality that attaches to the fetish structure.  Precisely what 
underscores immortalization and the subject’s forward movement in time accompanied 
by their fetish will be dealt with in the following section on memorialization.  Where 
compromise and disavowal can be more readily distinguished is in the processes 
following the retention and renouncement of belief.  As discussed with regard to 
disavowal, there is in that process a necessary conscious stage of avowal whereby the 
subject has the knowledge they consciously turn away from, which maintains that belief 
is not derived from ignorance.    
Compromise, as Freud suggests, is concerned with primary processes of repression at the 
level of the unconscious.  There is no conscious stage of compromise, no compromise in 
ignorance, which ultimately structures the fetish object as a structure of ambivalence.  
The compromise is instead a direct result of a conflict in the psyche of the subject 
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‘between the force of the unwelcome perception and the intensity of his aversion to it'631.  
‘In sexual fetish worship’, Böhme claims, ‘things must always be kept in balance: the 
annihilation of identity by castration, which can no longer be expunged from the world 
(the sacrifice), must be represented in a new form, must mask itself as the love object that 
warrants all feelings of lust being focused on it’632.  Accordingly, Böhme concludes, ‘[i]n 
the strict sense, the fetish is a compromise that is made in the unconscious between the 
fear of castration and the saviour of the phallus’633.    
Again, the following section on memorialization will draw out the importance attributed 
to the ‘new form’ that emerges in fetishism, one which is apposite in the context of Equity 
fetishism in terms, notably, of post-Judicature mobilization in the wider field of Common 
law of complete justice.  The type of procedure that John Sorabji summarizes as 
Chancery’s ability to ‘disapply procedural rules where abiding by them would frustrate 
its overriding objective of doing complete justice’, which itself signals a form of comprise 
occurring within the machinations of civil procedure634.  Compromise returns the 
discussion to unconscious conflicts over the universal nature of justice and fairness and 
a relationship to Equity at a corresponding unconscious social and institutional level.  
‘The fetish makes the unconscious fantasy that there is ‘nothing but the phallus’ possible’, 
says Böhme, while at the same time and in adherence to compromise preserving, ‘the 
repressed fantasy that there is such a thing as castration’635.  Thus, Equity fetishism 
serves to maintain the structure of the capitalist fantasy of completeness, whilst also 
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preserving a certain limit that serves as a reminder to the stakeholder that the fantasy is 
always already compromised.   
Civil justice reform as a form of institutional compromise is, I argue, driven by capitalism 
and has been seen both in nineteenth century Judicature and more recently with the 
Woolf and Jackson reforms in the belief that this would lead to a more perfect and 
complete system of justice.  Accordingly Judicature involved the creation of a form of civil 
justice in which Chancery’s overriding objective of doing complete justice could be 
preserved without the corresponding problems that rendered ‘its process both expensive 
and time-consuming’636.   Equity fetishism emerged from the nineteenth-century reform 
agenda as a perverse and fantastical response to stakeholder demand for a different form 
of the civil justice system to the one that predominated during the earlier periods of 
capitalism, largely because the old system did not satisfy their desires.  Despite the fusion 
of the court system and creation of a new and arguably more efficient way of doing civil 
justice, stakeholders did not achieve an infallible system of justice, and, indeed, the recent 
Woolf and Jackson reforms, whilst responses to changes in socioeconomic conditions 
under capitalism since the nineteenth century, are equally a testament to the 
impossibility of perfectibility.  In Freudian terms, compromise qua civil justice reform 
necessarily continues because a ‘particular and quite special penis’ only resides in fantasy 
and will never manifest in reality.   
4. Memorialization  
Memorialization of Equity as an object is central to understanding its significance and 
value as a fetish in the contemporary civil justice system.  A notable product of analyses 
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of Equity (including the present one) is the proliferation of historical references, each of 
which records and recounts a piece of Equity.  All are complicit, therefore, although to 
varying degrees of a memorialization symptomatic of Equity fetishism.  For instance, 
memorialization of Equity, as previously argued, is traceable to the effects of the 
nineteenth-century Judicature reforms which included securing the supremacy of Equity 
over Common Law and placing it, as Robert Pearce and Warren Barr maintain, ’on a 
statutory footing’637.  Moreover, memorialization was cemented through subsequent 
pieces of Judicature legislation in 1925 and 1981, as well as via the Rules of the Supreme 
Court. 
Memorialization of Equity via each stage of Judicature has looked to the past as much as 
to the future.  The modern foundations of Equity’s ‘supremacy’ continue to reside in the 
notion that its rules prevail over those of Common Law in the event of a conflict.  This 
idea can be traced to the Earl of Oxford’s Case, in which the Lord Chief Justice of the King’s 
Bench, Sir Edward Coke, and the Lord Chancellor, Lord Ellesmere, failed to agree as to the 
status of Chancery injunctions respecting Common Law judgments.  ‘This jurisdictional 
civil war’, Pearce and Barr claim, ‘was finally ended in 1616, when James I issued an order 
in favour of the Chancery Court and the common injunctions’638.  Despite attempts by 
Common Lawyers to reverse the outcome of the extraordinary intervention of the 
monarch by a Parliamentary Bill in 1690, which was eventually dropped ‘when it was 
shown that it would make equity unworkable’ and lead to injustice, ‘the primacy of the 
Chancery Courts was well established by the end of the [seventeenth] century’ and 
continued through the Woolf reforms at the end of the twentieth century as a further 
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memorialization of the notion of complete justice as the normative means for achieving 
civil justice outcomes639.  
As a key to fetishism memorialization involves a clear temporality which engages the 
subject in considerations of both the past and future in their structuring of the fetish 
object.  Beginning with Freud we can see that the structure of the fetish requires a special 
something that was believed in once upon a time (in the past), but, crucially, does not 
want to be given up (in the present or in the future)640.  As part of Freud's aetiology, the 
memorialization that helps establish the fetish is, as Böhme maintains, ‘the perverse 
memorial to an archaic time in which there was a "male gender, but not a female one”’641.  
The fetish locks the subject into a specific temporality in which the past tense is forever 
tied to the future tense of the object in a cyclical yet historically contingent masking of 
loss qua castration.  Or, more accurately, a re-signifying or re-symbolising that allows the 
meaning the object holds for the subject to endlessly (re)form in a chain of signification 
implies castration never occurred or has to occur in the fantasy life of the subject.  ‘It goes 
without saying’, argues Böhme, ‘that things also acquire meaning as memorial objects […] 
Here meaning is understood as an extra layer, a material patina.  The cultural part of 
things is put on them like a dress, which then gradually becomes a second skin.  This 
becoming historical and biographical of things makes them into archives of memory, in 
which individual people and collectives find security’642.   
With regard to the interrelation between Equity and Chancery in the structure of Equity 
fetishism, memorialisation involves a coalescence of both materialities and temporalities.  
The Court of Chancery represented and represents an archive of the materiality of Equity; 
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Equity sustained through an architecture of stone, bricks and cement.  Whilst the name 
of Chancery is carried forward, as a homology, through time on the signifying chain as the 
"Chancery" Division.  Therefore, a materiality (the weight of the stone, brick and cement) 
associated with the long-dead court remains part of how Equity continues to be 
interpreted and understood.  The divisional preservation of Chancery was thus, I argue, 
no accident and preservation of the name post-Judicature deliberately took account of 
and memorialised that which Equity had been, but, importantly, could not close-off what 
Equity was to become, notably a commercially astute and adaptable mode of civil justice 
capable of bearing more children 643.  ‘The essence of institutional equity is the creation 
of a special court, distinct from the courts administering the general law, having the 
power to modify or correct the general law’, state Bryan and Vann, although, as they 
further maintain in full acknowledgement of the idea of memorialization, ‘the paradox of 
institutional equity is that it is premised on the existence of a court which no longer 
exists’644. 
Due to the withering status of the Court of Chancery by the time of its closure, 
preservation also had to account for what Equity or civil justice more generally must 
never be again.  Not least because a return to costliness and inefficiency of the magnitude 
attributed to the Court of Chancery by stakeholders and reformers during the nineteenth 
century would contradict the spirit of capitalist ideology that had made the case for 
systemic reform of civil justice a necessity and a reality.  Accordingly, memorialization in 
the case of Equity fetishism reflects stakeholder desire for complete justice, but also of 
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certainty and stability in terms of the overarching procedural functionality of the courts.  
A desire driven by stakeholder anxieties regarding the loss of ground on which one’s 
certainty has been staked, the same ground from which the fetish emerges645.          
The fetish captivates the subject in a constant present that parallels an otherwise evolving 
experience, and around which are wrapped the arms of the past and future.  Gravestones, 
war memorials and other non-functioning objects that, insofar as they are made from 
organic or natural materials, decay (are subject to forces of entropy), are examples that 
give the subject a sense of fixity and immovability.  The tended grave in particular, which 
is visited, cleaned, repaired and maintained, is an example of the captivation of living 
subjects by static objects and by stasis as such.  Engaged in memorializing, these subjects 
affect a constant return to the once upon a time.  In lieu of the actual reincarnation of the 
body in the grave, this re-enactment of the moment or event signalling the living subject’s 
loss can be represented by the cleaning and renewal of the headstone.   
To tend is, therefore, to ritually institute forms of renewal and a sense of return to an 
earlier point in time where the special object remained, at least symbolically, intact.  
Meaning is then translated into the present and, indeed, projected into the future, raised 
up and celebrated.  A process that is succinctly put in the infamous memorialization of 
the war dead: lest we forget.  ‘This is always about overcoming death or the dead (things) 
that mark themselves as absent and a void’, argues Böhme, ‘[f]etishism can thus be 
described as an animating force that is taken from a memory that masks its origin and yet 
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in the fetish becomes an event in the here and now’646.  Central to this aspect of 
memorialization are, I claim, also aesthetic and atmospheric considerations.  As such, it 
is important to explain how these considerations further define fetishism. 
That fetishism has an aesthetic dimension is axiomatic.  Indeed, Böhme posits the 
relationship between fetishism and aesthetics as prehistoric and fundamental to the 
human condition itself647.  Fetishism, Böhme maintains, apprehends basic human 
considerations of and concerns with beauty and ugliness, pleasure and aversion648.  The 
suggestion is that the ethnographic and cultural anthropology of fetishism can be traced 
to a set of aesthetic values, which far from being fixed are in fact evolving with human 
experience and reason in the form of, for example, fashions, tastes, techniques, 
institutions and so on.  Considered in light of Freud’s aetiology, the relationship of 
aesthetics to fetishism can be linked to the substitutional value as well as the substantive 
qualities and characteristics of the fetish object itself.  The substantive thingness of the 
fetish speaks to the notion that fetishism necessarily involves reification and a freezing 
or stalling, temporally speaking, at the point of the fragmentation and loss of the primal 
object of desire.  Hence the purpose of the fetish, as Freud states, is to ‘prevent this loss 
from occurring’, something that goes to the heart of memorialization as a key feature of 
fetishism649.  Moreover, the fetish generates enjoyment for and happiness in the subject 
because it is not just any object but ‘a specific and very special one’650.  Integral to its 
ability to sustain belief, therefore, the fetish possesses for the subject an aesthetic quality 
that makes it special. 
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In being the special thing that provides enjoyment for the subject and makes him or her 
happy, the substantive aesthetic quality of the fetish equally exists in or rather generates 
a certain atmosphere for the subject.  Accordingly, to sustain belief there remains extant 
for the duration (life) of that belief in the fetish a commitment to a certain atmospheric 
(as well as aesthetic) quality, making it a vital component in structuring the fetish as such.  
For example, the genital construction performed by the little boy apropos his mother’s 
special phallus is, for Freud, clearly more than just an aesthetic concern – what may be 
considered as a concern for the penis as an aesthetic functional object itself, as well as for 
the functional integrity of that penis vis-à-vis the threat of castration651.  What is special 
about the object able to fulfil this genital construction can be directly traced to an 
atmosphere that surrounds it, what Böhme refers to as ‘the matrix of beauty’, which at 
once ‘arouses pleasure or dislike, attraction or revulsion’ in the subject652.   
Atmosphere in that sense, akin to a symptomology, manifests aesthetic effects which 
generate their own materiality653.  Moreover, atmosphere can involve something more 
subtle such as a gesture made in and through space, which describes or determines some 
form of causal outcome or consequence.  The historical view of Equity as a court of 
conscience signal juridical gestures of discretion and contemplation that illustrate an 
atmosphere of justice on the terms described here.  An atmosphere of civil process in 
which the court seeks less to know the defendant’s conscience, than for the defendant to 
have self-regard for their own conscience.  Or, rather, for the court to reach a point at 
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which it is able to interpolate a fiction of conscientiousness into proceedings in order, for 
instance, to guarantee the legitimacy of property rights claims.   
The Aesthetic atmosphere produced by the fetish always derives from a position of 
subjective desire.  It is not something that can be objectively or scientifically measured.  
That does not mean that the particular qualities of a fetish that trigger enjoyment and 
happiness for the subject cannot be relayed or communicated in some form to others.  
Take, for example, the deeply affective aesthetic representations of the Court of Chancery 
during its demise in the nineteenth century.  And in particular the reformist portrait 
painted by Charles Dickens in Bleak House that deliberately cast Chancery cloaked in fog 
as an arcane, esoteric and, most importantly, dysfunctional institution654.  The problems 
surrounding Chancery were, like Dickens' fog, all-pervasive and much debated by the 
nineteenth-century reformers.  What is more, the problems were cast as much in 
aesthetic as ethical terms.  The role commentators such as Dickens had in shaping 
perceptions of civil justice system were important therefore not least because they 
helped determine the fate of Chancery as a material place and an idea.  With the demise 
of Chancery, of course, came the reconfiguration of the system as a whole, as Gary Watt 
maintains: ‘Dickens added high-grade fuel to the existing fire of chancery law reform’655.  
And as part of an aesthetic commitment the aim of reform was to satisfy, if not exactly a 
cultural need for the (fetid) atmosphere of Chancery, then at the very least the need for 
an acknowledgement and appreciation of an atmosphere from which something 
                                                        
654 As an example from Dickens shows: 
On such an afternoon, some score of members of the High Court of Chancery bar ought to be – as here 
they are – mistily engaged in one of the ten thousand stages of an endless cause, tripping one another up 
on slippery precedents, groping knee-deep in technicalities, running their goat-hair and horse-hair 
warded heads against walls of words, and making a pretence of Equity with serious faces, as players 
might. (Charles Dickens. 2011. Bleak House. London: Penguin Classics, p.14) 
655 Watt, 2012, p.56 
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functional could be salvaged, namely Equity656.  Together with an aesthetic discourse, 
therefore, atmosphere describes how belief in Equity could ultimately be shaped by a 
memorialization of Chancery despite its ruin and closure. 
Complete justice post-Judicature (and post-Chancery) involved the interlinked desires 
for concurrency with the Common Law and for the procedural approach of Equity to 
prevail.  Moreover, Chancery remained an important part of civil justice, not only as an 
homology linking the name of the old court to the new, post-Judicature division, but, 
rather, in a ghostly and memorial form.  When Anthony Mason talks of Equity in the 
contemporary Common Law world in which he focuses quite specifically on ‘equity's 
incursions into the area of commerce', he, therefore, insists on ‘the distinctive concepts, 
doctrines, principles and remedies which were developed and applied by the old Court of 
Chancery, as they have been refined and elaborated since'657.  Mason’s ‘old’ Court of 
Chancery is a jurisprudential archive maintained for practical and systematic reasons 
under the heading of the post-Judicature Chancery Division, but equally a certain 
persistent spectre of Chancery that continues to haunt the moment of civil justice 
adjudication.     
What was imputed by reformers and stakeholders to be worthwhile and good about 
Equity and necessary to preserve and memorialize post-Judicature was thus necessarily 
fashioned from the atmosphere of Chancery and, indeed, still is or was until at least the 
end of the twentieth century; it was a concurrent vision of Equity that signalled the 
dominance of complete justice.  Mason describes, once again, the nature this dominant 
form of procedure took as the ‘underlying values of equity centred on good conscience’, 
                                                        
656 Jean Baudrillard. 2005. The System of Objects. Translated by James Benedict. London: Verso 
657 Mason, 1994, p.245 & p.238  
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that, ‘will almost certainly continue to be a driving force in the shaping of the law unless 
the underlying values and expectations of society undergo a fairly radical alteration’658.  
Mason does not expand on the ‘underlying values and expectations of society’ he refers 
to, but the juridical-economic status quo of capitalism underpinned by the civil justice 
system is not an unreasonable implication.  For Sorabji, the shift in underlying values and 
expectations came not in the form of a social so much as a juridical alteration.  Namely, a 
theory of civil justice formulated at the end of the twentieth century by the Woolf reforms 
based on the determination of an ‘overriding objective’, which echoed Benthamite 
utilitarianism and promoted economy and efficiency as necessary traits of the litigation 
process659.  From the point of view of this thesis it is interesting that both Mason and 
Sorabji imply that the same forces are at work in shaping civil justice - economic reason 
and capitalist ideology.  Moreover, that neither name capitalism but instead rely on 
euphemism is, I argue, testament to the depth of capitalist ideology; as Jodi Dean argues, 
in getting us to think only in terms of capitalist logics of, among other things, competition 
and efficiency660.      
Equity fetishism is indelibly marked by Equity’s (former) relationship to the Court of 
Chancery.  What is placed in brackets in the previous sentence is necessarily done so in 
order to highlight the temporality at play, and that, actually, to consider the relationship 
between Equity and the Court of Chancery to be ‘former’, finished or in the past is, as 
discussed above, inaccurate.  Memorialization of the (dead) Court of Chancery occurs in 
the (living) Chancery Division as a homology (in name), but also as a ‘tending of the 
graves’.  An analogy which adheres to Mason’s suggestion that Equity constitutes not only 
                                                        
658 Mason, 1994, p.258 
659 Sorabji, 2014, p.148-150 
660 Jodi Dean, 2012, p.73 
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a reference to the old Court but the constant refinement and elaboration since of the rules 
and doctrines originated in Chancery.  Variations of the memorialization on the signifying 
chain of Chancery (‘tending of the grave’), in terms put forward by Mason, naturally 
manifests in judicial statements.  For example, Bagnall J. in Cowcher v Cowcher [1972], a 
case concerning matrimonial property, in which he stated that: 
In any individual case the application of these propositions may produce a 
result which appears unfair.  So be it; in my view that is not injustice.  I am 
convinced that in determining rights, particularly, property rights, the only 
justice that can be obtained by mortals, who are fallible and not omniscient, 
is justice according to law; the justice which flows from the application of 
sure and settled principles to proved or admitted facts.  So in the field of 
equity, the length of the Chancellor’s foot has been measured or is capable 
of measurement.  This does not mean that equity is past childbearing; 
simply that its progeny must be legitimate – by precedent out of 
principle661.  
For Bagnall J. Equity was what the Court of Chancery did until Judicature and any 
development thereafter belonged only within the margins and cognizance of the Common 
Law662.  With reference to a complete system of civil justice, it was important that 
                                                        
661 Cowcher v Cowcher [1972] 1 WLR 425 at 430.  In a notable response to Bagnall J in Eves v Eves [1975] 1 
WLR 1338 at 1341, a judge on the more creative side of the spectrum, Lord Denning, infamously 
proclaimed that: ‘Equity is not past the age of childbearing.  One of her latest progeny is a constructive 
trust of a new model.  Lord Diplock brought it into the world [in Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886] and we 
have nourished it’. 
662 Following a broader school of thought on the integration of Equity and Common Law that was led until 
recently by Peter Birks, and which continues to live through the development of other bodies of law, 
namely the law of restitution and unjust enrichment, Sarah Worthington makes the point, forcibly, that: 
‘Integration is possible.  Integration is also desirable in the interests of better justice.  It facilitates the aim 
of treating like cases alike.  It also facilitates the sort of rational evolution of the law that is only possible if 
courts can draw distinctions based on meaningful differences rather than accidental jurisdictional 
divides’ [my emphasis] (2006, p.335)  
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absolute coherence between the ways and means of Common law and Equity be 
sustained.  The type of dogmatic insistence demonstrated by Bagnall J is summed up by 
Sarah Worthington who has equally managed to perform the remarkable (fetishistic) task 
of writing in-depth and with exceptional clarity about Equity, only to conclude that, as a 
body of law, it has no rational place in the future of the Common Law system of civil 
justice.  ‘[H]istory cannot’, Worthington argues, ‘go on to convincingly vindicate what is 
unquestionably a counter-intuitive choice […] Comprehensive, rational integration of 
Common Law and Equity doctrines appears to be the only defensible modern option in 
pursuing principled legal development’663.   
The integration that Worthington advocates is arguably a form of memorialisation par 
excellence in respect of Equity fetishism.  This is because its aim is to thoroughly dissolve 
Equity as a body of laws into the Common Law so as to, effectively, make it unclear to 
stakeholders where one law begins and another ends664.  Whilst at the same time 
preserving Equity as a distinguished and distinguishable other of the Common Law.  
‘[C]omprehensive doctrinal integration must surely be the grand plan for Equity and the 
Common Law’, states Worthington, ‘it is certainly the best plan for Equity in the common 
law’ [my emphasis]665.  Whether this is a typographic error on the part of the author or 
publisher, it nevertheless remains the case even as Worthington seeks to shift Equity 
from a parallel status with the Common Law (‘and’), to an integrated position of 
subservience ‘in’ the Common Law, it is Equity that remains capitalised, remains 
supreme, and thus ultimately prevails as the fetish object of complete justice.  As a 
                                                        
663 Worthington, 2006, p.335 
664 Peter Birks remarks on the ultimate failure to achieve this: ‘Although the institutional separation of 
law and equity finally came to an end in 1871, the inheritance of intellectual duality has proved difficult to 
overcome’ (Birks, 2005, p.292)   
665 Worthington, 2006, p.336 
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commentary on the victory of Equity over Common Law that the implementation of 
complete justice post-judicature signifies, Worthington’s slip, whether intended or not, 
is, therefore, instructive.          
5. Summary 
Having outlined three of the major features of fetishism in Freud's mature theory of the 
concept, it is now possible to summarize the notion of Equity fetishism before moving on.  
Fetishism as discussed, especially regarding disavowal, is not a function restricted to the 
level of the unconscious.  Instead, fetishism occurs in plain view, so to speak, as normative 
conscious (real) knowledge, which, by constructing mechanisms of belief, contradicts 
unconscious desires that manifest in the subject as unwelcome perceptions666.  Hence, 
different manifestations of fetishism, including Equity fetishism, do not amount to mere 
fantasy but maintain a basis in reality that allows them, as is the case with complete 
justice, to invite objective evaluation.  That is, to appear to be rooted in objective reason 
rather than subjective desire.  As Gemerchak maintains: ‘[T]he mystery of fetishism is 
that the closed circuit of desire and the belief in the satisfying nature of the object may be 
shattered, and consciously so, but the belief in the exclusive fulfilling object remains'667.     
As a condition of capitalist society in which ECJ corresponds to ‘the institutionalized 
structuring of social consciousness so as to create social reality as a comprehensive 
system of objective illusion’, Equity fetishism manifests in the fixation of stakeholders on 
‘empty signs rather than material substance’668.  Equity fetishism involves the production 
of more profound symbolic meanings.  This takes the form, primarily, of sustaining belief 
in the fantasy of a complete and thus certain system of civil justice, predicated on the 
                                                        
666 Gemerchak, 2004b, p.243 
667 Gemerchak, 2004a, p.41 
668 Gemerchak, 2004a, pp.24-25 
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post-Judicature unity or fusion of Common Law and Equity.  In this context, Equity 
fetishism sustains stakeholder belief in, for example, the coherence and rationality of the 
private property order in particular and capitalist ideology in general. 
 ‘The fetish’, says Gemerchak, ‘not only serves to disavow a lack and assert a presence, but 
as well to incarnate a lack, to simultaneously veil and unveil an essential absence’669.  
Reemphasizing aspects of the discussion above on memorialization it is argued here that, 
as a product of the nineteenth-century reform agenda, Equity fetishism is indelibly 
marked by the Court of Chancery.  That is, by a particular site of loss and negativity from 
which the notion of complete justice continues to speak.  ‘At the heart of fetishism, both 
on the side of the fetish object and the fetishistic subject', argues Gemerchak, ‘there is an 
internal contradiction between brute materiality and evanescent dissimulation, essence 
and appearance, which makes it flow'670.  As the exclusive material embodiment of Equity, 
that is, the physical site of the practice and dissemination of Equity’s ideas and reason, 
and thus, largely, the source and repository of the language of Equity, Chancery remains 
central to the notion and practice of Equity fetishism post-Judicature.  
In whatever context Equity arises, language is key.  As a feature of Equity fetishism the 
means of testifying to its ‘enduring presence’ occurs not only through the evocation of 
Chancery, in the homology between Court and Division, but also in the language of 
Equity671.  The centrality and solemnity of the language of conscience in shaping the 
nature and practice of complete justice, including the oft-used reflexive, 
unconscionability, has since the time of John Selden's Table Talk assumed the very 
                                                        
669 Gemerchak, 2004a, p.38 
670 Gemerchak, 2004a, p.13 
671 Gemerchak, 2004a, p.38 
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particular form of a foot fetish672. ‘We focus on language’, states Geoffrey Galt Harpham 
in his general analysis of language-as-fetish, ‘as a way of reassuring ourselves, albeit 
indirectly, of our special place in the order of things, our singular endowments and high 
destiny’, a statement which speaks to the status and degree of absoluteness afforded to 
justice, flexibility (adaptability), and fairness, as well as the various ways that Equity aims 
to apply these in various contexts for stakeholders673.   
Equity fetishism is key to the fantasy of the need for legal certainty (among many other 
fantasies) that capitalism promulgates in order to satisfy the stakeholder and guarantee 
the sanctity of economic reason.  The fantasy of legal certainty engages and captivates 
stakeholders.  It makes them want to invest, invite risk and competition and ultimately 
litigate over property rights and interests.  Underlying this fantasy (what the fantasy and 
fetishism mask) is the message capitalism wishes to communicate to the stakeholder: that 
castration is avoidable and complete satisfaction possible.  And communicating this 
message involves the language of Equity as it is recorded in case-law, legislation and other 
modes of juridical discourse that give credence to a culture of rights and the broader 
notion of a private property order674.   
Through language Equity structures belief in complete and certain justice.  As a desirable 
legal end certainty is not exclusive to Equity, but to the concurrent system of civil justice 
                                                        
672 Böhme, 2014, p.324; Žižek, 2008, p238.   
Selden famously remarked: 
Equity is a Roguish thing: for Law we have a measure, know what to trust to; Equity is according to the 
Conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity.  ‘Tis all one if they 
should make the Standard for the measure, we call a Foot, the Chancellor’s Foot; what an uncertain 
measure this would be?  One Chancellor has a long Foot, another a short Foot, a Third and indifferent 
Foot: ‘Tis the same thing in the Chancellor’s Conscience. (Selden, 1856, p.49) 
673 Harpham, 2002, p.66 
674 Where the language of Equity is concerned as a means of penetrating or engaging the mystique of 
Equity, there have perhaps been no more desiring stakeholders than those members of the Chancery Bar 
who, in the lead up to Judicature and throughout the nineteenth century, fought so vociferously to keep 
Equity distinct from the Common Law, and did so predicated on their special knowledge of that 
jurisdiction.   
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as a whole.  Certainty is itself contingent, therefore, upon the integrity of the whole.  In 
the notion of certainty, it is possible to discern yet another dimension of Equity fetishism 
with regard to the uncastrated fantasies of capitalism.  Equity fetishism turns upon, as 
Valerie Kerruish claims with regard to ‘rights fetishism', certainties in ‘[l]egal practice of 
deciding particular cases by general rules, of coercive enforcement of those decisions, and 
of claiming that such judgments and their enforcement are objectively or uniquely 
right’675.  As a consequence, Equity fetishism allows thoughtful subjects to lose 
themselves ‘in and to their own product: their thought and their laws’676.    
Finally, it ought to be clear by now that this thesis maintains that complete justice 
demanded by the stakeholder in Equity is never the thing as such (is never complete), but 
only ever a banal instant manufactured by a neurotic legal counterpart in and by language 
to defeat a negativity, a lack, at the core of the stakeholder.  It is more accurate to think of 
Equity fetishism therefore as a totalizing and fantastical means through which civil justice 
appears complete in the eye of the stakeholder, as that which the stakeholder actually 
seeks, when they seek justice in Equity.  Civil justice contingent upon the language of 
Equity, even where that engenders a closed and discrete field of knowledge and expertise, 
only serves to further alienate the stakeholder, insofar as the language is tied to an 
already alienating process of property.   
The fetishization of the language of Equity, as a more precise description of how Equity 
fetishism actually manifests, disguises endless chains of signification that are always 
inconclusive and which reveal in the stakeholder a certain commitment to and 
investment in the materiality of the sign.  But a sign mistaken for complete justice, 
                                                        
675 Valerie Kerruish. 1991. Jurisprudence as Ideology. London: Routledge, p.194 
676 Kerruish, 1991, p.194 
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certainty or both.  Language lives at the heart of what it means for Equity fetishism to 
prevail, rather than mere Equity677.  And, accordingly, for Equity fetishism to continue 
formatting scenes of complete justice in the field of property on behalf of stakeholders 
who need to believe, not only in the fantastic possibility that justice is complete and will 
legitimize their rights to property and thus make them good economic subjects under 
capitalism, but that the primal loss associated with castration never occurred and does 
not apply to them.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
677 In its prevailing, the centrality of Equity to legal consciousness established by Lord Ellesmere in the 
Earl of Oxford’s Case which continues in the present via s.49(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 marks the 
temporal record and legal consciousness of law in England and Wales.   
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Chapter 8 
Neoliberalism & Equity Fetishism:  
An Analysis of the Contemporary 
Capitalist Moment in Civil Justice 
 
The central values of civilization are in danger.  Over large stretches of the Earth’s surface 
the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have already disappeared.  In 
others they are under constant menace from the development of current tendencies of 
policy.  The position of the individual and the voluntary group are progressively 
undermined by extensions of arbitrary power.  Even that most precious possession of 
Western Man, freedom of thought and expression, is threatened by the spread of creeds 
which, claiming the privilege of tolerance when in the position of a minority, seek only to 
establish a position of power in which they can suppress and obliterate all views but their 
own. 
The group holds that these developments have been fostered by the growth of a view of 
history which denies all absolute moral standards and by the growth of theories which 
question the desirability of the rule of law.  It holds further that they have been fostered 
by a decline of belief in private property and the competitive market; for without the 
diffused power and initiative associated with these institutions it is difficult to imagine a 
society in which freedom may be effectively preserved678. 
1. Introduction  
During this chapter Equity fetishism will be discussed in light of the contemporary 
capitalist age, which is understood here to correspond with so-called neoliberalism.  In 
the time between Judicature and the Senior Courts Act 1981 the role and place of Equity 
has often been restated in the civil justice system.  Since then significant reform 
programmes in England and Wales have further shifted the onus of civil justice, I argue, 
towards an alignment of economic principles to Equity’s deontological imperative, or 
rather, vice versa.  In his final report on access to justice Lord Woolf remarked that civil 
justice should be inter alia ‘just in the results it delivers; fair in the way it treats litigants; 
offer appropriate procedures at a reasonable cost, and be responsive to the needs of those 
                                                        
678 Founding statement of the Mont Pelerine Society, Switzerland, April 8 1947.  The founding members 
included Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig Von Mises and Milton Friedman. [Online] Available at: 
https://www.montpelerin.org/statement-of-aims/ (accessed 4 May 2017)       
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who use it’679.  On the one hand, the Woolf Reforms echo the sorts of debates that 
informed the Judicature reforms during the nineteenth century, where cost and speed, 
especially where Chancery was concerned, were key themes and significant problems 
that needed to be solved.  On the other hand, however, the notable alignment of principles 
of fairness and justice with economic injunctions for civil justice to perform with greater 
efficiency, flexibility (adaptability and responsiveness), and cost-effectiveness are 
entirely contemporary justifications made within and native to neoliberal capitalism680.  
In that sense, the Woolf reforms accord with a notion and ideal of common sense justice 
native to neoliberal reason.  We have already explored the impact of Chicago School and 
the law and economics of Richard Posner, and there is a strong argument that will be 
made here that reforms to civil justice, conducted by the likes of Lord Woolf, whilst 
redolent of the nineteenth-century project to tidy up the legal field ‘littered with the most 
venerable survivals’ from bygone ages, is most recognisable as a further fusion of law and 
economics ‘such that ‘efficiency’ is made ‘a proxy for justice’681. 
This chapter will describe two main areas.  Firstly, the place of Equity and civil justice 
within neoliberal thought.  This will involve considering the impact of neoliberalism on 
notions of complete justice that has been described previously as the basis for selfishness 
in contemporary civil litigation in defence of private interests682.  Secondly, Equity 
fetishism will be considered in light of the emphasis placed on strategizing within 
neoliberal capitalism.  That is, the propensity for stakeholders to combine various social, 
                                                        
679 Woolf. 1996 
680 The role of flexibility has been covered in depth in the earlier chapters of this thesis.  In relation to the 
place of flexibility within contexts dominated by economic and commercial principles, in particular, see: 
Millett, 1998.  
681 Davies, 2017, p.87 
682 Jolowicz, 1983 
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political, moral, economic and legal options into strategies in support of, among other 
things, selfish interests.  
As part of this strategizing, there is I argue a reliance on fantasies of efficient commutative 
justice capable of salving the stakeholder-as-engaged economic subject within neoliberal 
capitalism.  Fantasies that turn on ECJ, but which now also embody models of 
adjudication such as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) that extend, and have thus 
rendered porous, traditional boundaries of civil justice ‘as a way of resolving disputes 
that does not require the use of court resources’683.  Whilst this thesis has identified 
Equity fetishism as broadly related to the notion of complete justice, in order to describe 
Equity fetishism under neoliberalism, this chapter will further examine unconscionability 
as a specific symptom of the demand placed on the subject by neoliberal capitalism to be 
flexible and agile.  That is, how unconscionability qua flexibility itself assumes the status 
of fetish, and stakeholders engaging under the aegis of neoliberal thought in both contexts 
of high-level economic risk and everyday bargaining come to rely on it both conceptually 
and materially in civil justice events, including forms of adjudication both in and out of 
court.  
2. The law of neoliberalism 
The drift towards socialist economic policies as an attenutation of capitalism during the 
first half and middle of the twentieth century in Western capitalist societies produced 
programmes such as the New Deal in the United States and the Welfare State in Great 
                                                        
683 Adam Gearey, Wayne Morrison and Robert Jago. 2009. The Politics of the Common Law: Perspectives, 
Rights, Processes, Institutions. London: Routledge, p.383; see also: Thomas O. Main. 2005. ADR: The New 
Equity. University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 74, pp.329-404; Carl F. Stychin and Linda Mulcahy. 2007. 
Legal Methods and Systems, 3rd Edition. London: Sweet & Maxwell; Sheela Rai, Sayak Chandra and 
Souvanki Mullick. 2008. ADR Processes: A Jurisprudential Understanding. The Icfai University Journal of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp.74-91   
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Britain.  But these have arguably been politico-economic aberrations in government 
policies otherwise caught within the ambit of capital since the late eighteenth century.  It 
is important to note that the monumental crises of capitalism, for example, in the form of 
the 1929 ‘Wall Street crash’ and the subsequent Great Depression in the United States 
that American historian Howard Zinn claims were symptomatic of ‘a sick and 
undependable system’, reveal that capitalism is inherently configured to reach points of 
logical impasse and crisis684.  Fantasies of complete justice are, therefore, vital to 
stakeholders if they are to maintain belief in an unstable and illogical form of social 
organization, and a parallel belief that capitalism holds the key to endlessly deferring the 
trauma of castration.   
During the middle of the twentieth century the Mont Pelerine Society was established by 
leading academics of the time and thinkers from a variety of different fields, whose 
founding statement quoted at the start of this chapter laid the foundations for a 
resurgence of late nineteenth century neo-classical economics and the desire to 
disseminate economic reason across Anglo-American post-war capitalist societies seen 
as being under threat from socialism685.  As the epigraph above shows, central to the 
conceptual foundations of neoliberalism are juridical and, it will be argued, fetishistic 
concerns that are captured in the two emphasized passages: ‘the desirability of the rule 
of law’ and ‘belief in private property’.  What the analysis later in this chapter will aim to 
describe therefore is how Equity fetishism is translated into the contemporary 
socioeconomic and legal moment, enabling stakeholders to, to paraphrase Sir Henry 
                                                        
684 Zinn, 1996, p.378 
685 Akin to the example of the Woolf reforms, or rather as evidence of how those reforms fit the sort of 
agenda proposed by the Mont Pelerine Society, what is recounted here is a tension between past and 
future practices (social, economic, political and legal) existing within the boundaries of economic reason.    
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Maine, ‘strive to recover a lost perfection’ and sustain their fantasies of uncastrated unity 
and through private property, wealth and complete civil justice686. 
This train of thought reflects the work of Frederick Hayek as one of the major architects 
of law’s place in neoliberal thought, and which led him to make the case for new super-
charged competitive and market-driven form of capitalism in his infamous diatribe 
against the perils of socialism, The Road to Serfdom687.  It is not unreasonable given the 
sheer amount of times he references the notion in his work to suggest that the heart of 
the matter for Hayek was competition and the strategic nature of competitive practices 
in particular.  His furious defence of competition was directed, not only against the 
centralising tendencies of economic organization that he regarded as key to socialism but 
equally against the prevailing threat of the capitalist who would promote the eventual 
collapse of free markets into a state of monopoly688.   
Hayek’s reimagining of capitalism gave particular prominence to the legal system in 
ensuring the legitimacy and effectiveness of the competitive market structure that he 
desired and in large part predicted.  ‘The functioning of competition not only requires 
adequate organisation of certain institutions like money, markets, and channels of 
information’, argued Hayek, ‘but it depends above all on the existence of an appropriate 
legal system, a legal system designed both to preserve competition and to make it operate 
as beneficially as possible’689.  In Hayek’s scheme, as well as for commentators and 
stakeholders of libertarian capitalism such as Ludwig Von Mises and Milton Friedman 
that formed part of what Mirowski calls ‘the Neoliberal Thought Collective (NTC)’, law 
(and we must include Equity within that definition when discussing a Common Law 
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687 F. A. Hayek. 2001. The Road to Serfdom. London: Routledge Classics   
688 Hayek, 2001, p.42 
689 Hayek, 2001, p.39 
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system) had a very particular role to play690.  Moreover, civil justice that, akin to the 
stakeholders who relied upon it, was always already subordinate to a need, contained 
deep within the internal logic of neoliberalism, for risk to be assumed and competition to 
flourish.  All forms of law and legal institution within a neoliberal superstructure 
predicated on so-called ‘free-market’ competition, that is, maximum deregulation and 
minimum state intervention, as the primary mode of socioeconomic organization had to 
achieve one overriding aim: efficient and effective competition and more risk as the 
essential platforms for maximum capital accumulation and profit691.   
Hayek’s vision prompted a system of law and within it civil justice that must be agile, 
flexible and creative.  All the features idealised in Hayek’s justice system have, at one time 
or another, been seen as particular attributes of an Equity jurisdiction that ‘balances out 
the need for certainty in rule-making with the need to achieve fair results in individual 
circumstances’692.  Indeed, Equity offers a particularly valuable lens through which to 
view the work of Hayek and in particular the basis of the neoliberal programme he 
ultimately unleashed.  And whilst Hayek does not expressly discuss Equity, he comes very 
close to ECJ in his notion of the ‘rules of just conduct’.  In particular, he attaches this notion 
of conduct to what he calls ‘end-independent rules which serve the formation of a 
spontaneous order’ (the potent concept behind the proliferation of free-market liberty), 
which are contrasted with ‘end-dependent rules of organization’, namely the basis of the 
type of unfavourable and inflexible central economic organization found under socialism 
that relies on high levels of government intervention and control of the economy through 
robust regulation693.  Rules of just conduct as end-independent rules are, like the 
                                                        
690 Philip Mirowski. 2013. Never Let A Serious Crisis Go To Waste. London: Verso 
691 Hayek, 2001, p.39 
692 Hudson, 2017, p.4 
693 Hayek, 2013, p.197  
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discretionary attributes of ECJ and, more specifically, the bases upon which 
unconscionability is applied, ‘the nomos which is at the basis of a ‘private law society’ and 
makes an Open Society possible’694.   
For Hayek private law as nomos, as a modality of individual utility and obligation, was 
necessary in order to foster independence and just conduct able to prevent stakeholder 
conflict and facilitate co-operation ‘by eliminating some sources of uncertainty’695.  As I 
have described, the private law domain, especially with regard to property, is one in 
which Equity is aimed at facilitating precisely this type of conduct through ECJ, as well as 
through the finer detail of its principles, doctrines and remedies.  Equity cannot, as is the 
case with any laws, entirely eliminate uncertainty, but with regard to the property rights 
framework and the private property order, can, echoing Hayek, ‘create certainty […] to 
the extent that they protect [proprietary] means against the interference by others, and 
thus enable the individual to treat those means as being at his disposal’ [my addition]696. 
3. Equity within neoliberal thought 
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes 
that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade.  The role of the state is to create and preserve 
an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.  The state has to guarantee, for 
example, the quality and integrity of money.  It must also set up those military, defence, 
police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and 
to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets […] In so far as 
neoliberalism values market exchange as ‘an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide to 
all human action, and substituting for all previously held ethical beliefs’, it emphasizes the 
significance of contractual relations in the marketplace.  It holds that the social good will 
be maximised by maximising the reach and frequency of market transactions, and it seeks 
to bring all human action into the domain of the market697.                      
Neoliberalism is not considered here as an abstract mode of social organization but an 
outgrowth of economic reason and in particular a set of strategies that broadly follow and 
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adhere to the ideology of capitalism.  Yet the strategic nature of neoliberalism is also that 
which ultimately differentiates it from classical forms of capitalism, and places 
requirements on stakeholders to imaginatively redefine themselves and society as a 
whole as economic ecosystems698.  Central to neoliberalism are interpellated economic 
subjects (stakeholders) who, despite subtle shifts in the exercise of economic reason that 
neoliberalism entails nevertheless remain entirely and unreservedly focused on 
achieving the aims that capitalism promises.  These stakeholders strive for individual 
accumulation (profit and wealth) and the reproduction of class power through the 
variegated ways and means of commercial and personal self-interest and 
entrepreneurialism, as we might find in traditional instances of capitalism.  As a species 
of rather than a reinvention of capitalism neoliberalism relies upon the same 
(super)structural arrangements and forces that feed the economic base of classical 
capitalism, notably markets and competition.   
As such neoliberalism is little more than a new name for a reconfigured form of capitalism 
that has pushed society towards an unreserved acceptance of the God-like nature of the 
market system and the forces of competition that lure stakeholders into engagement, 
action and investment, both economically and psychically.  And yet neoliberalism differs 
from traditional capitalism insofar as it claims a moral project and a set of ethical 
imperatives that, as the Mont Pelerine statement shows, adhere to pure classical 
economic ideals that predate the brutal turn of capitalism in its high industrial and 
imperialist forms, but also in its general expansion of global inequality.  Thus 
neoliberalism, almost as a perverse complement to communism’s critique of capitalism, 
offers a way to reset history in order to not simply mask the reality of capitalism’s failures 
                                                        
698 Byung-Chul Han claims that within neoliberalism, ‘we do not deem ourselves subjugated subjects, but 
rather projects: always refashioning and reinventing ourselves’ (2017, p.1)  
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and brutality, but to denude the influence of socialism and communism as a critical and 
socio-political alternative699.    
As keys to understanding the nature of neoliberalism, competition and a strong emphasis 
on markets and marketization prefigure a greater degree of risk that must be assumed by 
stakeholders in contrast to their capitalist predecessors.  Risk is not a marginal 
consideration in neoliberal thought.  On the contrary, it is the fuel for the engine of 
neoliberal progress.  But as Anthony Giddens claims, this emphasis on risk no longer 
reflects the truth of the external world in shaping human behaviour but is instead 
‘manufactured’ in order to satisfy certain prescribed political ends700.  But he also sees it 
as positive insofar as risk provides an apparently greater degree or expansion of choice 
within the social domain701.  Meanwhile, Philip Mirowski views risk as the sine qua non of 
neoliberal agency, that is, precisely what defines stakeholders in the contemporary age 
of capitalism: 
A denizen of modern neoliberal society has not demonstrated real 
flexibility of personal identity until they have prostrated themselves before 
the capricious god of risk […] Salvation through the market comes not from 
solidarity with any delusional social class or occupational category, but 
instead bold assertions of individuality through capitulation to a life of risk 
[…] the modern culture of risk is the very embodiment of the neoliberal 
commandment: there is no such thing as commutative justice, and 
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700 Anthony Giddens. 1999. Risk and Responsibility. Modern Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 1 (January), p.4 
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consequently, the participant must simply acquiesce in the verdict of the 
market702.   
Mirowski’s claim is of particular significance here because, if, as he states, ‘there is no 
such thing as commutative justice’ then how do we account for the type of civil justice 
system discussed throughout the thesis so far as a key component of the socioeconomic 
existence of stakeholders?  The answer lies in the first part of the quote: the reliance on 
and demand for flexibility.  This clearly defines a civil justice model tailored to meet 
economic and market principles that the likes of the Woolf reforms describe, and within 
this model unconscionability assumes the fetishistic role it does in the neoliberal age.  We 
will return to this matter in more depth shortly.       
Risk, like economic reason more generally, has become a standard by which the value of 
many if not all domains of social activity and behaviour are measured in contemporary 
neoliberal societies.  And neoliberalism, although arguably relying on civil justice to 
administer a robust private property order as capitalism did during the nineteenth and 
much of the twentieth century, inherits the doctrine of unconscionability as a particular 
strategic juridical form through which stakeholders can navigate their exposure to and, I 
argue, enjoyment of the uncertainties (and risks) of contemporary economic life.  Viewed 
through the prism of Equity fetishism, the tension between certainty in law and 
uncertainty in (economic) life that engenders risk is in many senses to neoliberal 
stakeholders what material forms of property were to their nineteenth-century capitalist 
counterparts.  There is no doubt that the contemporary neoliberal stakeholder seeks-out 
material property and corresponding property rights in accordance with the logic of 
capitalism.  But risk provides a patina and layer of enjoyment that induces stakeholder 
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engagement and investment in juridical-economic activity, as described in previous 
chapters, and signifies the augmentation and extension of enjoyment sought by fetishistic 
stakeholders.  As the prevailing dominant socioeconomic ideology, the entrenchment, 
reproduction and dissemination of neoliberal capitalism is enabled by and conducted 
through flexible and permissive laws and modes of civil justice.  Since the 1873 Act a 
transition in the nature of civil justice and thus Equity's role in the administration of it 
occurred by virtue of the implementation of the Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC) and 
further reform programmes, and did so, I argue, in conjunction with the shifting nature 
of capitalism.   
As a set of juridical strategies within neoliberalism, civil justice no longer simply involves 
the exclusive practices, reasoning and dominion of the courts but often occurs in the 
shadow of the courts703.  The contemporary rise of alternative ‘out of court’ forms of 
settlement and bargaining, especially ADR and mediation as means to maximise 
flexibility, cost-effectiveness and efficiency in civil procedure, has arguably augmented 
Equity's role in contemporary civil justice by ‘standing in the breach created by the 
merger of Law and Equity', and ‘reincarnating’ Equity704.  In other words, ADR and civil 
justice reform more broadly has, under the terms of this thesis, given new life to the 
fetishization of Equity, not least because it has reemphasised and re-energised the role of 
                                                        
703 James J. Alfini and Catherine G. McCabe. 2001. Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of the 
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704 Main, 2005, pp.329-330.  Flexibility and ‘the need to adapt procedures to the circumstances of the 
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Arbitrators, that is ‘the purpose of the ‘tracks' which Lord Woolf introduced in 1999' (Sir Rupert Jackson. 
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flexibility in law and civil justice procedure705.  ‘ADR is more flexible and adapts to the 
specific needs and demands of the case’, claim Robert B. Moberly & Judith Kilpatrick:  
With ADR the parties can utilize creative remedies and a broader range of 
solutions.  Because the courts use a relatively structured approach, the 
range of remedies available may be quite limited. Lawyers may be required 
to reframe the issues so as to fit a particular legal doctrine and, thus, the 
nature of the dispute.  As a result, the real issues and tailor an appropriate 
remedy.  When using ADR instead of the court system, judicial precedent 
may not be as important. ADR often provides for relaxed rules of evidence 
and procedure, which can enhance flexibility and make the process more 
streamlined than a judicial proceeding706. 
Further, and perhaps unsurprisingly given the role we have seen neuroses play thus far 
in the life of a legal community faced by the gradual colonisation of law by economics, 
Equity fetishism in the context of the rising influence of ADR has been met by neurotic 
counteraction.  Lord Neuberger, for example, has argued both a defence of formal, court-
based civil justice, and, in a starkly anti-neoliberal move, for a rejection of consumerist 
justice707.  What is more, Neuberger’s particular neuroses exemplify an opposition 
between reality and fantasy that we explored in earlier chapters, as he equivocates 
between the reality of law’s colonisation by economics, and fantasy in the form of 
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lamenting the effect of economics on the ‘value’ of justice708.  The former can be seen in 
the following passage from his 2010 lecture to representatives of the Chancery bar: 
A successful capitalist economy, as Adam Smith pointed out, depends on a 
trusted and effective legal system.  That is particularly true of an emphasis 
on financial and associated services.  In that connection, the high 
reputation of our legal services, our courts and our law has served us very 
well since the 18th century.  But we cannot afford to sit on our laurels.  High 
legal costs do not always present the same problem for large businesses 
and a few very rich individuals, but legal costs are rarely an irrelevant 
factor even to them. So competition from other jurisdictions must always 
be in our minds. And it's not just arbitration and the new courts in 
Singapore, Dubai, Qatar and the like: there are now courts in Germany and 
the Netherlands which offer English language hearings. The threat to the 
British economy if we cease to be pre-eminent in the commercial legal 
world is self-evident709. 
The latter in a keynote address to a civil mediation conference: 
Provided we acknowledge and take into account the disadvantages of 
mediation and do our best to cater for them or to neutralise them, I think 
we can and should be pretty uninhibited about supporting the idea of 
mediation in civil and family disputes.  Since 1999, with the Woolf reforms, 
and even more since 2012 with the Jackson reforms, there is a very strong 
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presumption that the court time and the legal costs involved in any civil 
case should be proportionate to the value of what is at issue in the case. Of 
course, the “value” of a case in this context is not limited to pure financial 
value, but normally and inevitably financial value is a major factor, and, 
frankly, sometimes the only factor, when one is assessing proportionality 
[emphasis added]710. 
Echoing the notion of civil justice  expansion beyond the court as a neoliberal strategy, 
Gabel and Feinman state in their assessment of the relationship between contract and 
ideology that, ‘[m]ost of the time the socioeconomic system operates without any need 
for law as such because people at every level have been imbued with its inevitability and 
necessity’711.  Gabel and Feinman’s claim here is, I argue, reflective of the particular shift 
in civil justice caused by neoliberalism that Lord Neuberger is motivated by but 
ultimately struggles to reconcile.  The effect of neoliberalism on modalities of civil justice 
(like justice more broadly conceived) has been not only to subject them to programmes 
of calculable efficiency (the ‘value' problem that Neuberger laments), but also to provoke 
a degree of hand-wringing regarding the (im)possibility of justice in an unjust world that 
inevitably leads, as Simon Critchley says, to ‘contemplative withdrawal […] a sort of drift, 
disbelief and slackening that is both institutional and moral' and thus ultimately to 
submission to the dictates of neoliberal capital, hence Neuberger's concern for the 
reputation and relative competitiveness of British legal services712.        
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Neoliberalism has accelerated the capitalist agenda during the last forty years by 
broadening capitalist logic and reason to include wider and more personalized pursuit of 
self-interest.  If, as David Harvey suggests, neoliberalism produces a chaos of individual 
interests, and, as William Davies claims, the ‘economist’s vocational and epistemological 
distance from moral reasoning is the crucial ingredient in neoliberal legal authority’, then 
the civil justice required in order to meet neoliberal interests, unless deliberately geared 
towards forms of restraint against those interests must flow with and work in the 
shadows of that chaos and amorality713.  If this can be interpreted as relating to laws that 
are systemized and encompass a degree of rule-compliance whilst remaining agile, 
flexible and discretionary, then it is clear that the type of civil justice implied matches 
conceptualisations of ECJ.  Neoliberal approaches to civil justice take seriously, and 
arguably more so than during the nineteenth century, the flexible and imaginative tenets 
of ECJ that allow more discretion and a greater free-play of enterprise around the fringes 
of legislation, regulation and the core of rule compliance at the heart of the property 
rights regime714.    
Equity fetishism, whilst a product of nineteenth-century capitalism, has, therefore, 
always already been primed for the coming of the neoliberal age and a time in which 
‘remedies to any problems have to be sought by individuals through the legal system', 
and conceptions of fairness and equality are seen merely as ‘atavistic holdovers of old 
images of justice that must be extirpated from the modern mind-set’715.  What we have 
seen with regard to civil justice as representative of the requirements of the legal system 
within neoliberalism, however, is a stretching and manipulation of the traditional 
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boundaries of civil justice in order to ensure that flexibility no longer applies to the 
application of rules and doctrines alone, but also to modes of adjudication as well.  This 
is, I argue, a validation of ECJ’s flexibly within the legal system, to civil justice, made by 
neoliberal stakeholders.  Insofar as neoliberalism is said to recreate and memorialize 
principles of free market neo-classical economics that ‘emerged in the second half of the 
nineteenth century (thanks to the work of Alfred Marshall, William Stanley Jevons, and 
Leon Walras) to displace the classical theories of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and, of 
course, Karl Marx’, then seeing how Equity fetishism translates from the late nineteenth 
to late twentieth century with relative conceptual ease becomes clearer716.  With regard 
to unconscionability as a remedy primed to support inter alia transactions of commercial 
stakeholders, Equity fetishism points to the belief that there is a fix for each and every 
problem that might arise, including those in other areas and competences of the law.   
In her discussion of the need to ‘fill gaps’ in the Companies Act 2006 for instance, Deirdre 
Ahern remarks that the ‘flexibility of broad, principle-based judge-made rules facilitated 
judicial revitalisation of the duties where required to move with the changing world view 
in relation to corporate standards. Age-old principles proved capable of yielding new 
applications and new perspectives and this was instrumental in ensuring that the duties 
retained both credibility and relevance’717.  Despite the neoliberal reinvigoration or 
‘reincarnation’ of Equity, Equity fetishism, I argue, is a testament to the reality capitalism 
has thus far failed and will continue to fail to universalize complete justice718.  ‘When 
universal law is recognized, idols are destroyed’, argues Jean-Joseph Goux, ‘[t]his law is 
what enables the subject at last to bear the emptiness of the sanctuary without needing 
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to furnish it with fetishes and images’719.  Captured in the concept of Equity fetishism 
there is an indication that stakeholders are not yet able or prepared to bear such 
emptiness.  The existence of Equity fetishism thus reveals an even greater monument to 
the castration that stakeholders deny is central to subjectivity as such within 
neoliberalism than during earlier points in Equity’s history within capitalism.            
The repetitive equivocation between crisis and failure that requires capitalism to be 
reimagined fits broadly with what Joseph Schumpeter referred to as ‘the essential point 
to grasp’ when dealing with capitalism: that it is a fundamentally evolutionary system 
that can ‘never be stationary’720.  The non-stationary nature of capital celebrated by the 
likes of Schumpeter abhors the inflexible rule and instead favours discretion and merit 
as modes of adjudication.  The flexibility of Equity thus favours neoliberal civil justice and 
the stakeholders invested in it who demand rules that bend to their will and self-interest.  
Discretion is not the court's alone in this regard, however, as when regulatory standards 
around, for example, taxation become too onerous for stakeholders to bear, and they and 
their capital take flight off-shore or hide behind obscure concentrations of economic 
power, namely, trusts721.  In that sense the ‘versatility’ of trusts, as described by Jonathan 
Garton, meets the versatility of modern private capital in its ability to flow freely to where 
it is less threatened by public or state interference722.  As John Christensen explains: ‘If 
the trustee, the beneficiary, and the trust assets are located in the right combination of 
jurisdictions, tax can often be avoided altogether without technically breaking the law’723.    
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Capitalism never leaves nor surrenders its grip on the domain of the social despite 
appearances or claims to the contrary.  As John Maynard Keynes remarked: ‘It 
[capitalism] is a method for bringing the most successful profit-makers to the top by a 
ruthless struggle for survival, which selects the most efficient by the bankruptcy of the 
less efficient.  It does not count the cost of the struggle, but looks only to the benefits of 
the final result which are assumed to be permanent’724.   
The dominance of capitalism throughout the majority of the twentieth-century and 
beyond (including at times of crisis) is a project of such resilience as to appear all but 
complete and victorious in its aims – ‘permanent’, to echo Keynes.  The many guises 
capitalist class power assumes (including neoliberalism) simply mask and detract from 
what is otherwise an unrelenting and durable set of core ideological practices and 
tendencies.  For stakeholders seeking to deflect the trauma of castration, through private 
property, the versatility of trusts to create wealth and so on, capitalism’s endurance 
explains its appeal.  Moreover, it explains why stakeholders are keen to mobilize the 
legitimating forces of law and civil justice in support and defence of capitalist ideology, 
and how this project has spread.  The neoliberal vision of law and justice now forms the 
basis of much-uncontested wisdom espoused, for example, in legal education textbooks, 
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where competition is viewed as normative and a central tenet of legal common sense725.  
At a general level Mirowski refers to this as ‘a whole panoply of diverse "policy" 
responses'726.  For the purposes of this thesis, we see it as far more specific: the 
application of ECJ in order to provide the flexible and agile civil justice system needed to 
complement and shadow the evolution of never stationary capital.    
4. Legal contortionism as neoliberal strategy  
It [law] provides only the means for a large number of different purposes that as a whole 
are not known to anybody.  In the ordinary sense of purpose law is therefore not a means 
to any purpose, but merely a condition for the successful pursuit of most purposes.  Of all 
multi-purpose instruments it is probably the one after language which assists the greatest 
variety of human purposes.  It certainly has not been made for any one known purpose 
but rather has developed because it made people who operated under it more effective in 
the pursuit of their purposes727.   
Equity fetishism is symptomatic of the fullest capability of legal contortionism: flexibility, 
adaptability, efficiency and agility, all of which are required and demanded within 
neoliberalism so stakeholders can manage uncertainty and negotiate risk in personal and 
commercial settings alike.  These legal contortions applied and performed at the level of 
civil justice are not merely instrumental to more efficient and effective juridical-economic 
ontologies but become part of the fabric of neoliberal existence.  ‘Flexible specialisation 
can be seized upon by capital’, argues David Harvey, ‘as a handy way to procure more 
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flexible means of accumulation’728.   In terms of civil justice this includes leaving open the 
possibility that the courts will have discretion concerning remedies and the path to 
remedies, namely unconscionability, and the need for ‘versatility’, as we have previously 
seen with regard to trusts729.  Mark Pawlowski maintains that unconscionability has been 
adopted by the English courts far more broadly in recent years, and has, I argue, under 
the ideological aegis of neoliberalism proven a suitably wide-ranging and agile 
counterpart to the socioeconomic activities of competitive risk-inclined stakeholders730.   
Whilst we examined unconscionability in earlier chapters, it is important to restate some 
of the characteristics of the doctrine here, as it forms the backdrop to this section of the 
chapter.  Unconscionability is defined in a variety of ways that appeal within neoliberal 
thought.  These definitions include highlighting the moral scope and content of the 
doctrine, as well as the ability to foster flexible and complete justice between parties.  
Drawing on a formulation of the doctrine in the nineteenth century, notably the case of 
Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch D 312, unconscionability has been defined as the intervention by 
Equity ‘to set aside unfair transactions made with “poor and ignorant” persons’731.  
Following the more recent decision in Hart v O’Connor [1985] AC 1000 a ‘preferable 
interpretation’ of unconscionability has been viewed as being in cases where the court is 
able to show ‘that the defendant acted in a morally reprehensible manner’732.  Meanwhile, 
flexibility and adaptability are necessary, as Peter Birks maintained, to meet ‘constant 
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change in pursuit of justice', because ‘it is important to remember that we do live in a 
legal world where continual and rapid change is an inescapable reality'733.   
There is no serious claim to be made regarding capitalism’s invention of 
unconscionability – the long durée of Equity discussed throughout this thesis clearly 
shows this is not the case.  Instead, neoliberalism has seized upon unconscionability as a 
formal and legitimate mode of legal reason, remedy and adjudication that also engenders 
the requisite flexibility neoliberalism demands.  ‘Unconscionability is equity’s 
jurisprudence’, argues Gary Watt, ‘since the word identifies that very species of 
wrongdoing which it is the peculiar function of equity to remedy, that wrongdoing being 
any conduct which, having no substantial justification, turns the common law into an 
instrument of harm by taking advantage of a general provision or general omission of the 
common law to oppress a party in the particular case’734.  For Graham Virgo statutory 
intervention via the Consumer Credit Act 1974 is the ‘most important statutory provision 
relating to unconscionable conduct’735.  The Act ‘gives the court extensive powers to deal 
with credit agreements where the relationship between the creditor and the debtor 
arising from the agreement is unfair to the debtor because of the terms of the agreement, 
the way in which the creditor enforced his rights under the agreement or anything else 
which the creditor has done or failed to do’736.  
Organizing civil justice in light of the demands of economic advantage enables 
stakeholders to secure the kind of favourable legal system highlighted by Hayek: an all-
pervasive form of economic reason that, as Philip Mirowski maintains, insists ‘upon the 
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thoroughgoing ignorance of everyone in the face of the all-knowing market’, one built on 
a platform of the chaotic free play of economics737.  Economic reason that is purposefully 
and superficially nebulous and shape-shifting, yet perversely still reliant on a degree of 
formalism and rule compliance.  The privileging of Equity’s notion of conscience in civil 
justice, which is channelled through the doctrine and language of unconscionability, 
engenders the essence of the liberal and flexible approach to civil justice favoured by 
neoliberalism.  One which perversely disrupts neurotic concerns that the language of 
unconscionability can only ever be capable of ‘sensible application’ and a ‘useful role in 
the story of property law […] provided it is kept distant from infractions of moral 
conscience and social mores’738.   
As with Virgo’s example of the Consumer Credit Act, it is important to note that the Act, 
like unconscionability, does not simply enforce an imperative of fair dealing among 
parties who may be unequal in terms of social or economic power, but foregrounds a 
morality that is always already economized in the neoliberal sense of ideological 
strategy739.  On these terms, unconscionability has, as Simon Chesterman has argued, 
affected ‘change at a level deeper than the application of doctrine’, in accordance with 
neoliberalism, it has helped change ‘the structure of justice itself’740.  Moreover, as Watt 
reminds us the ‘language of unconscionability arises from the long saga of law’s 
relationship to morality and in this sense borders on fiction and has the potential to 
engage with extra-legal notions of moral or ecclesiastical conscience’741.  Although he also 
adds, as if to negate any perverse estimations of the true value of conscience in law that 
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‘most jurists long familiarity has bred healthy caution’ when it comes to the possibility of 
extending the moral virtues of Equity beyond the margins of the legal context742.    
Unconscionability plays a significant role in sustaining the fantasy of complete justice by 
appearing to offer stakeholders more than a mere procedural framework in which to 
conduct and navigate their existence within society.  The very notion of a procedural 
framework is made elastic within the terms of neoliberal justice, and unconscionability 
provides an effective means of following the contours of such nebulous juridical 
conditions.  More than that perhaps, Equity fetishism offers stakeholders a type of 
‘spiritual duty in the form of what were termed moral obligations’, but are simply an 
‘equitable diversion of positive norms’, and unconscionability is a good solution for 
stakeholders on these terms743.  Under neoliberalism, unconscionability helps transform 
‘the ideology of ‘freedom and equality' […] into a new image that might retain the 
legitimating power of the older images while modifying them to conform more closely to 
the actual organization of daily life in the modern era'744.  In contrast to the types of 
capitalism discussed thus far it is no longer simply a project of complete justice that 
Equity is engaged with but under neoliberalism a far broader, nebulous and more 
pervasive social project that, to echo Wendy Brown, reaches for the very soul of the 
stakeholder745. A project, as we have already seen, fuelled not simply by stakeholder 
desire for property rights, but equally by the need for flexibility and agility in order to 
navigate the risks that accompany the accumulation of property rights and a competitive 
struggle for wealth within contemporary neoliberal capitalist societies.   
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So, Gary Watt’s claims concerning unconscionability - that ‘[i]f the retention of the 
language of unconscionability happens incidentally to perpetuate humane and 
aspirational virtues of conscience, that is well and good, but there is no room for the 
promotion of transcendental moral notions of ‘good conscience’ as a basis for enforcing 
and allocating rights in property’ - might ring true from the point of view of the law’s 
neurotic protection of its own internal logic746.  But from the point of view of perverse, 
fetishistic neoliberal stakeholders a doctrine such as unconscionability is precisely that 
which possesses a degree of the transcendental as a spiritual duty reproduced through 
the banal yet flexible diversion that ECJ offers from the risk-averse restraint of law’s 
positive norms.  
David Harvey claims that under neoliberalism ‘remedies to any problems have to be 
sought by individuals through the legal system’, yet, and albeit given a far more specific 
analysis of the legal context, it is important to consider this simple idea alongside Watt’s 
claim that any ‘judge who employs the language of unconscionability as a means of 
ditching property rules in favour of moral intuition is abusing the name of conscience’747.  
On the one hand, Harvey paints a picture of the legal context in which perverse 
stakeholders conduct themselves and perform their contractual social relations.  That a 
stakeholder is expected to use the legal system to remedy what are predominately 
contractual qua economic and financial issues points directly to the call of the neoliberal 
founders to respect the rule of law and the ramifications that flow from it.  On the other 
hand, through a further demonstration of the type of neurotic defence of legal principles 
that coloured the Judicature reform process by attempting to stave off the influence of 
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stakeholders in shaping civil justice post-Judicature, Watt reveals the strategic value that 
unconscionability holds for fetishistic neoliberal stakeholders.   
A clear and, I argue, a deliberate contradiction exists, therefore, between the value 
neoliberal thought places on stakeholder engagement with risk and the function the civil 
justice structure has in appearing to mollify uncertainties.  Accordingly it is through a 
privileging of doctrines such as unconscionability within the civil justice system that 
judges actually ‘justify the normal’, that is, capitalist, ‘functioning of the system’ by 
resolving the conflict through fetishized legal forms that promise to fix the failure of, for 
example, contracts to suitably facilitate social relations between stakeholders748.  In 
response to Harvey’s claim, therefore, I further argue that stakeholders substitute 
personal conscience for both a contract and the remedy of unconscionability that 
interjects at the point of the failure of that contract and this enables a certain freedom 
from the restraints of conscience.  ECJ, broadly-speaking, thus serves as the de facto 
conscience of neoliberal stakeholders, a fundamental strategic significance and purpose 
of ECJ and specifically the doctrine of unconscionability.   
Neoliberalism demands that stakeholders walk a fine line between ‘success’ (profit, 
accumulation) and ‘failure’ by virtue of its privileging of risk, and civil justice must, 
therefore, offer a safety-net for stakeholders.  As Mirowski argues, ‘accepting risk is not 
the fine balancing of probabilities, the planning for foreseen exigencies and the exercise 
of prudential restraint; rather it is wanton ecstasy: the utter subjection of the self to the 
market by offering oneself up to powers greater than we can ever fully comprehend’749.  
Accordingly, for stakeholders to have a sense that they are insulated when it comes to 
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necessarily exposing themselves to risk in everyday economic life, or that their individual 
economic conditions can somehow be ‘reset’ by remedies is important.   
Citing P.S. Atiyah’s view on risk and contract in light of Lord Woolf’s recommendations 
for the application of remedies in Equity to address a commercial financial loss - although 
he does not agree with it wholeheartedly - Hudson highlights how unconscionability is 
used to shape more effective commercial practices750.  This involves ECJ in the context of 
commercial contracts being used to promote ‘greater economic efficiency by requiring 
commercial people to become better at evaluating such risks before forming contracts’751.  
The type of preparedness and due diligence that Atiyah appears to advocate when it 
comes to stakeholders engaging in contractual relations might be interpreted as common 
sense.  If you are able to understand the ramifications of what you are contractually 
agreeing to, Atiyah appears to say, then you have successfully evaluated the risk that 
naturally accompanies the contractual process.  As, arguably, a neurotic response to risk, 
however, and not the response we would expect from the perverse fetishistic 
stakeholder, the type of contractual regime Atiyah is advocating does not account for the 
lure that risk has for stakeholders.  Thus it is a desire for rather than protection against 
risk that justifies stakeholder evaluation of the contractual regime in which they commit 
to socioeconomic transactions.  What could easily be interpreted here as either legal 
instrumentalism or a sort of ‘baptism by fire’ for commercial actors who fail to suitably 
(or rationally) evaluate the risks before committing to a commercial transaction, is in 
actuality entirely in tune with the normative forms of competitive risk-taking contained 
within the ethos that neoliberalism promotes.  So, whilst Hudson feels it necessary to 
undertake a ‘defence of Equity’ regarding commercial actors who may see it as a body of 
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law that works against their interest by unreasonably restraining their exposure to risk, 
considered through the lens of neoliberal reason the opposite is instead true.  For 
stakeholders, Equity is absolutely the thing as a strategy embedded within economic risk-
taking, because it inoculates against economic failure whilst fostering belief in a culture 
of risk.   
As long as the stakeholder is economically active and, importantly, acting competitively 
by exposing themselves to risk, they have, in strict neoliberal terms, already proven 
themselves successful.  As Atiyah maintains, in an overtly neoliberal voice: ‘The whole 
point of the free market bargaining approach was to give full rein to the greater skill and  
knowledge of those who calculated risks better […] He who failed to calculate a risk 
properly when making a contract would lose by it, and next time would calculate more 
efficiently’752.  In short, the stakeholder always comes back for more and the protection 
offered by discretionary remedies saturated in the deontological imperatives of 
conscience are a significant way that this can be guaranteed.  The emphasis on the 
remedial qua conscience here, therefore, accords with neoliberalism's normative 
construction and interpellation of the individual as an economic and entrepreneurial 
actor in every sphere of life.  Moreover by acting as the de facto conscience of 
stakeholders, so they need not concern themselves with restrictions their own conscience 
may place on the elision between the self and economic activity,  unconscionability salves 
stakeholder exposure to the harsh realities of what Wendy Brown calls, ‘”mismanaged 
life”, the neoliberal appellation for failure to navigate impediments to prosperity’753.   
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In a discussion not only of unconscionability but of the more general concept of 
compensation, Roberto Esposito says that as a remedy compensation ‘implies, and 
reproduces, what it seeks to make up for’754.  For the stakeholder unconscionability, like 
Esposito’s notion of compensation, implies a desire to fill a particular lack that exists, for 
example, with regard to a financial loss, albeit less in terms of bare economic calculation 
than through a form of subjective or personal (psychic) restitution.  Yet in filling this lack 
the stakeholder equally maintains their belief in the fantasy of complete fulfilment: 
financial and psychic fulfilment as one and the same.  Remedy defined in these terms, 
much like the broader conception of Equity that holds within its jurisprudence these 
forms of remedial action, performs the basic requirement of the fetish to substitute and 
thus deflect from the fact of loss even as actual economic or financial loss might or does 
occur755.  ‘What else is a surrogate, or prosthesis, if not a device that substitutes a 
presence, thereby reaffirming its absence?' asks Esposito, and in his question, we can 
once again discern the basic outline of fantasy and fetishism traceable to Equity and 
ECJ756.  Fantasy ‘denotes a framing device which subjects use to "protect" themselves 
from the anxiety associated with the idea that there is no ultimate guarantee or law 
underlying and guiding our social existence', argues Jason Glynos, ‘[t]his guarantee has 
been given many names, certainly when one takes the long historical view: God, Reason, 
the Senses, the Laws of History, and so on.  But this guarantee – conceived as a key part 
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of the fantasmatic device used to defend against a form of "Cartesian anxiety" – can take 
any guise whatsoever'757.    
5. Conclusion 
Unconscionability is an example of what Hartmut Böhme calls ‘fetishistic synecdoche’ - ‘a 
figure through which the signifier completely substitutes the object it refers to, thereby 
becoming independent of this object’758.  Unconscionability qua Equity fetishism is a 
function of a culture of legal contortionism and remedial strategizing employed by 
stakeholders against a backdrop of risk, competition and market engagement as 
requirements in contemporary economic life.  Neoliberal emphasis on competition, risk 
and strategies to manage the two, gives civil justice purpose, and makes ECJ an economic 
consideration first and foremost.  As Davies maintains: ‘[a]s a replacement for the pursuit 
of justice itself, neoliberalism offers the goal of competition as a form of quasi-justice, 
which lacks a substantive concept of the common good’759.  And so, by virtue of the 
recurrent neoliberal problematic of ‘how to represent or stabilize uncertainty, without 
determining it through political dictat’, civil justice as a set of strategies ‘offer to solve 
this’760.   
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The neoliberal notion of having a strategy (Wendy Brown talks of the neoliberal citizen 
‘who strategizes for her- or himself among various social, political, and economic 
options’) begins with remedies assuming the object thingness of Equity fetishism761.  The 
unknown purpose of the object thingness of Equity-as-remedy is transformed into an 
adaptable strategy and assumes a known purpose ‘developed because it made people 
who operated under it more effective in the pursuit of their purposes’762.  
Unconscionability gives stakeholders a formalized conscience and within a semantics of 
perverse neoliberal stakeholder fantasy, complete justice qua Equity fetishism re-emerge 
as object(tive) strategies always already indexed to the stakeholder’s fate in a society 
beholden to competitive and risky market activity and conduct.   
Unconscionability marks a significant point of expansion of the traditional basis of the 
relief proffered by Equity763.  ‘The transformations seen in the equitable jurisdiction’, 
claims Simon Chesterman, ‘mark a deeper transformation not merely in the formal 
(procedural) dispensation of justice, nor indeed the substantive rights of parties, but in 
the structure of justice itself’764.  ECJ à la unconscionability speaks to a particular 
emphasis given by stakeholders to judicial discretion.  Specifically forms of discretion 
that impose upon the neurotic judge, not the perverse stakeholder, the real risk of 
injustice765.  As a flexible, imaginative and discretionary invention unconscionability 
assumes the characteristic of a combination of certainty and uncertainty, ‘the known and 
the unknown’ and ‘the experience of a limit’766.  Moreover, it is a point of fantastical 
ecstasy that always already engenders the actions of neoliberal stakeholders in pursuit 
                                                        
761 Brown, 2005, p.43 
762 Hayek, 2013, p.107 
763 Mason, 1994, p.238 
764 Chesterman. 1997, p.357 
765 Chesterman. 1997, p.363 
766 Chesterman. 1997, p.363 
255 
 
of the enjoyment of their economic and proprietary interests, and the corresponding 
pleasure and relief felt by them by virtue of the remedial intervention that denies failure 
and thus denies lack.  As Bernard Harcourt maintains: ‘The element of desire in the notion 
of “fantasy”, naturally, emphasizes wish fulfilment in the Freudian sense, but also an idea 
of playfulness.  There is something enjoyable, often libidinal, which satisfies the person 
who believes’767.     
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Chapter 9 
Law and the Reality it Masks: A 
Conclusion 
 
We have arrived at the conclusion that without abolishing the distinction between law and 
equity, or blending the Courts into one Court of universal jurisdiction, a practical and 
effectual remedy for many of the evils in question may be found in such a transfer, or 
blending of jurisdiction, coupled with such other practical amendments as will render 
each Court competent to administer complete justice in the cases which fall under its 
cognizance. We think that the jurisdiction now exercised by the Courts of equity may be 
conferred upon Courts of law, and that the jurisdiction now exercised by Courts of law 
may be conferred upon Courts of equity to such an extent as to render both Courts 
competent to administer entire justice without the parties in the one Court being obliged 
to resort to the aid of the other768. 
1. Introduction 
The statement quoted above from Lord Chancellor Campbell at the second reading of the 
Law and Equity Bill in 1860, one of the many stepping stones towards Judicature reform, 
is univocal in its appraisal of what is required to remedy the perceived ills in pre-
Judicature civil justice.  Latent in Campbell’s remedy ‘for many of the evils’ were serious 
questions regarding the future of the Court of Chancery:  questions that were crucial in 
shaping the idea that civil justice ought to be more competent so as to achieve complete 
justice.  For Lord Campbell or any number of lawyers, whether in the nineteenth century 
or at any time in history, a competent justice system able to demonstrate not its own 
competence so much as that of the legal community who operate within it, makes it a vital 
consideration for civil justice reform.   
What amounts to competence for the lawyer who must defend the ways and means of 
law with neurotic determination is, however, not necessarily the same interpretation of 
competence arrived at by stakeholders for whom the civil justice system must work in 
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particular ways and produce particular and economically valid results.  As Duncan 
Kennedy claims: ‘If the cardinal principle, the legal foundation of capitalism, was that the 
state must respect the will of private parties concerning property and contracts, and if 
the cardinal principle rigidly controlled the particular subrules, then it was much more 
plausible to describe the economic process as “free”’769.  Moreover, by ensuring economic 
reason as determinative of freedom through a regime of rights in and over property, in 
personal and commercial contexts, civil justice facilitates enjoyment for the stakeholder 
around a set of fantastical and perverse interests.  As Alison Dunn maintains, ‘[I]n the 
commercial setting, equity’s armoury is particularly attractive.  The increasing 
complexity of the commercial world, with its diverse forms of property transactions, 
dictates a more direct and far-reaching approach to the recovery of assets than the 
common law can provide’770.  This is one example of Equity as competent in the eyes of 
the stakeholder, and, therefore, equally an ‘attractive' object of desire and devotion.  
Given the discussion throughout this thesis, it is important to ask what competence 
represents or, more importantly, what realities it ultimately masks in terms of complete 
justice, the nature of civil justice more broadly, and the relationship of these to the 
existence and psychic life of stakeholders. 
Competence is not a word or idea used expansively by this thesis thus far, and specifically 
not in relation to the theorization of the Judicature reforms and the results that flowed 
from them in the years of civil justice reform and evolution under capitalism that 
followed.  The intention here is not to introduce a novel principle that will steer the 
critique along a new path.  Instead the notion or ideal of competence posited by Lord 
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Campbell is relevant because it provides a means of summarizing and to some degree 
reconciling the main themes addressed during this thesis.    
2. (In)competent justice 
The idea of competence as it is understood here spans two planes.  Firstly, the 
transcendentalism of ECJ, that is, as a stakeholder fetish charged with the authorial 
promise of guaranteeing private property rights to one party or another that legitimate 
engagement in the private property order and bind it to the promise of the accumulation 
of wealth, and, ultimately, the belief in the future perfect of the secular and Godless ‘thou 
will be done’ of economic reason.  Secondly, the utter banality, bureaucracy and utility of 
civil justice that threatens to anchor the stakeholder ‘in the drudgery of daily life’771.  
Presented by Lord Campbell during a period of rapid growth in capitalism during the mid-
nineteenth century, the notion of competence echoed one of Sir John Mitford’s earlier key 
determinations of the role of Equity’s ‘extraordinary jurisdiction’, namely that the Court 
of Chancery assumed control over Common law jurisdictions by ‘removing from them 
suits’ which they were ‘incompetent to determine’772.  What I claim are determinations of 
complete justice based on notions of competence that engender a marriage of the 
transcendental with the bureaucratic in harmony with neoliberal thought; what we might 
otherwise call a ‘super-banality’773.  The competence of which Lord Campbell spoke 
continues, in other words, to resonate as a contemporary idea more than a century and 
half later. 
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Like the excessive packaging that accompanies many contemporary commodities and 
often elicits the ire of the consumer who must negotiate it before they are able to get to 
the sweet fruit of the commodity inside, the apparent complexities that civil justice wraps 
around the private property order (that appear to restrain the free-play of stakeholder 
economic interests) and that constitute competence are transformed by Equity into a 
tantalizing prospect for stakeholder enjoyment.  This is notable in ideas of fairness and 
conscience, and within the doctrine of unconscionability, which Alastair Hudson says is 
illustrative of Equity’s engagement ‘on a deontological, moral project, which it does by 
reference to the doctrine of precedent and centuries of careful worrying at its core’774.  
And yet, I argue, conscience in this context bears no relation to the ‘sense of guilt’ that, as 
Freud tells us, is a vital ingredient in understanding conscience as a tension between the 
harsh super-ego and the ego of the subject775.  Guilt is instead reserved for the criminal 
law where it justifies particular forms of sanction that society says ought to be applied to 
guilty minds and acts.  In contrast, defendants and claimants emerge from the civil justice 
system as either winners or losers determined not by a morality or ethics that is human, 
but one that is economic.  Regardless of the outcome, conscience remains devoid of any 
real sense of guilt because it is vouchsafed from elsewhere, as a deferred systemic 
conscience, rather than a personal one.  Conscience does, in that sense, masquerade like 
the fetish object as a mere prosthesis that acts as a placeholder for what is lacking in the 
subject.   
Further, Equity and ECJ are not suggestive of a moral project with centuries of ‘worrying 
at its core' as Hudson claims, but are instead, and perhaps most notably within neoliberal 
capitalism, strategies predicated on a one-dimensional consideration that conscience is 
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and ought to be economically determinative776.  R.H. Tawney points to enforced 
reappraisal of the role of conscience in the life of Christendom due to the rise of capitalism 
as a need to come to terms with an ‘obstinate refusal to revise old formulae in the light of 
new facts' in which the ‘whole fabric of their philosophy, truth and fantasy alike, was 
overwhelmed together'777.   Max Weber talks of the particular recalibration of conscience 
in the construction of a ‘style of life according to the dictates’ of the spirit of capitalism’778.  
Whilst Herbert Marcuse describes people ‘led to find in the productive apparatus [of 
capitalism] the effective agent of thought and action to which their personal thought and 
action can and must be surrendered.  And in this transfer, the apparatus also assumes the 
role of moral agent.  Conscience is absolved by reification, by the general necessity of 
things’779.  Conscience as a basis for a better and more competent civil justice is, therefore, 
I argue, part of the expectation of systems and institution's to work towards and achieve 
deeper and stronger capitalism, including fluid capital market economies that privilege 
the exchange value of property and the favouring of tradable forms of ownership qua 
proprietary rights and interests.  ‘At a theoretical level, the association of conscience with 
moral values, social standards, fairness and justice serves to sustain the quintessential 
nature of equity or epieikeia’, argues Alison Dunn, ‘[o]n a more practical level, the 
doctrine’s inherent pliability enables a flexible approach to be taken not just to the 
remedy it affords, but also to its triggering requirements – two important characteristics 
in the face of a changing society’780.  Dunn’s outline of Equity describes the clash of 
apparent supra-economic (moral) and economic concerns indicative of the type of super-
                                                        
776 Hudson, 2014, p.61.  
777 Tawney, 1990, p.276 
778 Weber, 2002, p.295   
779 Herbert Marcuse. 2002. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. 
London: Routledge, p.82 
780 Dunn, 1999, p.142 
261 
 
banality I associate, echoing Baudrillard, with the meta-psychological effects of Equity 
fetishism, but which, as Tawney, Weber and Marcuse show, is an inescapable part of the 
construction of social expectations that correspond with the machinations of capital - a 
conjunction which also recalls the earlier discussion in this thesis of Marx with Freud.     
We have seen that ECJ and in particular the idea of conscience are for stakeholders both 
objects of desire, in the form of remedies, vindication of rights and so on, and object causes 
of desire by virtue of being an added layer of banal bureaucracy that ensures the 
stakeholder maintains a certain motivating distance in the form of a future promise of 
finding the lost object qua private property and wealth.  ‘It is precisely the status of being 
out of reach’, as Todd McGowan claims, ‘that serves to animate the subject’781.  
Accordingly, ECJ never fulfils the promise of competence as such, nor has to, but, to 
paraphrase McGowan, ‘the act of promising itself has a creative power' that ensures 
stakeholders remain engaged and continue to invest economically and psychically in 
property in accordance with the demands of capitalist ideology782.  Yet Equity, ECJ, 
property rights nor wealth can or will ever reunite the stakeholder with the lost object,  
and the stakeholder as contemporary economic subject must perpetually negotiate the 
trauma of castration through a variety of substitutions in fantasy.  And from the point of 
view of fetishism, in particular, a disavowal that a loss has ever occurred or that the 
subject is fundamentally constituted around a lack. 
What is for stakeholders a competent civil justice system therefore, one capable of 
producing so-called good results in terms of economic reason (improved efficiency, 
favourable cost-benefit analyses of case-load disposal, and so on), is arguably 
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incompetent by any measure that does not insist upon economic reason as the primary 
or only determining factor of civil justice.  This is because, I argue, a competent civil 
justice system in the eyes of the stakeholder is one in which the messy, human reality at 
the core of civil justice has been deliberately masked in order to bring the stakeholder 
into a more immediate and ecstatic union with economics as objective reality.  Moreover, 
one in which the reality of the failure of civil justice to realise the incomprehensibility of 
human relations through property and the accumulation of personal wealth, by instead 
promoting the property order as, for example, morally determinative, is masked by a 
thick tradition of neurotically defined language and principles that help structure 
stakeholder belief in the fantasies promulgated by capitalist ideology.  As a result 
competence is not only a measure of the distance between the transcendental and banal 
into which the fetish is rooted or from which it emerges, but also a clear indication of the 
influence of capitalist ideology and its colonisation of, among other things, the 
intertwined discourses of consolidation and reform that have shaped civil justice, 
piecemeal, since Judicature. 
3. The politics of Equity 
The only way the nineteenth century judges could choose, and the only way we can choose 
a background regime is by making a vast multiplicity of detailed distributive and other 
ethical choices about right and wrong in human interaction.  The actual choice of the 
supposed "free market regime" of the late nineteenth century just could not be justified, 
then or now, on the basis of economic or legal science.   The   choice   of   that   particular   
free   market   system   over   the   other   possibilities was inescapably political783. 
In my theory and analysis of Equity fetishism I have presented a case that does not 
consider capitalism or neoliberal capitalism to be good facilitators of justice in the public 
interest nor on behalf of the commons.  Prevailing forms of justice within capitalism befit 
a narrow cohort of stakeholders able to demonstrate the privilege necessary to gain 
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access to justice by virtue of substantial private interest and wealth, but that justice also 
defines and legitimatises forms of economic subjectivity in Western Common Law 
societies that is judged, almost exclusively, by the ability to own, to transact, and 
ultimately to perform and conduct oneself in a common sense qua neoliberal capitalist 
juridical-economic fashion.  The deontological imperatives that defined Equity in Thomas 
More's time and even, albeit in a denuded way, through the ideas of Jeremy Bentham and 
up to Judicature are long gone in substance but preserved and fetishized in name and 
ideal as, among other things, the discretion of judicial reason and the flexibility of 
unconscionability that bends a utilitarian law to points of fairness demanded and defined 
by the economic will.   
R.H. Tawney offers a useful summary of the course this thesis has followed, where, 
notwithstanding the early modern conjunction of law and religion in the life and work of 
Thomas More and thereafter, Tawney's references to departmentalization of religion 
within economics apply equally, I suggest, to the fate of Equity and the Common Law: 
When the age of the Reformation begins, economics is still a branch of 
ethics, and ethics of theology; all human activities are treated as falling 
within a single scheme, whose character is determined by the spiritual 
destiny of mankind; the appeal of theorists is to natural law, not to utility; 
the legitimacy of economic transactions is tried by reference, less to the 
movements of the market, than to moral standards derived from the 
traditional teaching of the Christian Church; the Church itself is regarded 
as a society wielding theoretical, and sometimes practical, authority in 
social affairs.  The secularization of political thought, which was to be the 
work of the next two centuries, had profound reactions on social 
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speculation, and by the Restoration the whole perspective, at least in 
England, has been revolutionized.  Religion has been converted from the 
keystone which holds together the social edifice into one department within 
it, and the idea of a rule of right is replaced by economic expediency as the 
arbiter of policy and the criterion of conduct [emphasis added]784.      
The notion of privilege is apposite here because it describes what both divides 
communities and creates the strange glue that binds them within capitalism, through 
aspiration and the bourgeois desire for private property and belief that it will lift them to 
a place of privilege.  ‘Private property has made us stupid and one-sided that an object is 
only ours when we have it – when it exists for us as capital’, argues Marx, ‘when it is 
directed possessed, eaten drunk, worn, inhabited, etc. – in short, when it is used by us.  In 
the place of all physical and mental senses there has therefore come the sheer 
estrangement of all these senses, the sense of having. The human being had to be reduced 
to this absolute poverty in order that he might yield his inner wealth to the outer 
world’785.  In contrast, Hayek claims that private property is not a privilege (and socialists, 
amongst others, are therefore wrong to refer to it as such), precisely because all are free 
to acquire it.  Therefore even if only a few might actually do so, by virtue of a privileged 
relationship with civil justice, this does not make property, nor any means of attaining it, 
a form of privilege786.  Yet the idea that all are free to acquire property is certainly 
contestable if not just simply wrong, especially given what prevailing scholarship on 
inequality maintains787.  But, then again, this is exactly the type of fantasy alluded to 
throughout this thesis: a fantasy promulgated by capitalism that promises the 
                                                        
784 Tawney, 1990, p.273 
785 Marx, 1975, p.300 
786 Hayek,2001, pp.83-84 
787 See note 6 
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stakeholder so much and delivers, at least in terms of a satiation of unconscious desires 
and often also in the material, proprietary substitutions they inhabit, so little.      
To take political economy seriously, and perhaps more the necessity of its critique, in 
terms of Equity and civil justice is a message this thesis has attempted to communicate 
by bringing to the centre of the discussion the influence of capitalism on that field of 
juridical reason and practice.  Capitalism, I have argued, promulgates fantasies, demands 
particular forms of subjectivity and conduct, and shapes the nature and institutions of 
civil justice in harmony with ‘the idolatry of wealth […] the practical religion of capitalist 
societies’788.  Equity is, therefore, political, although this is systematically and often 
obscured by shifts in socio-political dynamics that ultimately lead to the de-politicization 
of economic subjects qua ‘the Dictatorship of Capital’789.  ‘The equity that most dominates 
the late capitalist imagination’, argues Fortier, ‘is equity as wealth’790.  He continues: 
“What is your equity?” is an economic and not a moral question.  This 
notion of equity is well-grounded in legal precedent: common law 
recognizes only the rights of ownership; equity, out of fairness, recognizes 
property rights other than ownership.  Thus we can purchase equitable 
property rights in things (companies, etc.) that we don’t actually own.  
Equity has always been in large part about property rights.  But the elision 
of the principle of fairness at work, so that when we now speak of equity 
we don’t mean the principle of fairness that demands a recognition of 
                                                        
788 Tawney, 1990, p.280 
789 Han, 2017, p.6. For further left-critique on shifts in the political and the nature of de-politicization, see 
for example: Jacques Rancière. 1999. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. Translated by Julie Rose. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Slavoj Žižek. 1999. The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of 
Political Ontology. London: Verso; Jodi Dean, 2009; Bruno Bosteels. 2011. The Actuality of Communism. 
London: Verso       
790 Fortier, 2005, p.186 
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certain property rights but only of the monetary value involved, seems 
something like the elision of the creation of value that Marx sees in the 
notion of capital itself.  Such an elision of principle and right, even as it 
speaks of wealth, cheapens equity as a moral idea791.   
Neither the super-banality of civil justice nor the ‘elision of the principle of fairness’ as a 
peculiar contribution that Equity makes to the field of civil justice can ultimately mask 
the political or the brutal and uncompromising core of competitiveness and self-interest 
that is the sine qua non of modern capitalist society, one which capitalism would rather 
the stakeholder did not see or concern themselves with for it might undermine the 
legitimacy of the capitalist project792.  Instead, the fetishization of Equity structures a 
fantasy of fairness through civil justice and private property and presents it to the 
stakeholder as a coherent and complete moral project that masks reality and disavows 
the traumatic core of capitalist subjectivity. 
In the mind of the fetishist, as Freud tells us in his 1927 formulation of the concept, ‘the 
woman has got a penis, in spite of everything; but this penis is no longer the same as it 
was before’793.  For Freud (and Lacan), the first major change that occurs with regard to 
the penis in theoretical terms is its transformation into the phallus, what Jean-Joseph 
Goux describes in his own work conducted at the intersection between Marx and Freud 
as ‘the general equivalent of objects’794.  For the fetishist, all objects are open to 
                                                        
791 Fortier, 2005, p.186 
792 ‘Capitalism portends the end of the sacred or sublime location that could continue to reside outside of 
the system of exchange’, argues McGowan, and accordingly everything ‘becomes secular and quotidian 
because everything can be exchanged for the right price.  This is the universe we continue to inhabit 
today’ he concludes, ‘a universe in which value is reducible to exchange value and in which nothing 
transcends the gravitational pull of exchange – not honor, not loyalty, not even love’ (McGowan, 2016, 
p.218) 
793 Freud, 2001, p.154 
794 Goux, 1990, p.4 
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fetishization insofar as they are able to take the place of the penis (the object cause of 
desire) and as a consequence inherit ‘the interest which was formerly directed to its 
predecessor [the penis]'795.  The final twist in Freud’s aetiology being that with the fetish 
the subject’s interest ‘suffers an extraordinary increase […] because the horror of 
castration has set up a memorial to itself in the creation of this substitute’796.  All attempts 
made by the subject to deflect the trauma of castration ultimately fail, leaving the subject 
only one conceivable option: learning to enjoy the limitations of human social existence 
and therefore ‘what they do not have’797.  Equity fetishism thus points to not competent 
civil justice, but its inverse and endlessly resisted form – especially by a neurotic legal 
community – incompetent justice. 
‘Facts never speak for themselves.  Meaning is always imposed on them', says Roger 
Cotterrell, a reality that has rebounded throughout the topics discussed in this thesis.  His 
solution (and mine) is the study of law in its broader social and political context and a call 
to theory that is both able and necessary ‘to examine the coherence of the meanings we 
attach to what we observe about law and the context in which it exists'798.  No shortage 
of critical work has achieved these aims.  But Equity, I believe, has not enjoyed quite the 
same level of attention.  This thesis has described Equity and civil justice as products of 
capitalist reason and logic and fetishism as a response within civil justice to capitalism.  
And within this complex psycho-judicial reading of civil justice we find Equity prevailing, 
not because legislation mandates it as such, but because it is necessary to the 
stakeholder’s powerful desires and fantasy life within capitalism. 
                                                        
795 Freud, 2001, p.154 
796 Freud, 2001, p.154 
797 McGowan, 2013 
798 Cotterrell, 1987, p.80 
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